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Abstract 
Based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2003 and 2006 
in the border cities of Slubice, Poland and Frankfurt(Oder), Germany, this dissertation is 
an examination of the meanings and practices of the European Union's transnational 
citizenship policies. By documenting the everyday negotiations, interactions, and 
reflections of life on the Polish-German border, this study chronicles both the successes 
and failures of European Union citizenship at the local level, and focuses particularly on 
how various social groups experience European Union citizenship in disparate ways, how 
the performance of citizenship contributes to the formation of transnational public spaces 
and identities, and how the tension between the legal and cultural elements of European 
Union citizenship profoundly structures local citizenship practice. The key intervention 
of this study is the observation that even as European Union policies aimed at creating 
deterritorialized economic, social, and political spaces expand supranational citizenship 
rights and privileges, hierarchies of value embedded within these policies grant rights 
differentially to individuals and groups in ways that are often linked to ethnicity and 
nationality. This dissertation therefore argues that despite European Union 
policymakers' efforts to create a hybridized "European" identity that might transcend 
historical conflicts and divisions, the processes they are using to pursue this goal are 
simultaneously generating new forms of difference and inequality. 
n 
For my Parents 
and 
For Sofiya 
111 
Acknowledgements 
Many individuals contributed to the realization of this project, all of whom I own 
a debt of gratitude. I would first like to thank my adviser, Matti Bunzl, who provided 
invaluable insight and encouragement throughout my graduate studies, and the members 
of my dissertation and advisory committees, Zsuzsa Gille, Mahir Saul, Andrew Orta, and 
William Kelleher, who helped shape the intellectual development of this project. I would 
also like to thank my colleagues in Poland and Germany, Michal Buchowski, Jaroslaw 
Janczak, Toralf Kleinsorge, and Sebastian Mayer, who assisted my research in 
Frankfurt(Oder) and Slubice in a myriad of ways, both practical and academic. I am 
grateful to Junjie Chen, Jennifer Hardin, William Hope, Tina Hope, Jolanda Kersten, 
Jennifer Shoaff, Katherine Sredl, Sarah Phillips, and Michelle Wibbelsman, who 
contributed their ideas, critiques, and intellectual and emotional support during my time 
at the University of Illinois and while I wrote this dissertation. I am especially thankful 
to my parents, Jody and Riley Asher, and my sister, Aleesha Perry for their love, support, 
and encouragement throughout my scholarly endeavors. Finally, I would like to thank 
my wife, Sofiya Asher, for the indispensable help and assistance that made a great deal of 
this project possible, and above all, for her love and patience. 
IV 
Table of Contents 
Table of Abbreviations vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 2: Tomorrow's Europeans Today 39 
Chapter 3: Inventing a City: Cultural Citizenship in "Srubfurt" 63 
Chapter 4: Spaces of Commerce: Citizenship Regimes and Local Economics in 
Frankfurt(Oder)/Smbice 94 
Chapter 5: Schengen's Excluded: Third Country Nationals on the Polish-German 
Border 125 
Chapter 6: New Citizens of a New Empire? EU Imperialism and Euro-orientalism 152 
Bibliography 193 
Appendix A: Buying Detergent: A Transnational Illustration 216 
Curriculum Vitae 220 
v 
Table of Abbreviations 
A8 The 10 countries that acceded to the EU on May 1, 2004 with the exception of 
Cyprus and Malta. 
A10 The 10 countries that acceded to the EU on May 1, 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia). 
A12 The 12 countries that acceded to the EU on May 1, 2004 and January 1, 2007 (the 
A10 plus Bulgaria and Romania). 
CP Collegium Polonicum in Slubice, Poland 
DM German Marks 
EC European Community 
EEC European Economic Community 
EC J European Court of Justice 
EMU European Monetary Union 
EU European Union 
EU15 The 15 EU member states prior to the EU expansion on May 1, 2004 (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom). 
EU25 The 25 EU member states following the accession of the A10 on May 1,2004. 
EU27 The 27 EU member states following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 
January 1,2007. 
EUR EU Euros 
FRG Federal Republic of Germany 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GDR German Democratic Republic 
PLN Polish Zloty 
VI 
MEPS Master's of European Political Studies 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
PPS Purchasing Power Standard 
vn 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
A European Border in 2005 
An ironically located McDonald's on the comer of Karl Marx Strasse and Rosa 
Luxemburg Strasse marks the beginning of the border crossing between Frankfurt(Oder), 
Germany and Slubice, Poland. Proceeding west toward the border, a traveler passes a 
casino, a few taxis waiting near the Frankfurt(Oder) Sports Museum, and several empty 
lots that until recently held socialist-style apartment blocks. Entering the covered area of 
the border control complex, cars and bicycles continue along the roadway to inspection 
booths, while pedestrian traffic is directed along the outside edges to windows located in 
the checkpoint buildings. After waiting in a short line—almost never more than five 
minutes—all travelers must present a passport or national identification card to both the 
German and Polish border police. For European Union (EU) citizens, this is an open 
border, and the document check is usually cursory, amounting to only a glance through a 
passport or at an ID card. For people carrying non-EU, "third country" passports, the 
check is more stringent, and its rigor often depends on the traveler's country of origin. 
After clearing the checkpoint, travelers cross a steel three-lane bridge that spans 
the Oder River (Fig. 1.1). From the bridge, crossing the approximately 150 meters that 
actually separate Frankfurt(Oder) and Slubice appears deceptively easy. However, at 
least 70 people have drowned since 1993 during attempts to illegally cross the Polish-
German border. Police boats and helicopters regularly patrol the river, while various 
1
 Source: Data compiled from various media sources as of March 14, 2007 by the NGO UNITED 
(www.unitedagainstracism.org). 
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less visible surveillance technologies, such as thermal imaging cameras, monitor the 
frontier to prevent unauthorized access to the EU's border-free zone. 
At the end of the bridge, a white and red boundary marker bearing Poland's 
crowned white eagle (Fig. 1.2) greets travelers arriving on the east side of the river. 
Parallel to the river and adjacent to Slubice's protective dike, a long, often two-car-wide, 
line of taxis waits around-the-clock for people crossing from Germany. On the opposite 
side of a traffic circle, mini-buses stop to take people to the local bazaar, located a little 
less than two kilometers from the bridge and a favorite destination of German shoppers 
(See Chapter 4). Directly across from the bridge, Slubice's pedestrian zone, ulica 
Fig. 1.1: The border bridge between Frankfurt(Oder) (far side) and Slubice. The border 
checkpoint buildings are visible at the left end of the bridge. 
Jednosci Robotnicze (United Workers Street), or the "Zigaretten Strafie" (Cigarette 
Street) in local slang, offers the discount cigarette and alcohol shops that are ubiquitous 
along the border, as well as restaurants, beer gardens, hair salons, convenience stores, and 
money exchanges. 
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The less famous of Germany's two Frankfurts, Frankfurt(Oder) is referred to 
locally simply as "Frankfurt," and its full name is normally used only to differentiate it 
from the much larger Frankfurt(Main)-a 
stylistic convention I will also observe 
throughout this dissertation. Frankfurt is 
located about 80 kilometers east of Berlin, and 
together with Slubice forms a transnational 
urban area of about 90,000 residents.2 Even 
before Poland's EU accession on May 1, 2004 
made the Oder River an internal EU border, 
this location placed the cities at the center of 
the EU's efforts to expand its common market 
through the elimination of barriers to the free 
movement of people, goods, services, and capital. As a "laboratory" of European 
integration, Frankfurt/Slubice is therefore one of the locations where the EU has most 
vigorously pursued policies aimed at creating what Martinez (1994) calls "integrated 
borderlands," or border regions that have "no barriers to the flow of goods and people," 
and "enjoy a relationship of equality, trust and respect" (Donnan & Wilson 1999:51). 
By pursuing this project of deterritorialization, EU policymakers work against 
several of the most entrenched functions of state borders. Borders are extremely potent 
symbols of state power, and are places not only where the practices, techniques, and 
tactics of Foucaultian governmentality are particularly visible and personally encountered 
(Foucault 1991:102, cf. Donnan and Wilson 1999), but also where populations, the 
Fig. 1.2: The border marker in Slubice. 
The Zigaretten Strafie is visible in the 
background. 
Frankfurt(Oder)'s population in 2005 was 64,656, while Slubice's population in 2006 was 20,212. 
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"terrain par excellence of [modern] government," can be delineated, managed and 
regulated (Miller and Rose 1990:2, cf. Brubaker 1992a:27-31, Foucault 2007:105, Inda 
2005:4). In this regulatory function, state borders act as powerful mediators of identity 
by separating individuals into different categories (e.g. "national," "alien," "asylum 
seeker," "legal permanent resident," etc.) based on the relationship between the traveler 
and the government whose border is being crossed. This is particularly true in places like 
Poland and Germany, where state borders correspond closely to linguistic, cultural, and 
ethnic boundaries, and where the concept of citizenship is intimately—and often legally-
tied to an idea of common descent within an ethnic and cultural nation. 
Although state borders are powerful markers of national identity and difference, 
the economic, cultural, and even political ties produced by local cross-border contact can 
also work to subvert these divisions by producing ambiguous transnational identities that 
pull individuals away from close identification with the "imagined community" (B. 
Anderson 1983) of the nation-state where they reside (Berdahl 1999, Donnan & Wilson 
1999, Sahlins 1989, Strassaldo 1982). This tension between the "interface" and 
"identity" components of borders contributes to their inherent dynamism (Wallman 
1974:206). As places of "cultural confrontation, articulation and.. .penetration, where 
struggles over the production of cultural meanings occur in the context of asymmetrical 
relations" (Berdahl 1999:9), borders can be understood as culturally creative spaces in 
which ethnic and national identities are at once constructed, employed, challenged, and 
negotiated through everyday social practices (Berdahl 1999, Hannerz 1997, Rosaldo 
1989). 
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For this reason, border regions are potentially fertile grounds for the development 
of an EU citizenship identity that can accommodate multiple ethnicities and nationalities. 
However, border regions also present significant obstacles to the deployment of this 
identity. Because they are locations where high levels of inter-group contact continually 
threaten the coherence of group identities, border regions are often places where the 
maintenance of social boundaries becomes especially salient (Barth 1969:15-16). In fact, 
Barth (1969) suggests that boundaries between groups in poly-ethnic societies will 
remain stable despite long-term and intensive interactions between groups as long as they 
continue to be socially meaningful.3 EU policymakers have therefore devoted significant 
attention in border regions to establishing an equally meaningful transnational social 
sphere by using EU regional development funds (e.g. PHARE and INTERREG) to 
support transnational projects and institutions that promote cross-border integration and 
cooperation. 
Especially in locations like Frankfurt/Slubice, where ethnic conflict has been both 
intense and recent, the success of transnational citizenship initiatives at the EU's internal 
borders is often read—rightly or wrongly—as a bellwether for transformations occurring 
throughout the EU in the wake of the continued expansion of its powers, institutional 
bureaucracy, and territory. Frankfurt and Slubice have frequently played a similar 
symbolic role in Polish-German relations, and public officials from the two countries 
have periodically made use of the cities as an apt setting for high-level summit meetings 
and policy announcements.4 Because of their placement on a multiplicity of social and 
3
 Cole and Wolfs (1972) study on the persistence of ethnic borders between villages in northern Italy is a 
powerful example of this assertion. 
For example, the following meetings were held in Frankfurt and Slubice: in 1972, Prime Ministers Piotr 
Jaroszewicz and Willy Stoph, and First Secretaries Edward Gierek and Erich Honecker met for a summit 
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symbolic boundaries, Frankfurt and Slubice present a unique transnational locality from 
which to ethnographically interrogate the tensions created between national and EU-level 
paradigms of citizenship as Poland and Germany reconfigure their governing regimes in 
order to accommodate the requirements of the EU. 
Based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork and approximately 100 in-depth 
interviews conducted between 2003 and 2006, the following chapters explore what it 
means to be an EU citizen, and in some cases a non-citizen, through the daily practices, 
negotiations, interactions, and reflections of the residents of Frankfurt and Slubice. The 
core theme of this dissertation is the observation that even as EU policies aimed at 
creating deterritorialized economic, social, and political spaces expand supranational 
citizenship rights and privileges, hierarchies of value embedded within these policies 
grant rights differentially to individuals and groups in ways that are often linked to 
ethnicity and nationality. Thus, despite the EU's efforts to produce a hybridized 
"European" identity that might transcend the region's historical ethnic and national 
divisions, the very processes the EU is using to pursue this goal are simultaneously acting 
to create new forms of hierarchy and difference. 
A Troubled History 
The origins of inter-ethnic conflict and competition in the territories surrounding 
Frankfurt and Slubice date back to at least the Middle Ages. In 1250, Piast Poland ceded 
control of its lands bordering the Oder river {ziemia lubuska) to Brandenburg, and by the 
between Poland and East Germany; in 1990, Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced conclusion of the frontier treaty; in 1997, Polish Prime Minister Jerzy 
Buzek and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl attended the ribbon cutting of the renovated bridge at the 
Swiecko border checkpoint; in 2004 Foreign Affairs Ministers Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Joschka 
Fischer attended EU enlargement celebrations held on the border bridge; and in 2005, German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroder and Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski issued a joint declaration on education. 
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time of Frankfurt's charter in 1253, the site of the city already contained both German 
and Slavic settlements. This mixed settlement pattern was typical of the regions 
surrounding the Oder and Neisse River valleys, and persisted until after World War II. 
Although the border regions came under the jurisdiction of several states, the political 
border separating Polish and German-controlled lands remained more or less stable in its 
location east of Frankfurt and west of Poznan until the late 18 century, when the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth was partitioned by Prussia, Russia, and Habsburg Austria. 
By the end of the third partition in 1795, Prussia had expanded its borders to include both 
Poznan and Warsaw.5 
During the 19l century, nationalist movements that emphasized ethnic 
determinism and a tripartite link between a distinct territory, its people, and their culture 
developed in both Prussia and a then-stateless Poland (cf. Brubaker 1992a, 1996, Porter 
2000, Snyder 2003). Both Germany (in 1913) and Poland (in 1920) later codified this 
ethnicity-based view of the nation-state in citizenship laws that privilege jus sanguines 
and an idea of common descent. Recognizing the potential problem of Polish nationalism 
within its borders, the Prussian state increased its efforts to colonize ethnically Polish 
lands with German settlers (Brubaker 1992:128-132), particularly in the late 19th century 
after the Franco-Prussian war and the declaration of German Empire in 1871. 
Coupled with efforts by Polish nationalists to restore the historical borders of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the multiethnic composition of Western Poland and 
competing claims over its territories created a highly volatile situation between Poland 
and Germany after Poland regained independence in 1918. Between 1918-1921, Poland 
5
 Prussia later lost control of Warsaw in 1807 when Napoleon "liberated" the city. After the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815, Warsaw became part of Russian-controlled Congress Poland. 
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participated in six border conflicts, including a major war with the Soviet Union. Two of 
these conflicts were with Germany: the Posnanian War of December 27, 1918 to June 28, 
1919 and the Silesian Uprisings, which were fought sporadically during the summers of 
1919-1921 (Davies 2005:292,372). The conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 
required Germany to further cede territory to Poland in Upper Silesia as well as West 
Prussia, where the co-called "Polish Corridor" secured Poland's access to the Baltic Sea. 
Both regions continued to be sites of conflict between the Polish and German 
governments, and eventually became part of Hitler's pretext for the invasion of Poland in 
1939. 
According to Arendt (1968:141-161), the map of Eastern Europe drawn by the 
Treaty of Versailles and the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was inherently 
unstable. By leaving large numbers of ethnic minorities within states whose legitimacy 
was based principally on the representation of ethnic majorities, the Treaty created a 
situation in which minorities could appeal directly to another nation-state for protection, 
especially when they faced disenfranchisement or discrimination their country of 
residence. Because these ethnic minorities were structurally out of place within a system 
of ethnically-defined nation-states, these minorities created a perennial problem for 
national governments that could only be dealt with in one of three ways: assimilation, 
repatriation, or elimination (Arendt 1968:161, cf. Bauman 1989). 
As the interwar period progressed, there was increasingly less popular or political 
will to pursue minority assimilation in either Poland or Germany (Brubaker 1996). In the 
Polish-German border regions, two-thirds of the German minority opted for repatriation 
and emigrated to Germany, a population shift that so weakened Germany's ethnic claims 
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to the territories it lost at Versailles that the Weimar Republic paid agricultural subsidies 
to German landowners to remain in Poland (Brubaker 1996:90, 125-126). 
Simultaneously, German revisionist propaganda focused on the "heroic" struggle of the 
German minorities in the ethnic borderlands of Silesia, Poznania, and East Prussia, which 
had the effect of contributing to the ever-increasing level of tension between the two 
countries prior to the outbreak of World War II (Brubaker 1996:119). 
At the end of World War II, the comprehensive Allied negotiations at the Yalta 
and Potsdam Conferences in 1945 realigned Poland's post-war borders and attempted to 
solve the problem of the overlapping settlement between Poland and Germany once and 
for all. After the Soviet Union made clear its intention to annex the portions of Poland it 
had acquired in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Poland's eastern border was shifted to the 
Curzon line.6 Poland was compensated for this loss of territory by the movement of its 
western border to the Oder and Neisse rivers.7 In order to avoid establishing a large 
German minority in Poland, about seven million ethnic Germans were forcibly expelled 
from these "recovered" territories (deZayas 1979:xxv,58-59,89). The expellees were 
replaced by approximately 4.5 million ethnic Poles who were resettled primarily from 
central Poland and Soviet-annexed lands located in contemporary Ukraine and Belarus 
(Gruchman, et al. 1959:136,144). One of the principal motivations for the displacement 
of these populations was Allied policymakers' goal of ensuring a more lasting peace in 
the region by removing the problematic and potentially subversive ethnic minorities that 
6
 This line was proposed by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-
1920 and the post World War I peace negotiations (Davies 1982:504) and was in approximately the same 
location as the Nazi-Soviet demarcation line of 1939. 
7
 Poland was also granted most of East Prussia. 
8
 In total, around 12 million Germans were expelled from Poland. Another 3.5 million were forced to 
emigrate from Czechoslovakia (deZayas 1979:xxv). 
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had plagued Central Europe during the inter-war years9 (deZayas 1979:4-10). The desire 
for security and stability thus trumped human rights concerns, and justified the 
resettlement of at least 31 million people throughout Central Europe by both organized 
and disorganized means between 1944 and 1948 (Magocsi 2002:192-193). As a result of 
these population transfers, Poland-like much of Central Europe—became more ethno-
linguistically homogeneous than at any other point in its history (cf. Magocsi 2002:97-
30,197-201) and for the first time the post-war Polish-German border corresponded 
strictly with ethno-linguistic settlement patterns. 
Slubice was "founded" by resettled Poles in 1945, when the shift of the Polish-
German border divided the eastern riverside district of Frankfurt-then called 
Dammvorstadt—from the rest of the city. ° The historical city center, railway station, and 
most of the remaining post-war industry and infrastructure were located on the German 
side of the border, and Slubice was transformed from an integral part of a regional center 
to a small and relatively isolated town with only 3,198 residents by 1950 (Preiss, et. al. 
2003:116). Elena, a physical education instructor, outlined a common story about her 
grandparents' arrival in Slubice: 
After World War II, their house [near Warsaw] burned, so my 
grandparents came here. . .They came by train—a cattle train. When the 
train stopped, [they just got off]. My grandfather had 7 kids, and was 
looking for a big house and land. There were lots of free houses [in 
9
 This strategy was pursued throughout post-World War II Central Europe. In addition to Germans and 
Poles, populations of Czechs, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Magyars all experienced 
resettlement For a summary and cartographic representation of these population shifts see Magocsi 
(2002:189-193) 
10
 Slubice's name derives from a Slavic settlement in the Middle Ages called Sliwice (Urza_d Miejski w 
Stubicach 2003:5). Several other cities were also divided by the movement of the border, including 
Gorlitz/Zgorzelec, Guben/Gubin, and Kustrin/ Kostrzyn 
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Slubice]. A lot of people were afraid to go near the border, because they 
thought it would be temporary.. .but they stayed 30 years. No one wanted 
to invest in houses, and it was unkempt because people were afraid the 
Germans would come and take it back. 
While the post-war border was officially accepted by East Germany in 1950 by the 
Gorlitz Treaty, the permanent residence of Polish settlers in the border regions was 
relatively assured only after West Germany and Poland concluded the Warsaw Treaty in 
1970, which confirmed the Oder-Neisse line and normalized relations between the two 
countries. However, the final disposition of the Polish-German border was not resolved 
until 1990, when Poland and a newly reunified Germany reaffirmed its location in a 
border treaty. While this treaty settled any territorial claims between the Polish and 
German states, it did not address property claims made by individuals, and the status of 
compensation for the losses experienced by German expellees remains an unresolved 
issue for international courts. In December 2006, the Prussian Trust (Preussiche 
Treuhand), a group representing about 1000 German expellees,12 filed 22 claims with the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, an action that was immediately 
denounced by the Jaroslaw Kaczynski-led Polish Government, which insinuated that the 
cases might require a renegotiation of the border treaty. Although a study by a team of 
Polish and German legal experts (Barcz and Frowein 2004) suggested that the Prussian 
11
 Formally known as the "Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on 
the confirmation of the frontier between them." 
12
 This group should not be confused with the Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen), a political 
organization led by the German MP Erica Steinbach (CDU), which has about 2 million members. The 
Federation of Expellees is best known for its support of a permanent exhibition and documentation center 
in Berlin called the "Center Against Expulsions" (Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen). This initiative is 
extremely unpopular in Poland, and in 2003, the cover of the Polish weekly Wprost featured a 
photomontage portraying Steinbach in a Nazi SS Uniform sitting astride then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
under the title, "A German Trojan Horse: Germans owe Poles Billions of Dollars for World War II." 
However, neither Steinbach nor the Federation of Expellees supported the claims of the Prussian Trust. 
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Trust's suits have little chance of success, the Prussian Trust's strategy is nevertheless 
predicated on the assertion of enforceable citizenship rights at the European level, as well 
as the assumption that Poland, as an EU member state, would be unlikely to disregard the 
Court's ruling should the Trust prevail.13 
Living on the Border 
The contested nature of the Polish-German border contributed to post-World War 
II border regimes that reified national and ethnic difference as a way to consolidate and 
legitimize power over the new territorial arrangements (S. Anderson 2001, Schultz 2002, 
2003). According to Schultz (2002), the residents and administration of Slubice 
constructed a civic identity in opposition to Frankfurt. She explains, "[Slubice] wanted 
never to share the urban history of Frankfurt(Oder). Slubice as border guard of the Polish 
'Regained Territories' built up her own history, rooted in the pioneer period after the last 
world war" (2002:53). This cross-border division was reinforced by the physical 
separation of the two cities. For most of the 45 years between 1946, when the border was 
closed, and 1991, when visa-free travel was introduced between Poland and Germany, 
the border crossing between Slubice and Frankfurt was strictly controlled. With the 
exception of 1972-1980, when the border was opened to limited cross-border traffic, it 
was very difficult—and often impossible—for average residents to travel between the two 
cities. Individuals authorized to commute across the border for work were one exception 
It should be noted that the European Court of Human Rights is not an EU institution, but rather an 
institution of the Council of Europe (a 47-member non-EU international organization founded in 1949 for 
the purpose of protecting human rights and promoting the development of democracy and the rule of law in 
Europe), which is responsible for the enforcement of its decisions. 
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to this rule, and the semiconductor plant (Halbleiterwerk) in Frankfurt was a particularly 
important source of employment for women from Slubice. 
Jan, a Slubice musician, described crossing the border in the 1980s: 
[Even though the border was closed,] I could cross because the orchestra 
in Frankfurt invited me, and I was given a border pass. I also worked in 
Frankfurt. . .[Because of this,] I had occasion to watch the reaction of 
people in the GDR to Martial Law. About 3 months after Martial Law 
was declared... [at the] railway bridge, and the bridge here [between 
Slubice and Frankfurt], four bunkers were installed for heavy arms. The 
border officers were armed to the teeth, as if there was Martial Law in 
Germany and not Poland... It was a "Border of Friendship" but only on 
paper.. ."Friendship," but you couldn't move freely. There weren't 
railway connections. The border between Poland and Germany was as 
tightly guarded as North and South Korea!.. .A person who was guarding 
the border had an obligation to know all citizens. [There were] mines, 
barbed wire, even a mouse couldn't get through. But it was all about 
friendship! 
In the years immediately following the opening of the border in 1991, there was little 
improvement in the relationship between residents of Frankfurt and Slubice. After 
German unification, Frankfurt became a center of neo-Nazi activity, much of it directed 
at Poles. On the day visa requirements were dropped between the two countries, a group 
of about 200 neo-Nazi protesters gathered near the border crossing in Frankfurt to throw 
rocks and accost Polish cars (Boyes 1991). Anti-Polish violence, mainly in the form of 
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robberies and minor assaults, was not uncommon in Frankfurt throughout the early 
1990s, and in 1992, a dormitory at the European University Viadrina was firebombed in 
an attack apparently motivated by its high enrolment of Polish students (United Press 
International 1992). 
Maciej, a retired radio operator from Slubice, described one of these altercations: 
When I was in [Frankfurt], around 1994-ish... I was coming out of a store 
and stopped [my car] to let some people cross. When they saw the Polish 
license plate, some skinheads sat on the hood of the car, and two came to 
the window, talking and giving a "sign of peace" (i.e. the middle finger). 
Behind me there was a line of German cars, but no one said anything. 
When I left, I drove slowly, and one kicked the turn signal light and broke 
it out. There was a police car sitting 200 meters away. I showed them the 
car was damaged, and the skinheads came that way, but the police said 
they weren't interested. At the border I told the guards, but the answer 
was the same, the [Polish guards] said I could file a complaint, but I didn't 
want to. 
Neo-Nazi activity in Frankfurt was eventually brought under control, and by the time of 
my fieldwork had been virtually eliminated. Nevertheless, Frankfurt continues to enjoy a 
notorious reputation throughout Germany, and its infamy was reinforced in 2006, when 
the remains of nine newborn children were discovered hidden in a garden shed in a 
nearby village. The infants' mother, a resident of Frankfurt, was convicted of allowing 
the children to die by neglect, in a case that was widely considered symbolic of the depth 
of social alienation and deprivation present in the former East Germany. 
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Peter, a cultural studies student from Berlin, had a first impression that was 
typical for many Germans arriving in Frankfurt, "I didn't like it. I was afraid of the 
Hochhciuser (high rise socialist-style blocks of fiats), afraid of fascists.. . I was fed up 
with the prejudice of people here. . . All my friends [in Berlin] said, 'don't go out at 
night, be careful of Nazis.'" Others found the post-socialist aspects of Frankfurt exciting 
and exotic. Alex, a student in international business from West Germany, explained: 
I like to go out in the Eastern area [of Germany] and the shrinking 
Plattenbau (socialist-era pre-fabricated concrete buildings) ghetto. East 
Germany is becoming a huge national park, with people leaving and 
factories closed... the Plattenbau ghetto is so run down it already has 
beauty. . . For me [Frankfurt is] like living in a city in a desert, the city 
only provides shopping. I don't do much with the city; it has more 
infrastructure than people. A friend of mine says Frankfurt is just a 
panorama: the Oder River and the Plattenbau. You don't really interact 
[with people] and it's empty. 
When I asked Frankfurt's mayor, Oberbiirgermeister Martin Patzelt, if the city had an 
image problem, he replied: 
It is certainly so. Comparatively, the unemployment level—17%—is the 
same as in Dortmund [in West Germany], and the level of criminality and 
right-wing extremist groups is no higher in Frankfurt than anywhere else. 
However, Frankfurt has been put into a box by the media. The media 
picture is not the same as what the objective figures show. . . Visitors can 
only be happily disappointed in Frankfurt, or happily disappointed that 
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their stereotypes didn't fit. In comparison with other towns, the cultural 
and social activities [in Frankfurt] are fantastic, and the number of 
international events through the university, and also through the theaters, 
ensure that Frankfurt will become increasingly interesting. 
Patzelt was highly committed to the creation of a transnational urban environment in 
Frankfurt and Slubice. Nevertheless, Patzelt was also acutely aware of the many 
obstacles to cross-border cooperation, and, in a list that was frequently reiterated by my 
correspondents, identified three issues as especially frustrating: 
The disproportion in income between Poles and Germans.. . is why the 
town planning between Frankfurt and Slubice is not making much 
progress. The second problem is the difference in languages. The third is 
the mental difference. If the mental difference were smaller, then the 
other barriers would be easier to cross. On the other hand, if there weren't 
the language barrier, then the mental barrier would also be easier to cross. 
And the problem of income difference would be more quickly solved if we 
could cooperate better. They are all interconnected. 
In spite of these problems, Patzelt was optimistic about the future of the "European" 
project in the two cities. When I asked him what he hoped to see in Frankfurt and 
Slubice in ten years time, Patzelt answered that he would like to see the cities "work 
together in such a way that from the outside it would look like one town." In a broad 
sense, this is also the goal of the EU's more generalized efforts to establish fluid and 
integrated market and social spaces within its borders—goals which were key 
motivations behind the creation of the EU's transnational citizenship initiatives. 
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Citizenship is Hereby Established 
As the residents of Frankfurt and Slubice began to negotiate the local meanings 
and practices of the newly opened border, the leaders of the then-12 EU member states 
were in the process of redefining the scope of cooperation in the European Community in 
the Treaty on European Union (commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty), which was 
signed on February 7,1992, and established the blueprint of the European Union as it 
operates today. Among its many policy innovations, the Maastricht Treaty codified EU 
citizenship for the first time, stating, "Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. 
Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. 
Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship."14 With 
this declaration, the Maastricht Treaty established how its supranational body of citizens 
would be defined and continuously replenished; two issues that are central to any 
governing regime (Brubaker 1992b:277). However, rather than simultaneously creating 
supranational eligibility criteria for this new membership category, the Treaty instead 
relied on the citizenship policies of the EU member states to determine who qualifies as a 
citizen. In this way, Maastricht balanced the challenge its supranational expansion of 
EU citizenship rights posed to the national sovereignty of its member states with a 
reaffirmation of their authority. 
The overlaying of the EU's supranational citizenship onto the citizenships of its 
member states represented the culmination of a legal process that began in 1957 when the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) directed its member 
Treaty on European Union, Art. G, Para. 9. In the consolidated versions of the EU Treaties this became 
Art. 17 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. 
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states to create a common market characterized by the free movement of goods, capital, 
services, and people. The EEC Treaty viewed its proto-citizens essentially in economic 
terms, and refers only to "workers" in its provisions.16 In keeping with the EEC Treaty's 
mandate, the Council of Ministers issued secondary legislation on citizenship rights in the 
1960s and early 1970s, with the goal of implementing the free movement of workers 
between member states and enabling them to be employed in the same manner as 
member state nationals (Council Regulations 15/61, 38/64 and 1612/68, Kostakopoulou 
2001:42). To promote the use of these rights, the Council also issued regulations 
granting the rights to entry and residence to workers' family members (Council 
Regulation 1612/68, Art. 10) and the right for workers and their families to remain in a 
member state after employment (Council Regulation 1251/70, Kostakopoulou 2001:42). 
At the 1972 Paris Summit, EEC officials realigned their objectives to place more 
emphasis on political union between the member states. With this change in focus, they 
simultaneously recognized the importance of establishing a "European" identity to the 
success of the project. In 1973, the foreign ministers of the nine member states followed 
up on this conclusion by issuing a "Declaration on European Identity" at the Copenhagen 
Summit, which defined European identity in terms of a shared European civilization 
based on the principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human 
rights (Part I, Para. 1), and sought to locate the role of this identity both in relation to the 
rest of the world (Part II) and in the construction of a united Europe (Part III) (cf. 
Kostakopoulou 2001:44-45, Wiener 1998:67-68). 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg. 
See Art. 48-51 in EEC Treaty. 
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The European Council established policy initiatives to support the development of 
this conception of European identity at a second Paris Summit in 1974, including direct 
elections of the European Parliament17 and the creation of a passport union18 
(Kostakopoulou 2001:45-46, Weiner 1998:85-89). The Declaration on European Identity 
thus became the basis for a "special rights" policy that developed for European 
Community (EC)19 citizens during the 1980s, and through which the EC established the 
supranational rights that would be granted to EC citizens in addition to the national rights 
provided by their country of residence. 
In 1978, the Bayerl Report to the European Parliament defined "special rights" as 
"the rights which the citizen possesses as a legal subject vis-a-vis the State and may be 
asserted at any time" (European Parliament 1979:86, Wiener 1998:90). The report went 
on to distinguish between three types of special rights: 
(a) defensive rights that protect fundamental freedoms vis-a-vis the state 
(fundamental rights); 
(b) claims which citizens are entitled to make on the state, for example in respect 
of provision for their welfare (civil rights); and 
(c) rights which guarantee participation of citizens in the state's institutions 
(political rights) (European Parliament 1979:87). 
The Bayerl Report also argued that fundamental rights should be incorporated explicitly 
into Community law through the EC's Treaties, and that in order to support workers' 
17
 This was achieved by a Council decision in 1977 (OJ EC 278, 8/10/77, p. 1-11) 
18
 See Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 7/75, "Towards European Citizenship" 
(European Commission 1975). While a uniform passport was introduced by a European Council resolution 
in 1981 (OJ C 241, 19/09/81, p. 1), a common policy for the elimination of identity checks at internal 
Community frontiers was established separately from the institutions of the EEC as part of the 1985 
Schengen Agreement. The provisions of the Schengen Agreement, and the 1995 Schengen Convention 
were incorporated into the framework of the EU in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. 
19
 Over time, the EEC eventually became known simply as the European Community. 
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special right of free movement, political rights for Community citizens residing outside 
their country of national citizenship should be expanded to include voting rights at all 
levels of decision making as well as the right to hold public office (European Parliament 
1979:87-90). 
As EC policymakers pursued their primary goal of establishing a common market 
during the 1980s, they gradually realized that in order for transnational labor mobility to 
become a practical reality, it would require a corresponding expansion in social and 
political rights at the EC-wide level, such as guaranteed access to healthcare, portability 
of pensions, mutual recognition of diplomas, and some degree of local suffrage. 
(Dell'Olio 2005:58, Wiener 1998:132-134, 162-175, 203). In this manner, the 
construction of the common market gradually became as much about creating a 
transnational social space as an economic space (Wiener 1998:203). While no new 
citizenship legislation was adopted before the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (cf. Wiener 
1998:163-180), the European Council responded to the need of greater protection and 
portability of social rights in 1989 by issuing the "Community Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights for Workers" (European Council 1990). The Charter laid out the guidelines 
for a more comprehensive social policy within the EC including social protections and 
benefits for workers, living and working conditions, pensions, recognition of diplomas 
and occupational qualifications, the right to collective bargaining, and gender equality 
(cf. Wiener 1998:176-178). As in earlier legislation, social rights were once again 
extended only to economically active individuals and their families. 
Both the Commission and the Parliament addressed the issue during this period, but no compromise was 
ultimately reached. 
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At the same time, the European Parliament sought a more far-reaching solution to 
citizenship rights within the EC, and in 1989 adopted the "Declaration of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms" (European Parliament 1989). Although not a legally binding 
document, the declaration reads like a Community Bill of Rights, and extends these rights 
to "everyone" within the EC (cf. Kostakopoulou 2001:53). This more liberal approach to 
citizenship did not, however, become part of the definition of EU citizenship codified in 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
Along with formally defining EU citizenship (Art. 17), the Maastricht Treaty 
imparts EU citizens with a limited set of formal rights: the right to free movement and 
residence anywhere within the EU's member states (Art. 18); the right to vote and stand 
as a candidate in European Parliament and municipal elections in whichever member 
state the citizen chooses to reside, under the same conditions as nationals of that state 
(Art. 19);21 the right to diplomatic or consular protection from the authorities of any 
member state while in a third country where the state of the individual's national 
citizenship is not represented (Art. 20); and the right to petition the European Parliament 
and apply to the European Ombudsman (Art. 21). The Maastricht Treaty therefore 
represents a minimalist conception of EU citizenship which "conceives EU citizens as 
derivative or the sum of the member states' citizens" and limits itself to a few basic rights 
that ensure labor mobility while minimizing legal institutionalization and the impact on 
national citizenship laws of the member states (Eder and Giesen 2001:9). With the 
exception of officially creating a legal basis for citizenship in a supranational treaty 
organization, the citizenship provisions outlined in the Maastricht Treaty were hardly 
21
 This right may be subject to a residency period of not more than 5 years for voting, and not more than 10 
years for standing as a candidate, in municipal elections if the proportion of community nationals exceeds 
20% of the total population (Council of the European Union Directive 94/80/EC, Art. 12). 
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revolutionary. Except for the provision of local electoral rights, all of the rights granted 
to members of the new and novel category of "EU citizen" previously existed in other EC 
legislation, and no fundamental civil rights, nor social or cultural rights, were addressed 
in the Treaty (Kostakopoulou 2001:57, cf. Closa 1992, Wallace and Smith 1995, Welsh 
1993). 
However, it is important to point out that all members of the EU are signatories to 
both the European Convention on Human Rights, which addresses civil rights, and the 
European Social Charter, which addresses a wide range of social rights (although the 
number of Charter's articles implemented varies from state to state). Additionally, the 
economic and political membership criteria for EU applicant countries adopted at the 
Copenhagen European Council in 1993 (the "Copenhagen Criteria")22 required "that the 
candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities." It might therefore be 
argued that human and social rights in the EU were sufficiently supported by agreements 
external to the EU Treaties. In order to address the perceived shortcoming in the 
Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council 
of the European Union "solemnly proclaimed" the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union in 2000, which comprehensively outlined the civil, political and social 
rights of all individuals within the EU, as well as the particular rights reserved for EU 
citizens (essentially a restatement of the rights contained in the Maastricht Treaty). 
Because it is not part of EU law, the Charter currently enjoys ambiguous legal status, a 
See also Treaty on European Union, Art. 49 and Art. 6(1). 
Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6/1993, Point 1.13. 
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problem that is rectified by its inclusion in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, assuming that the 
treaty successfully completes the process of ratification in all 27 member states. 
Defining a Supranational Citizenship 
Although the creation of EU citizenship made possible a layered system of local, 
national, and transnational citizenship practices that could potentially divide, contest, and 
multiply the allegiances and loyalties of its member states' populations in a way that 
fundamentally questions the authority and sovereignty of the nation-state (Lodge 
1993:380, Cohen 1999, Turner 1993), EU citizenship was not initially conceived as 
something inherently "post-national." When the concept of a Community citizenship 
first began to regularly appear on policy-makers' agendas in the 1970s, it was 
conceptualized principally as a modern citizenship which would help enhance EC 
legitimacy by scaling up the state-building and identity-generating elements of the 
national citizenship model for use on the supranational level (Wiener 1998:8 cf. Brubaker 
1996, Bendix 1964, Tilly 1975). For this reason, nation-state-based theories of 
citizenship provide a useful starting point for examining the characteristics of 
transnational citizenship in the EU. 
By integrating a population into a "community of citizens," the principle of 
citizenship allows the EU, like a nation-state, to assert its legitimate authority to represent 
this community both within its borders and in international relations (Schnapper 1998:16-
35 cf. European Commission 1995:19-23). In this way, citizenship has played a crucial 
role in establishing and maintaining sovereignty within the modern nation-state system 
24
 Both the United Kingdom and Poland, however, secured an opt-out to the Charter of fundamental rights 
section of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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(Brubaker 1992, Schnapper 1998). The concept of citizenship typically performs two 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing functions for the nation-state; it assists in the 
formation of a community's sense of collective identity, and it helps define the 
relationship between this community and the state (Brubaker 1992a, 1996, Cohen 1999, 
Marshall 1950, 1964, Ong 1996, 1999, Turner 1993,Tilly 1996, Schnaper 1998, Soysal 
1994). As a state-building institution, citizenship consists of a set of practices that 
structure a relationship between an individual subject and some type of governing 
apparatus, in which both parties are empowered with a certain set of enforceable rights 
and obligations (Cohen 1999:248-249, Soysal 1994:120, Tilly 1996:8, Turner 1993). As 
an identity-generating device, citizenship forms a category of membership, which not 
only contributes to an individual's sense of solidarity and belonging within a common 
community, but also defines who can fully participate in this community by virtue of 
their privileged position vis-a-vis a governing body (Brubaker 1992, Cohen 1999:248-
252, Ong 1996, Schnaper 1998:63, Tilly 1996:8,). 
Citizenship need not be uniform across a governed population or territory. 
Instead, a range of citizenship practices and identities can coexist within a single 
governed territory, and individuals can be subjected to differing, multiple, and even 
conflicting, sets of rights and obligations, depending on the constituent groups to which 
they belong (cf. Tilly 1996, Ong 1999). Two interrelated elements of citizenship are 
particularly instrumental in determining the shape of these practices: a legal element, 
defined by the juridicially supported rights and privileges a citizen can demand (Brubaker 
1996:43, Cohen 1999:248), and a cultural element, defined by a sense of belonging in a 
particular community (Soysal 1996:17, cf. Flores 1997, Rosaldo 1989, Stevenson 1999). 
Page 24 
In his influential studies of citizenship, T.H. Marshall (1950, 1964), offers one 
model for addressing the differential character of citizenship rights by arguing that 
citizenship can be broken down into bundles of sequentially evolving component rights. 
In a typology that almost certainly informed the Bayerl Report's classification of the 
"special rights" needed for EC citizens (European Parliament 1979:87-90), Marshall 
argues that within the nation-state, civil rights, or the rights required to secure individual 
freedom (e.g. free speech, right to own property, right to justice and equality before the 
law) developed first, followed by political rights ensuring participation in the exercise of 
political power, and finally, social rights (e.g. education and social services), which allow 
individuals to share in the economic and social welfare, as well as the heritage, of a 
society (Marshall 1950:10). Within a system of governmentality (Foucault 1992, 
2007), the rights contained in these bundles can be allocated differentially across 
political, social and cultural fields, creating varied and unequal "citizenship regimes" (D. 
Anderson 1996, Humphrey 1999) in which some groups are empowered with more 
rights, or more access to rights, than others. 
While Marshall has been appropriately criticized for his evolutionary approach, 
(Cohen 1999, Turner 1990, 1993), his discussion of the component nature of citizenship 
remains highly relevant to an analytical framework for investigating how different groups 
(e.g. different national citizenships) within the EU are unequally empowered in the 
exercise of EU citizenship rights by the policies and practices of the EU and its member 
states (See Chapters 4 & 5). I am therefore less concerned with the evolutionary aspects 
of Marshall's theory, than with his assertion that social rights facilitate the exercise of 
25
 Marshall's civil rights and social rights are equivalent to the Bayerl Reports fundamental and civil rights 
respectively. 
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civil rights and mediate the contradiction between a liberal democracy's basic equality of 
law and the fundamental inequality of the capitalist economic system (Marshall 1950:25, 
33-35, cf. Turner 1986, 1990, Soysal 1994). This is especially important in the context 
of the EU law, which has tended to define its subjects in economic terms, and has 
attached its rights of citizenship to circulation within its economic system rather than the 
ascriptive criteria of jus sanguines or jus soli (Peebles 1997:586, 592). Furthermore, 
individuals within the EU only receive protection under EU law when "they fall into the 
sphere of commodity circulation and production," that is, when they are exercising 
mobility within the market (Peebles 1997:591, cf. 586, 593-595). For this reason, 
mobility is the core right of EU citizenship because it is the right that most serves the 
market, while the EU's other transnational political and social rights crystallize around 
and support this mobility (d'Oliveira 1995:65). This support is critical because it is these 
social and political rights that make the right to free movement meaningful by enabling 
transnationally mobile EU citizens to participate in their new communities. 
EU Citizenship in Practice 
Despite their importance to the legal identity of EU citizenship, the rights 
contained in the Maastricht Treaty appear to be utilized by only a small minority of EU 
citizens. In 2003, EU citizens exercising the right to reside in another EU member state 
accounted for only about 2% of the EU's total population, a figure that is lower than the 
total number of "third country" nationals27 living in the EU (accounting for about 3%) 
(Eurostat 2006:39). In terms of historical mobility, 4% of EU residents reported moving 
26
 This figure includes nationals from the 2004 accession countries. 
27
 Citizens of countries that are not EU member states. 
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to a different EU country after leaving their parental home (another 3% reported moving 
outside the EU), although this figure varied widely from country to country, up to a high 
of 15% in Ireland (EuroFound 2005:17). However, for people who do exercise freedom 
of residence, it appears to be a right of paramount importance, and is often related to 
major life-course decisions such as job, family and housing. Changes in employment 
motivated 34% of moves between EU countries or outside of the EU, while changes in 
partnership or marital situation motivated 18% (EuroFound 2005:19).28 
While residing abroad, few non-national EU citizens exercised their right to vote 
or stand as a candidate in European Parliament and municipal elections. At 45.6% in 
200429, turnout in EU parliament elections is typically low in comparison to national 
elections (European Commission 2000b:5). For non-national EU citizens, participation is 
even lower, with only 11.9% registered to vote EU-wide in 2004, ranging from a low of 
3.9% in Greece to a high of 39% in Ireland to (European Commission 2006:7). 
Unfortunately, there is no data indicating how many of these individuals actually turned 
out to vote, and it also appears that some number of EU citizens living abroad choose to 
continue to vote in their country of national citizenship (European Commission 2000:33). 
In the same 2004 European Parliament elections, 57 non-nationals stood as candidates, 
but only 3 were elected MEPs30 (European Commission 2006:9). 
hi the case of municipal elections, 13 (of the then 15) member states responded to 
a 2001 European Commission questionnaire on the right of non-national EU citizens to 
28
 In this case, the categories were not mutually exclusive, and respondents could indicate multiple 
motivations. 
29
 Participation in EU Parliament elections has declined steadily since the first elections in 1979 (at 63% 
turnout). In 1999 turnout was 49.7%, and in 1994 it was 56.5%. Source: European Parliament. 
30
 In 1999, 62 stood as candidates and 4 were elected, and in 1994, 53 stood as candidates and 1 was elected 
(European Commission 2000:8). 
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vote and to stand as a candidate, but the data reported is much less clear than for the 
European Parliament elections. In Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, all 
residents, including non-national EU citizens, are automatically entered on electoral rolls, 
while in the other nine member states, the average rate of registration was 26.7%, varying 
from a low of 9.5% in Greece and a high of 54.2% in Austria (European Commission 
2002b: 11). No systematic turnout data is available for either group, making it impossible 
to gauge participation levels. It is also difficult to assess the number of non-national 
EU citizens who stood as a candidate in municipal elections, as only Finland, Sweden and 
Luxembourg could provide data. From the limited data available, it can be determined 
that non-nationals stood as candidates in at least eight member states, and some of these 
candidates were elected in at least seven member states (European Commission 
2002b: 13). Nevertheless, it is probably safe to conclude from the information available 
31
 France and Denmark did not respond. 
2
 Only Finland and Germany reported actual values for non-national turnout. In Finland turnout was 
30.2% nationally in its 2000 elections. Germany reported turnout values at the state level for six elections: 
21.5% in Stuttgart (1996), 12-36% in Bavaria (1996), 23% in Hamburg (1997), 17.5% in Berlin (1999), 
16.9% in Bremen (1999) and 11% in Saarbriicken (2001). (European Commission 2002b: 11). 
33
 The following table (1.1) summarizes the information available for non-national candidates in EU 
municipal elections for 1996-2001 (European Commission 2002:13). 
Country 
Finland 
Sweden 
Luxembourg 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Germany 
Austria 
NoH-national Candidates 
65 
1829 
138 
Unknown number 
Unknown number 
Unknown number 
Unknown number 
Unknown number 
Number elected 
5 
408 
No data 
30 
2 
3 
319 elected in nine Lander, no 
information available from seven 
Lander 
20 elected in seven Lander, no 
information available from two Lander. 
Table 1.1: Non-national candidates in EU municipal elections, 1996-2001. 
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that non-nationals hold a very small percentage of the offices available in the EU's more 
than 85,000 municipalities.34 
EU citizens make use of their right to petition with similar infrequency. In 2005, 
the European Parliament received only 1032 petitions, 628 (60.9%) of which were 
admissible (European Parliament 2006:20), and the Ombudsman only 3,920 complaints, 
1184 (30.7%) of which were inside its mandate35 (European Ombudsman 2005:22). For 
the Ombudsman, this represents a 5% increase over 2004 (European Ombudsman 
2005:10), while petitions to Parliament remained more or less stable36 (European 
Parliament 2006:20). For institutions representing an estimated 458 million people,37 
these figures seem quite modest. 
Finally, no definite information is available on EU citizens utilizing diplomatic 
and consular services of other EU member states in third countries where their country of 
citizenship is not represented, although the legislative procedures required to implement 
this right were completed by the fifteen pre-2004 EU member states (EU15) by 2002 
(European Commission 2004:9). Nevertheless, knowledge of this right is not widespread 
among EU citizens, and in 2006, a Flash Eurobarometer survey reported that only 23% 
indicated they were aware of this right, and 34% believed that in such circumstances, 
At the time of the questionnaire in 2001 
35
 Of those within the mandate, 84.6% led to a formal inquiry. 
36
 Unlike petitions to the European Parliament, complaints to the European Ombudsman increased 
significantly following the 2004 EU expansion, with the Ombudsman receiving 1874 complaints in 2001, 
2211 in 2002, 2436 in 2003, and 3726 in 2004 (European Commission 2004:9, European Ombudsman 
2005:10). The European Parliament received 908 petitions in 2000, 1132 in 2001, 1601 in 2002, 1315 in 
2003, 1002 in 2004 (European Parliament 2006:20). 
37
 As of 2004. Source: Eurostat 
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they would have to contact their home country's ministry of foreign affairs 
(Eurobarometer 2006a:9). 
Judging from the above data, one might expect EU residents to exhibit a 
correspondingly weak sense of cultural citizenship within the EU. On the contrary, in a 
2006 Eurobarometer survey, 50% of EU residents said they felt attached to the EU, while 
63% said they felt attached to "Europe" (2006b:70), suggesting that many more people 
identify with EU citizenship than actually put its rights into practice. The notable 
exception to this gap between the EU's social imaginary and actual citizenship practice 
appears to be the right to travel freely within the EU, which was exercised by 169 million 
EU residents in 2005, and accounted for 69% of the EU's total tourist receipts (EUR 
161.6 billion) (Hussain and Bylinski 2007:5-6). When asked, "What does the European 
Union mean to you personally?" 50% of EU residents answered, "Freedom to travel, 
study and work anywhere in the European Union"--the highest level of any response 
(Eurobarometer 2006b:73). 
Perhaps more than the other Maastricht citizenship rights, the right to free 
movement operates as an especially powerful symbol for EU integration by promising an 
ever more unified and border-free social space. It is also a future-oriented right, which 
offers the potential of opportunities within the EU. Even if only a small number of the 
EU's total population has already resided in another EU country, the proportion of EU 
citizens intending to do so is increasing. This is especially true for young people and 
citizens of the ten 2004 accession states (A10), as was demonstrated in a 2005 
Eurobarometer survey on future mobility intentions. Compared to 3% of EU15 residents, 
38
 17% thought they would have to use consular assistance from the European Commission Delegation in 
that country, and 16% thought they would have to use the services of a travel agent (Eurobarometer 
2006:9). 
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5% of A10 residents intend to move within the EU in the next five years (3% overall of 
EU25 residents) (EuroFound 2005:22). 
Younger and better-educated individuals tend to have greater mobility intentions, 
with 9% of EU25 residents aged 18-24, 6% of those aged 25-34, 4% of those classified as 
highly educated, and 12% of those still studying, intending to move within the EU in the 
next five years. Latvia (7.4%), Poland (7.2%), Lithuania (8.5%), and Estonia (8.3%) had 
the four highest levels of mobility intentions,39 and of the individuals from these four 
countries who expected to move, 75% of were under 35, and 66% were either highly 
educated or still studying (EuroFound 2005:24). Compared to earlier findings from 2001, 
intentions to move within the EU have increased in both the EU15 and the A10, from 
1.7% to 2.7% and 1.6% to 5.1% respectively (EuroFound 2005:27). This increase in 
mobility intentions for A10 residents is likely a direct result of EU accession and the 
possibilities for inter-EU mobility provided by EU citizenship rights, a conclusion 
supported by the observation that past mobility and intended mobility for people moving 
outside the EU are equal, at 1% (EuroFound 2005:16, 22). 
Residential mobility in the EU is therefore gaining momentum, especially among 
young and well-educated populations—the transnationally-oriented elites who are more 
and more proving to be the "winners" of Europeanization (See Chapter 2). Freedom of 
residence also seems to be valued more highly by the populations of certain member 
states, and here the Polish example is both illustrative and striking. In absolute numbers, 
the 7.2% of Poland's 38.6 million residents who intend to move within the EU over the 
next five years amounts to 2.78 million people. Even if this figure is diminished by a 
39
 Interestingly, residents of other A10 countries also have some of the lowest levels of intentions to move 
within the EU, with the Czech Republic at 1.6%, Slovakia at 1.8% and Hungary at 2.5% (EU Mean: 3.1%) 
(Eurofound 2005: 23, Krieger and Fernandez 2006:12). 
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factor of 2-3 to account for only those with a firm intention to move, between 900,000 
and 1.39 million additional Polish migrants can be expected (Krieger and Fernandez 
2006:11-12). 
These figures are corroborated by post-accession trends in Polish migration, a 
phenomenon that has recently received widespread international media coverage. Using 
data collected by the European Citizen Action Service, the Polish daily Rzeczpospolita 
concluded that about 3% of Poland's total population, and 5% of its working age 
population, left to work in another EU country since 2004 (Slojewska 2006). Of these 
approximately 1.1 million people, more than 70% went to Germany or the United 
Kingdom (Slojewska 2006). Despite Germany's maintenance of post-accession 
restrictions on labor mobility for workers from the A8 (the ten 2004 accession countries 
minus Cyprus and Malta),40 it remains the primary destination country for Polish migrant 
workers (although Germany's percentage of this total has declined as migration to the 
United Kingdom has increased) (Kej>ihska 2005:26). German law allows workers to be 
recruited from neighboring countries in certain economic sectors, including agriculture, 
construction and seasonal work, and Polish workers dominate all of these categories. 
About 380,000 work permits were issued under these laws in 2004, 75% of which were 
to Polish recipients (Migration News 2007). 45% of another 22,000 project-tied workers 
sent to Germany in 2005 by firms based outside Germany were also Polish, as were 85% 
of Germany's approximately 330,000 seasonal workers, who were admitted to Germany 
in 2005 to work for up to 90 days (Migration News 2007). 
40
 The EU15 were allowed to implement an up to seven year transitional period during which measures to 
limit labor migration by restricting labor market access could be applied unilaterally on the citizens a new 
member state. Only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden fully opened their labor markets in 2004. 
Cyprus and Malta were excluded from these transitional agreements, and their citizens enjoyed immediate 
access to all labor markets within the EU. 
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After fully opening its labor market to A10 citizens in 2004, the United Kingdom 
experienced a remarkable influx of foreign workers. According to an estimate by Capital 
Economics, a market research consultancy, more than 600,000 migrants have entered the 
UK from the A8, about 100,000 more than the 510,000 who officially registered to work 
between May 1, 2004 and Sept. 30, 2006 (Ford 2007, Home Office 2006:4), and a figure 
that overwhelmed the Home Office's 2003 estimate of between 5,000 and 13,000 per 
year (Dustman, et. al. 2003:57). Of those officially registered, 63% (about 320,000) are 
Poles (Home Office 2006:8). 
These high levels of Polish migration recently played a key symbolic role within 
the EU's project of continued integration. In the months leading up to France's 2005 
referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty, the hypothetical "Polish plumber," who 
might move to France and undercut French workers,41 became a metonym for labor 
mobility and transnational integration within the EU, as well as a stand-in for French 
fears related to immigration and the economy in a domestic labor market characterized by 
nearly 10% unemployment.42 This mistrust of immigration contributed to the 
subsequent defeat of the Constitutional Treaty referendum in France on May 29 (55% 
against), followed by a second defeat in the Netherlands two days later (62% against). 
The Polish Tourism Board in France responded to this debate with a humorous 
poster campaign featuring a sexy Polish plumber holding a phallically placed group of 
pipes (Fig. 1.3) and a slogan reading, "I'm staying in Poland, come in great numbers" (Je 
reste en Pologne, venez nombreux). The campaign received worldwide media coverage, 
41
 Like Germany, France has maintained restrictions on labor market access for A8 citizens. The EU 
Constitutional Treaty did not, in fact, make any changes to this policy. 
42
 Ironically, according to a New York Times article, the French pluming union reported that while there is 
an overall shortage of 6,000 plumbers, there are only about 150 Polish plumbers in France (Sciolino 2005). 
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and the "Polish plumber" became something of a national celebrity in Poland, with the 
image appearing regularly in newspaper articles and advertisements. 
The fact that this "Polish plumber" is "staying" while inviting tourists to visit 
from abroad is also indicative of the tension between legal and cultural citizenship within 
the EU. By exercising the rights of working and living abroad where market-determined 
demand and wages are highest, 
it would seem that a mobile 
Polish plumber should be 
celebrated as an archetypical 
EU citizen rather than one of 
anxiety and apprehension. 
Instead, it is the tourist that 
more often fills this role. Even 
though both tourists and 
workers have the legal right to 
free movement within the EU, 
it is the non-threatening 
Fig. 1.3: The Polish Tourism Board's "Polish Plumber." 
movements of the tourist that most easily fit with current sense of EU cultural citizenship. 
Like the "Polish plumber," who is excluded from French society by local economic 
uncertainties, EU citizens wishing to exercise their supranational citizenship rights 
beyond traveling routinely encounter a host of social realities and structural factors that 
limit their ability to do so; a situation which contributes to the relatively limited exercise 
of most of the Maastricht Treaty-defined citizenship rights outlined above. 
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Location and Organization of this Study 
The failure of the Constitutional Treaty in two of the EU's founding members 
plunged the EU into a period of institutional crisis. In October 2005, the EU entered an 
official "period of reflection" on the future of Europe, which sought to build a new 
political consensus by engaging citizens in a wide-ranging discussion about the EU's 
future, organized around the various efforts of the European Commission's "Plan D— 
Democracy, Dialogue, and Debate" framework43. After a little over a year, the German 
European Council presidency declared the reflection period over in January 2007, and 
secured a mandate for an intergovernmental conference to draft a new treaty, which 
opened in Lisbon on July 23, 2007. Essentially a slightly modified version of the 
Constitutional Treaty, the subsequent "Reform Treaty" (later renamed the Lisbon Treaty 
after its signing on December 13, 2007) is currently undergoing ratification, a process EU 
policymakers hope to complete by 2009. 
The majority of the research for this dissertation therefore took place in this 
liminal period between the collapse of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and conclusion 
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, a time when debates about what type of governing body the 
European Union is and should become were especially salient—questions that remain 
highly relevant as the EU moves forward. This dissertation contributes to this debate by 
describing how the EU is experienced in the daily lives of the residents of Frankfurt and 
Slubice. By documenting the everyday practices of life on the Polish-German border, the 
subsequent chapters chronicle both the successes and failures of EU citizenship at the 
43
 See European Commission press release IP/05/1272: "European Commission launches PLAN D for 
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate." 
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local level, paying particular attention to how different social groups experience EU 
citizenship in different ways, how the performance of citizenship contributes to the local 
formation of a transnational, or "European," public space and identity, and how the 
tension and gaps between the legal and cultural elements of EU citizenship structure local 
citizenship practices. 
Following a narrative organization that starts with contexts where EU citizenship 
has become most meaningful and concludes with those where it has been more 
problematic or even divisive, this dissertation approaches the urban space of 
Frankfurt/Slubice as a microcosm for understanding EU-wide struggles and negotiations 
over the content and meanings of the EU's transnational citizenship policies. Chapter 2 
begins with an evaluation of how tomorrow's transnational "Europeans" are created and 
socialized in Frankfurt and Slubice by focusing on the cities' university and secondary 
school students—two groups that have been especially targeted by EU initiatives aimed at 
promoting citizenship in the Union (Shore 2000). Chapter 3 then describes how cultural 
events in Frankfurt/Slubice have been used to build social connections and establish the 
beginnings of a unified public space in the two cities, and presents an extended case study 
of how a local NGO employs citizenship practices and imagery as part of an ongoing 
project designed to break down cultural barriers between the cities. Chapter 4 examines 
how varying "citizenship regimes" (D. Anderson 1996, Humphrey 1999) are constructed 
in Frankfurt/Slubice as the interaction between governing institutions, social apparatuses, 
and everyday cross-border activities categorize individuals into groups that are subject to 
differing and unequal citizenship practices that introduce hierarchy into provisions of EU 
citizenship. Chapter 5 explores how "third country" nationals residing in 
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Frankfurt/Slubice are excluded from full participation in the local practices of EU 
citizenship due to the limitations placed on their cross-border movements by the 
implementation of the EU's common border regulations (cf. Balibar 2004, Kipnis 2004, 
Peebles 1997, Torpey 2000, Wiener 1998), and how these individuals respond to this 
exclusion by strategically managing their citizenship statuses. Finally, Chapter 6 
observes how individuals living in Frankfurt/Slubice locate themselves as subjects within 
an orientalizing discourse (Said 1979, Wolff 1994) that evaluates Eastern European 
countries and their citizens as less "European" than their Western counterparts (cf. 
Todorova 1997, 2005, Bakic-Hayden 1995), and argues that the internalization of this 
discourse creates the potential for a permanent and destabilizing "second-class" 
citizenship status within the EU. 
By expanding citizenship rights transnationally and offering membership in an 
international governing body, EU citizenship puts into question the sovereign authority of 
EU member states to govern their citizens (Lodge 1993:380, Turner 1993:2). As a 
location at the edge of two member states, Frankfurt/Slubice is therefore at the center of 
the reorganization of social membership provoked by the disorienting effects of the EU's 
efforts to deterritorialize and integrate its internal borders and spaces. In 
Frankfurt/Slubice, the opening of state borders has also destabilized the boundaries 
between the cities' two dominant ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups, leading to the 
sometimes-uncomfortable confrontation between individuals interacting in everyday 
domains of cross-border practice. By resolving these confrontations, residents of 
Frankfurt/Slubice negotiate and define not only the local meanings of "European" 
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citizenship, but also what it means to be an EU citizen living in a transnational 
Europastadt, miasto europejskie, or "European City." 
Page 38 
Chapter 2 
Tomorrow's Europeans Today 
Introduction 
On a sunny afternoon in April 2006, classes were cancelled at the European 
University Viadrina (Europa Universitat Viadrina, henceforth the Viadrina) in Frankfurt, 
and its faculty, staff, and students assembled to celebrate the 500th anniversary of their 
university's namesake, the "Alma Mater Viadrina." During its 305-year history (1506-
1811), Alma Mater Viadrina's law, theology, medicine, and philosophy faculties 
educated many of Frankfurt's most renowned residents, including Ulrich von Hutten, 
Thomas Miintzer, Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Heinrich von Kleist, and both Alexander 
and Wilhelm von Humboldt. This final student was eventually responsible for the 
university's demise, when his foundation of the University of Berlin (today Humboldt 
University) precipitated the Prussian State's closure of Alma Mater Viadrina in 1811 and 
the transfer of its library and much of its faculty to Breslau (Wroclaw). 
Full of academic and political pomp, the formal ceremony was clearly intended as 
a tradition-inventing event that "established] a continuity with a suitable historical past" 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983:1), a purpose reinforced by the event's gothic setting in a 
13th century Franciscan church, now converted into the C.P.E. Bach concert hall. The 
German Ministry of Finance validated the symbolic link between the two universities by 
issuing a stamp (Fig. 2. l)~which was officially unveiled during the ceremony-
commemorating "500 Years of Viadrina University Frankfurt(Oder)," and bearing the 
seal of the modem university. The blue and gold anniversary banners displayed 
throughout the city also displayed the modern seal, further encouraging the conflation of 
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the two institutions. The 180-year gap between the closure of the first Viadrina and the 
foundation of the second in 1991 was not emphasized, nor was the fact that the new 
university bears little resemblance to the old, save for its name and location. 
It is perhaps not surprising that a young and 
future-oriented institution like the Viadrina would 
cultivate links to a more ancient tradition in order to 
BFR1 IN 
'\ i A D K I K V \ 
cm 
provide a type of retroactive endorsement to its 
contemporary claims of legitimacy. Nationalist 
movements have frequently made use of this strategy 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), as have the EU's 
institutions, which routinely make reference to a 
Fig 2.1: Viadrina University's
 c o mmon cultural legacy inherited from ancient Greece 
500 anniversary stamp. 
and Rome, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment 
(Shore 2000:54-57).l At the same time, the Viadrina and its partner university in Slubice, 
Collegium Polonicum (CP)2, are themselves both symbols and products of EU 
integration, with a mandate to prepare their students for the demands of an increasingly 
borderless and transnational Europe through comparative EU-oriented study. 
Within the history of the nation-state, education has been a core technology for 
the legitimation of new social and political orders, the establishment of collective 
identities, and the initiation of citizens (B. Anderson 1992, Gellner 1983, Hein and 
Selden 2000, Hobsbawm 1990, Novoa and Lawn 2002, Shore 2000:56, Soysal 2002, 
Soysal and Schissler 2005). For these same reasons, the EU has also endeavored to use 
1
 The strategy was employed in the naming of many of the EU's educational initiatives, which have 
included Erasmus, Socrates, Leonardo, Comenius, and Grundtvig. 
2
 Collegium Polonicum is a division of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznah. 
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educational mobility initiatives as a way to foster a sense of EU citizenship and identity. 
However, EC member states were reluctant to grant the Community the legal competence 
required to actively intervene in a field so central to the maintenance of their "imagined 
communities." EC educational programs were therefore quite limited until the mid-
1980s, when several European Court of Justice decisions concluded that the principle of 
non-discrimination between EC nationals included transnational access to education 
(Corbett 2005:10-13,123-125). Following these decisions, EC policymakers began to 
focus their attentions on establishing international exchange programs and creating 
bureaucratic mechanisms to facilitate the mobility of students, vocational trainees, and 
teachers, and in 1988, the Council of the European Union issued a resolution requiring 
member states to make "every effort" to implement a "European dimension" in 
education. The "European dimension" described in the resolution was a somewhat 
amorphous concept which included language skills, knowledge of the historical, cultural, 
social and economic aspects of the Community, a preparedness to "take part in the 
economic and social development of the Community," the "value of European 
civilization," "a sense of European identity" and an awareness of "the advantages which 
the community represents" (Council of the European Union 1988). In keeping with the 
principle of subsidiarity, the EC continued to restrict its role in this Europeanizing 
process to facilitating information exchange, providing basic teaching materials about the 
EU, supporting teacher training and exchanges, and promoting cooperation among NGOs 
and educational institutions. 
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty formally expanded the EU's legal competencies in 
education (Art. 149-150), and committed the EU "to the development of quality 
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education" through actions that encourage mobility for students and teachers, establish 
educational exchanges, promote language acquisition, and develop cooperation between 
educational institutions. Mobility is the key term in EU-level educational policy, and 
almost all of its initiatives are centrally about creating workers and citizens that are 
prepared to respond to the demands of its transnational market. To this end, the Council 
has emphasized the experiential aspects of education, especially the participation of 
students and teachers at all educational levels in transnational exchanges and cooperative 
"European" projects. Because these programs are voluntary, they avoid transgressing on 
member states' educational sovereignty (Tulasiewicz and Brock 2000:33), while 
providing participants with a first-hand experience of transnational, "European" 
citizenship. 
The Erasmus program for university students and teachers is perhaps the most 
well known of these exchanges, and since its inception in 1987 more than 1.5 million 
students have participated (European Commission Press Service 2006). While a sizeable 
number, this participation rate is well short of the European Commission's long-held goal 
of 10% of its total student population (2% of eligible students per year over an assumed 5 
year course of study) (Corbett 2005:118-146). Achieving this goal would require more 
than doubling the 2005 participation rate of about 150,000 students a year (European 
Commission Press Service 2006).4 The European Commission's current goal is to reach 
3
 The EU's 7 billion-Euro educational framework for 2007-2013, the "Lifelong Learning Initiative," 
includes the Comenius program for primary and secondary schools, the Erasmus program for higher 
education, the Leonardo da Vinci program for vocational education and training and the Grundtvig program 
for adult education. The "Lifelong Learning Initiative" superceded the Socrates I (1995-1999) and 
Socrates II (2000-2006) initiatives which included the Comenius, Erasmus, and Grundtvig programs, as 
well as the Lingua program for language education and the Minerva program for information and 
communication technologies in education. 
4
 This amounts to a little less than 1% the eligible student population. Teacher mobility is about twice this 
level, at 1.9% of the eligible teacher population in 2005 (European Commission 2006). 
Page 42 
3 million participants by 2012 (European Commission Press Service 2006). For its part, 
the Viadrina easily exceeds the Commission's goal with about 6%, of its students 
participating in Erasmus during the 2004-2005 academic year. 
In order to support Erasmus exchanges, the Council established the European 
Credit Transfer System (ECTS) in 1989 to facilitate the international transfer of 
university credit and enhance comparability between national programs.5 This move 
toward an EU-wide standard in higher education was expanded in 1999, when the 
Ministers of Education from 29 European countries (including both EU and non-EU 
members) met at the University of Bologna and agreed to take steps toward the 
implementation of a "European higher education area" by 2010. The subsequent 
"Bologna process" aims to establish a universal three-cycle university degree system 
(bachelor/master/doctorate), as well as processes to assure mutual recognition of 
qualifications (through the "Europass" documentation system) and educational quality 
assurance (managed by the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher 
Education (ENQA)). Assuming this process is completed, it represents nothing short of a 
revolutionary reorganization of long-established national education systems in favor of an 
international and EU-driven model. 
As a technology of government, the EU's educational programs are part of a 
broad strategy of building a sense of "European" identity and citizenship. By creating 
common degrees and actively supporting student mobility, EU policymakers help 
5
 ECTS is based on the principle that 60 credits equal an academic year of full time study, or about 1500-
1800 working hours (1 credit equals 25-30 hours). ECTS also introduces a standard grading system, which 
is normally given alongside the local grade and follows an A-F scale (A represents the top 10%, B the next 
25%, C the next 30%, D the next 25%, E the next 10% and F for failing students. F grades are divided into 
FX: "fail- some more work required to pass," and F: "fail - considerable further work required."). 
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establish an educational context that provides tomorrow's "European" elites with a basic 
set of common experiences, skills, and values from which they can derive the cultural 
capital necessary to become fully active EU citizens. According to 2006 Eurobarometer 
survey results, students and young people already exhibit a more positive general attitude 
toward the EU than older cohorts (See Table 2.1). If there is an emergent sense of EU 
cultural citizenship, it would therefore seem that students are among those who exhibit it 
most fully. 
People answering: 
Age 15-24 
Age 25-39 
Age 40-54 
Age 55+ 
People still 
studying 
I'hcir country's 
membership in the 
LI J is "a good 
thin si." 
-
67% 
60% 
57% 
51% 
73% 
Their countrv has 
on balance 
benefited from 
being a member of 
"the hi!. 
69% 
63% 
59% 
51% 
74% 
l'hej are 
•'optimistic" about 
the future of the 
Kuropean l/nion. 
77% 
72% 
68% 
63% 
81%> 
"I hey are "Tor" 
further 
enlargement of the 
" i:u. 
60% 
55% 
49% 
39% 
63% 
Table 2.1: Attitudes toward the EU according to age group in 2006 (Eurobarometer 2007b:97,99,171,190). 
Because EU educational policy operates principally at the international 
administrative level, its efficacy is dependant on the cooperation of individual 
universities like the Viadrina, which must actively engage in the "European" project and 
structure their curricula and study programs accordingly. This chapter therefore 
examines how students in Frankfurt and Slubice are being trained in EU citizenship 
practices as they prepare for careers in presumptively transnational corporations and 
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institutions. Having grown up in the normative context of open borders and easy travel 
within the EU, today's students can be considered part of the first truly EU-generation.6 
In Frankfurt and Slubice, an average university student has few or no memories of the 
socialist period and its collapse, or even a time before visa-free travel between Poland 
and Germany. Unlike their parents and grandparents, many of whom experienced 
forcible expulsion from their homes after the post-World War II revision of Poland's 
borders, today's students often consider international displacement to be a potential 
source of social and cultural capital in a manner similar to language or technical skills. 
Michal, a recent graduate of Slubice's liceum7 told a familiar story about his 
family's arrival at the Polish-German border. At age three, Michal's father and his 
family were deported to Siberia after World War II when their home in Western Poland 
(today Belarus) wound up inside the Soviet Union. After seven years, they were allowed 
to return to Poland. According to Michal, they "tried to get as far away from the Soviet 
Union as possible" and chose Slubice because it happened to be the place where the 
transport was crossing the Polish-German border. Michal's family was hardly unique in 
this regard, and I was told many similar stories of people simply getting off the train in 
post-war Slubice and looking for an empty house in which to live. As for himself, 
Michal was preparing to study multimedia technology at the polytechnic university in 
Szczeczin. When I asked him if he might return to Slubice after his studies he said "Not 
on my life." 
Slubice and Frankfurt are thus located at the historical confluence of two opposed 
governing dynamics, both of which require the displacement of persons and populations. 
6
 The journalist T.R. Reid has labeled this group "Generation E" (2004). 
7
 Poland's college-preparatory secondary schools. 
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The first is a territorializing dynamic, which endeavored to secure the legitimacy and 
long-term stability of post-World War II territorial arrangements by creating more 
ethnically homogeneous national populations through compulsory emigration. Ironically, 
the success of this stability project helped give rise to a second, deterritorializing 
dynamic, which is driven by the creation and expansion the EU's common market and its 
requirement of open borders and a transnationally mobile labor force. Given this context, 
Frankfurt/Slubice's border location makes their universities a fitting microcosm for 
exploring the potentiality of EU citizenship in spaces and institutions where the everyday 
interaction of multiple histories, nationalities, ethnicities, and languages creates 
possibilities not only for division and conflict, but also for cooperation and integration. 
Building a "European" University 
Despite its focus on pursuing the "European dimension" in education, Viadrina 
University's contemporary history begins amidst the national and regional political 
confrontations following German unification in 1990. The Viadrina was founded in 1991 
during a period of systematic devaluation of East German education, which included not 
only an overall reduction in the faculty of East German universities, but also the mass 
migration of West German academics to take over key positions in the Universities of the 
new [East German] Lander" (Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996, cf. Rodden 2002:175-
217). After 1990, "more than two-thirds of the 140,000 [higher education] employees 
from the [GDR] era were fired or furloughed"8 (Rodden 2002:215), while hiring 
processes that advantaged West German scholars resulted in "virtually an entire change 
of personnel" in faculties of social sciences, law, education, and economics—fields 
8
 For example, at Humbolt University in Berlin, only 37% of its 1230 faculty positions in 1993 were held 
by people who worked there before 1989 (Rodden 2002:213). 
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viewed as most susceptible to the ideological demands of the East German state (Weiler, 
Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996:99-100). 
While responsibility for higher education in the German federal system lies with 
the governments of the individual Lander, the national government wields considerable 
fiscal power over educational policy decisions by providing up to 50% of investment 
funds for educational institutions. The allocation of these funds is subject to the 
evaluation of the Wissenschaftsrat, a "scientific council" consisting of both academics 
and representatives of the federal and Lander governments that provides advice and 
recommendations on issues in higher education and research (Weiler, Mintrop & 
Fuhrman 1996:93). After unification, the Wissenschaftsrat evaluated the entire East 
German educational system, and by 1992 had typically recommended that each East 
German Land limit itself to one university (cf. Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996:92-98). 
Working under the assumption that Wissenschaftsrat would eventually come to 
this conclusion, Brandenburg9 sought to subvert the Wissenschaftsrat by quickly 
establishing three new universities in 1991 —• Brandenburg Technical University 
(Brandenburgische Technische Universitat) in Cotbus, Potsdam University, and Viadrina 
University in Frankfurt—before the Wissenschaftsrat had time to evaluate the state 
(Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996:97). The Wissenschaftsrat was then faced with three 
already-operating universities that would be politically difficult to close (Weiler, Mintrop 
& Fuhrman 1996:97, Weiler 1994:432). Each university was given a particular 
disciplinary mandate: Potsdam for education and teacher-training, Cotbus for 
environmental science, and Frankfurt for business administration and economics, cultural 
studies (Kulturwissenschaft), and law. This choice of faculties for the Viadrina 
9
 The German state (Land) containing Frankfurt(Oder). 
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represents four areas of academic production that are all central competencies of EU 
policymaking. The Viadrina was also given the specific task of enhancing Polish-
German relations by linking the countries' academic communities. In a demonstration of 
this commitment, the Viadrina's Chancellor, Gesine Schwan, has also served as the 
Coordinator for German-Polish Social and Cross-border Cooperation in the German 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2005.10 
Brandenburg also intended its universities to be a pragmatic way of shoring up 
development and partially stemming the tide of emigration from the economically weak 
eastern (Frankfurt) and southeasten (Cotbus) parts of the state (Weiler, Mintrop & 
Fuhrman 1996:97). After the post-unification collapse of the Frankfurt's once- renown 
semiconductor industry, it was hoped that Viadrina might become a "new point of 
identification for the city" (Weiler 1994:431). Judging by opinions of my 
correspondents, the Viadrina has played this role quite well, with many people openly 
acknowledging the importance of both cities' universities in keeping Frankurt(Oder) and 
Slubice from disappearing into peripheral obscurity. 
Beginning with 456 students in 1992, Viadrina's enrollment had grown to 5199 
by the 2007-2008 academic year. While still a small university by German standards, the 
Viadrina is unique in its commitment to building an international student body, backed by 
Brandenburg's formal policy of reserving one-third of the university's places for Polish 
students (Weiler 1994:433). In the 2007-2008 academic year, Polish students comprised 
about 20% (1053) of Viadrina's enrolment, while students from another 73 countries 
represented about another 10% (490), a remarkably high number given that German 
10
 In 2004, Schwan was also the SPD/Green Party candidate for the German presidency, but was defeated 
by Horst Kohler (589 to 604 votes). 
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universities typically allocate no more than 5% of places in most major subjects to 
foreign students (Weiler 1994:436). 
By providing its students with diverse cultural experiences and an 
interdisciplinary and comparative approach to scholarship, the Viadrina explicitly 
endeavors to educate tomorrow's transnational "Europeans." As part of this international 
mission, the Viadrina participated in the organization of the Collegium Polonicum (CP) 
in Slubice, which opened in 1998 under the auspices of Adam Mickiewicz University in 
Poznah. Although CP's students and faculty are organizationally part of Adam 
Mickiewicz, CP was envisioned as a cooperative cross-border research and teaching 
institution. Located only 50 meters from the bridge linking the two cities, the 
construction of CP's modernist main building and library transformed Slubice's city 
center and are lasting symbols of Polish-German reconciliation and European 
cooperation. The cooperative nature of CP also allowed the universities to tap sources of 
EU funding for cross-border cooperation. Of the approximately DM 70 million in total 
investment funds spent on Collegium Polonicum by 1998, DM 24 million was provided 
by the EU regional development funds (through the PHARE and INTERREG programs), 
DM 30 million by the Polish government, and DM 12 million by the Foundation for 
Polish-German Cooperation (TAZ 1998:17). 
By the 2006-2007 academic year, CP enrolled approximately 1800 students,H 
who, together with students from Viadrina, form a cross-border community that was 
designed to express and enact the EU values of cooperation and integration. However, 
managing the cross-border programming of the universities has also presented unique 
11
 CP offers courses in 15 disciplines including undergraduate studies in Political Science, Polish Philology, 
Environmental Protection, Information Sciences and Polish Studies for Foreign Students. 
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difficulties, not the least of which was the logistical problem of delays at the border 
potentially interfering with students' course schedules and attendance.12 To help alleviate 
this problem, an agreement was reached with the local border authorities which allowed 
university students, staff and faculty to bypass lines at the border by showing their 
university ID cards. While more efficient border controls had made this privilege mostly 
redundant by the time I began my fieldwork in 2003—and Poland's Schengen accession 
on December 21, 2008 eliminated the need altogether—a sign posted at the border 
crossing continued to explain the policy and thanked other travelers for their patience and 
cooperation. Nevertheless, in the courses I taught at CP, my students still occasionally 
attributed their tardiness to delays at the border, and it remained apparent that for a cross-
border university to function in a way that it is practical for students to attend classes in 
two countries on the same day, the border controls between these countries must be 
sufficiently deregulated to consistently allow easy travel in either direction. 
The universities also continue to observe their respective national—and non-
equivalent—academic and holiday calendars. A colleague at CP explained, "[when you 
plan a course,] you have to decide first if your class is German or Polish [as far as the 
calendar is concerned]. You can choose either way, but in practice most students and 
professors are both." Differences in faculties and curricula further limit integration 
between the universities, and for the most part—and particularly at the undergraduate 
level—students are enrolled in, attend classes at, and receive degrees from only one of 
the two universities. Dual degrees from both universities are offered only at the 
graduate level in the Master's of Polish and German Law and Master's of European 
12
 For students from non-EU countries, obtaining visas for both countries was often a problem as well. See 
Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
13
 CP's degrees are granted by Adam Mickiewicz University. 
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Political Studies programs. The latter degree is a flagship cooperative program of the 
universities, and is illustrative of the universities' approach to the training of "European" 
citizens. 
Mastering Citizenship Practice 
The Master's of European Political Studies (MEPS) program at Viadrina and CP 
is the universities' local contribution to Europe's growing number of EU-oriented study 
programs that endeavor to train students the EU's economic, legal, political, and cultural 
fields.14 The MEPS program aims to attract about 30 students per year in equal numbers 
from Poland and Germany. Due to the program's high language requirements—students 
must be proficient in both German and English prior to admission, and if they do not 
already speak Polish, must enroll in courses during the program—finding qualified 
applicants is often difficult, and for the 2006-2007 academic year the program admitted 
only 9 of 11 applicants.15 These high admission requirements also help ensure that 
MEPS students will have backgrounds that contribute to their successful post-graduation 
entry into a transnational and deterritorialized "European" elite which has the 
international experience required to join businesses and institutions anywhere in the EU, 
including the institutions of the EU itself. 
Iwona was a protypical example of this type of MEPS student. Until age five, she 
lived in Wroclaw, where her Grandmother had settled after being forced to leave Lwow 
14
 Perhaps the best known and most prestigious of these programs is the Master's of European Studies at 
the College d'Europe in Brudges, Belgium and Natolin, Poland. According to the College d'Europe's 
website (accessed February 7, 2008), 26% of its alumni work at EU institutions. 
15
 Viadrina also offers two other single-degree Master's of European Studies programs, a "regular" 
program in which only German is required, and a "multilingual" program that requires German and at least 
two languages out of English, French, and Polish. 
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(L'viv) following World War II. After her parents divorced in 1985, Iwona moved to 
West Berlin with her mother, who was ethnically German and could exercise the right of 
return. Iwona spoke both Polish and German at home, and, unusually, retained 
citizenship in both countries. This Polish-German background made Viadrina's border 
location especially appealing, and Iwona chose to live in Slubice rather than Frankfurt not 
only because it was cheaper—she said that she might not have been able to afford the 
living expenses in another university town—but also because she wanted to take 
advantage of the chance to correct problems in her Polish by speaking it more regularly. 
Iwona described her biography as an asset to her studies, saying, "I can do a double 
diploma, and I have the [Polish] language. It is easier to communicate. There are big 
differences [between Polish and German] students; they are not always interested in each 
other. It is easer for me to integrate on both sides." Like many of the students I 
interviewed, a strong identification with a nation-state has become destabilized for 
Iwona. When I asked her if she felt more German, Polish or European, she explained, "I 
try to think in a very European way. If someone asks me [this question] I have no answer. 
I have both nationalities.. .1 try to take the good things from both nationalities. I try to 
think European. It is the best solution for me." 
Holding a MEPS or a similarly EU-focused degree helps validate an individual's 
membership in a developing "European" social category. Bourdieu observes the 
important role academic degrees play in making and maintaining distinctions between 
social groups (Bourdieu 1984, 1996) and in instilling group members with a sense of 
common culture (Bourdieu 1996:81). By guaranteeing "a competence extending far 
beyond what they are supposed to guarantee" (Bourdieu 1984:25), academic 
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qualifications and titles certify an individual's possession of cultural capital (Bourdieu 
1984:23). Therefore, "it is written into the tacit definition of the academic qualification 
formally guaranteeing a specific competence (like an engineering diploma) that it really 
guarantees possession of a 'general culture' whose breadth is proportionate to the prestige 
of the qualification" (Bourdieu 1984:25, emphasis original). 
For graduates of EU-oriented degree programs, this "general culture" is the 
ability to—like Iwona—"think European." Along with possessing this naturalized sense 
of what it means to be European, EU degree holders also acquire the experience of living 
and working in a multinational and polyglot environment, as well as membership within 
the kind of deterritorialized networks of EU elites that are becoming an increasingly 
important, but not necessarily democratic, source of power within EU governmentalitity 
(Novoa and Lawn 2002:8). For students in Frankfurt/Slubice, it is this cultural capital 
that is the true "European dimension" in their educational experience, and in practical 
terms translates into proficiency in two critical areas for the full exercise of EU 
citizenship: a preparedness for transnational displacement and mobility, and language 
ability. 
Mobility as Opportunity 
Almost all the students I spoke with in Frankfurt and Slubice were preparing for a 
future elsewhere. In 2004, youth unemployment (ages 15-24) in Lubuskie16 was 48%, 
making it the fifth highest region anywhere in the EU (behind only three French foreign 
departments and one region of Greece). Youth unemployment for the same period in 
Brandenburg was also quite high, at 23% (Eurostat 2005a). With few prospects in the 
16
 The Polish district (wojewodztwo) containing Slubice. 
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region, most students have little choice except to leave the cities soon after the end of 
their studies, and only one of the students I interviewed planned to stay in either city.17 
Slubice and Frankfurt's students thus embody the EU's normative ideal of a 
mobile citizenry, even if this displacement is driven as much by economic realities as 
identification with the EU's values of open markets and multiculturalism. When I asked 
her about the effects of the EU expansion in her home country, Diana, a Viadrina 
master's student in economics from Latvia, described this economic exodus: 
It is a very big problem in Latvia that young people go to Ireland, 
Germany, etc. to earn money and think they don't have to stay in Latvia. 
There is a lot of unemployment [in Latvia] and [on top of that] now we 
don't have our people. They are in London, or Ireland and we have only 
old people. [The young people] think, 'why do I have to stay here, if I can 
go to Germany, etc.?' Many young people graduate and go to the USA, 
thinking they can earn money [there]. 
Even though she was part of this problematic population, Diana did not plan to return to 
Latvia immediately after her studies. When I inquired if she identified herself as more 
Latvian or European, she said, "I think more European. I like it here—Germany, 
Hamburg, Berlin. Maybe I'll stay here. But I also like Latvia. Maybe in 6 or 7 years I 
can go to Latvia and work there." 
The lack of opportunity closer to home helps fuel the post-accession wave of 
young people moving from throughout the eight 2004 East European accession countries 
(A8) (See Chapter 1) to more prosperous places in the EU. In September 2006, the 
17
 This student only planned to stay because he hoped to eventually take over his family's house, one of the 
few in Slubice that had remained in the same family since before World War II. 
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United Kingdom reported that 83% of the 743,000 post-accession immigrants who 
arrived from the A8 and applied for worker registration were under 35 (44% were 
between 18 and 24) (Home Office 2007:10). In this regard, attending Viadrina also 
provides Polish students with potential access to Germany's still-restricted labor 
market,18 since graduates of German universities were allowed to stay for up to one year 
to search for employment (this period was increased to three years after November 1, 
2007). Foreign students at German universities are also permitted to work up to 90 days 
per year, making Viadrina's border particularly attractive to Polish students who can live 
(cheaply) in Poland, but work—albeit limitedly—in Germany. Given that Polish wages 
tend to be about 25% of wages in Germany (See Chapter 6), ninety days of work in 
Germany could potentially equal a year's pay in Poland. 
Especially for its Polish students, the Viadrina offers relatively easy access to 
international experience, a source of cultural capital that is increasingly convertible 
directly to economic advantage within the EU. According to a 2006 study on the value of 
ERASMUS student mobility, 53% of former ERASMUS participants believed that their 
experience abroad was an important aspect in obtaining their initial post-graduation 
employment (Bracht, et. al. 2006:61). Employers evaluated work experience abroad less 
enthusiastically, with only 34% indicating that it was an important recruiting criterion 
(Bracht, et. al. 2006:90). However, foreign experience seems to be valued much more 
highly in Central and Eastern Europe,19 where 48% of employers indicated it was an 
important recruiting criterion, compared to only 25% in Western Europe (Bracht, et. al. 
18
 In accordance with the provisions of the Accession Treaty negotiations, Germany exercised its right to 
maintain up to seven years of post-accession restrictions on labor mobility for workers from the A8. 
19
 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland. Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. 
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2006:90). Furthermore, when employers were asked to indicate the competence of 
graduates, graduates with international experience received ratings of high proficiency 
more often than graduates without international experience in all 19 categories surveyed, 
ranging from adaptability (81% vs. 57%) and initiative (79% vs. 62%) to written 
communication (70% vs. 58%), analytical competence (70% vs 59%), and problem-
solving ability (70% vs. 58%) (Bracht, et. al. 2006:96-98). 42% of employers also 
indicated that internationally experienced graduates are more frequently given increased 
levels of responsibility than non-experienced graduates (Bracht, et. al. 2006:102), while 
21% indicated that internationally experienced graduates receive higher pay after five 
years of employment (Bracht, et. al. 2006:103). While the amorphous nature of cultural 
capital makes it difficult to quantify its economic value, the perceived proficiency gap 
between mobile and non-mobile graduates seems to indicate a competitive advantage 
derived from students' experience of transnational displacement. 
Linguistic Advantages, Linguistic Barriers 
Of the many benefits of international study, language ability appears to most 
clearly contribute to a student's fund of cultural capital. 70% of employers (87% in 
Central and Eastern Europe) indicated that foreign language proficiency was an important 
recruitment criterion, and graduates with international experience were rated as 
demonstrating a high degree of foreign language proficiency by 88% of employers 
compared to only 48% for graduates without international experience (Bracht, et. al. 
2006:90,98). For Polish graduates of the Viadrina, one of the most valuable aspects of 
their diploma is therefore its validation of their practical mastery of German, certified 
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formally by their university entrance exams, and informally by several years of 
successful study in a second language. Likewise, an MEPS degree indicates the ability to 
work in both English and German, two of the EU's most important and widely used 
languages. Given that exercising the right to work anywhere in the EU often depends on 
language abilities, this "guarantee of competence" (Bourdieu 1984) makes it more likely 
that these students will experience a full sense of cultural citizenship within the EU. 
Nevertheless, language use remained a distinct area of non-integration at CP and 
the Viadrina, despite the everyday multilingualism of their students. Language was often 
cited by my correspondents as the biggest barrier to cooperation between the residents of 
Frankfurt and Slubice, and continued to be extremely contentious issue for many of the 
universities' students. Language use in the cities and at the universities was almost 
always asymmetrically skewed in favor of German, with Poles generally expected to 
learn German, while very few Germans learned more than a few words of Polish. This 
situation was usually justified by the higher levels of wealth and stronger economic 
positions of Germany and Frankfurt relative to Poland and Slubice. My correspondents 
on both sides of the border regularly told me that learning German presents Poles with a 
potential economic opportunity, while few Germans, even in the border regions, have an 
incentive to learn Polish, and instead choose to concentrate on learning English or 
French. 
At the EU-wide level, the use of English far outpaces both Polish and German. 
English is the most widely spoken and studied foreign language in the EU, a well as in 
Poland and Germany (Table 2.2), where the study of English at the secondary school 
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level is nearly universal (Table 2.3). Increasingly, English is also the EU's language of 
state, and the common language in which EU policymakers from different member states 
communicate. According to Phillipson, a hierarchy of languages can be identified within 
the EU's institutions, with English at the top, followed by French, more distantly by 
German, and finally by everything else (2003:132). This hierarchy is supported by the 
widespread use of English and French as languages for the drafting of EU documents and 
as everyday "procedural languages" in the EU's institutions, particularly as the number 
of official EU languages continues to expand, reaching 23 by 200822 (Phillipson 2003). 
The position of English as the EU's preeminent international language increases the 
potential cultural and political capital of English speakers—especially as a first, but even 
as a second (or third) language—and enhances their ability to exercise their rights as EU 
citizens and to fully participate in the EU's institutions. 
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EU25 
Germany 
Poland 
38 
56 
29 
14 
9 
19 
1 
1 
-
14 
15 
3 
6 
7 
26 
Table 2.2: Percentages of people reporting that they spoke a language 
other than their mother tongue in the EU25, Germany, and Poland in 2006, 
by language indicated (Eurobarometer 2006). 
While all four of Frankfurt's Gymnasien (college preparatory secondary schools) teach English, only 
one—Karl Liebknecht Gymnasium —teaches Polish. At Karl Liebknecht, about 37% (273) of its 729 
students study Polish, although about 90 of these students are Polish nationals from Slubice participating in 
an international student exchange. All of Karl Liebknecht's students study English (Karl-Liebknecht-
Gymnasium 2006). In Slubice, all 337 Liceum students study both English and German. 
21
 The figures provided by the EU's translation service regarding the original language of documents 
submitted for translation suggest that English is even rapidly displacing French. In 1997, the top three 
source languages were English, at 45.4%, French at 40.4% and German at 5.4%. In 2006, the languages 
were the same, but the proportions had shifted dramatically, with English accounting for 72% of the 1.541 
million pages translated, followed by French at 14%, and German at 2.8% (European Commission 
2007b:6). 
22
 Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, 
Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and 
Swedish. 
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Germany 
Poland 
1-nelish 
93.8 
96.3 
(iennan 
-
72.5 
I-'rcnch 
30.0 
12.1 
Spanish 
13.8 
0.9 
Russian 
3.0 
13.2 
Table 2.3: Percentages of secondary students studying foreign languages in 
Germany and Poland in 2005 (EU25 data was not available). Source: 
Eurostat. 
The dominance of English as the principle second language of the EU is reflected in the 
languages used at CP and the Viadrina. Although Polish and German language courses 
are offered at both universities CP and Viadrina, the universities' curricula are 
predominated by their respective national languages, followed by English at Viadrina, 
and combination of German and English at CP. Given this language profile, English is 
often used as the common language of communication since it is most reliably the 
language spoken most fluently by the most people and English is frequently the lingua 
franca of conferences, seminars and other cross-border meetings at the universities and in 
the cities, particularity when participants can not be reliably assumed to speak German. 
Krzysztof, a Polish graduate student in linguistics, believed that language use 
deeply influenced inter-personal relations and attitudes in Frankfurt/Slubice, and given 
Poland and Germany's history of conflict, working in a third language—usually English-
is often helpful in easing the deep-seated tensions between the two sides. With both sides 
using a second language, the linguistic advantage that Germans often enjoy, and many 
Poles experience as neocolonial, is diminished. In keeping with this argument, Krzysztof 
routinely chose to speak English instead of German in public settings, even though he 
spoke both languages quite well. 
Language difference at the university also contributed to the polarization of social 
groups, and in social situations students regularly separated by native language, even to 
the point that several of my correspondents reported attending parties where the Germans 
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had gathered in one room and the Poles in another. This division also seemed to extend 
to students' residency choices. Even though Slubice's dormitory compound offered 
rooms at rents about 50% (or less) lower than similar accommodations on the German 
side, and was open to all students at both universities, its residents were almost 
exclusively Polish, and most German students preferred living in Frankfurt (or even 
Berlin). This residency barrier was even a problem for a new international student house 
in Frankfurt. Working under the motto of "Europe begins here" {Hierfangt Europa an! 
Tutaj zaczyna si% Europa), the student house's membership was in the process of 
remodeling a small block of socialist-style flats they had managed to save from 
demolition24 with the support of the Viadrina's administration and the mayor's office of 
Frankfurt. The flats cost only about 100 EUR a month—less than average in Frankfurt, 
and not much more than in Slubice—as long as residents agreed to participate in the 
project. The student house had the goal of filling at least 50% of its 33 rooms with non-
German students, but at the time I visited it had succeeded in attracting only three Polish 
students (although another four residents were international students). 
Social pressures among students appear to reinforce this self-segregation by 
language and nationality. Karl, one of the few Germans students I met who lived in the 
Slubice dormitories, explained the double bind he experienced after moving to Poland, 
"[In Poland] I talk like normal. Some people say, 'you are in a foreign country, you 
shouldn't speak German,' but I don't think it is foreign. I live here. Poles say I am 
kurwa (a whore)25 for it. Germans say I am kurwa for living here." By not bothering to 
23
 This practice seems to be common even at the European Commission (Shore 2000:164,188). 
24
 See Chapter 4. 
25
 Literally meaning "a whore," kurwa is a strong expletive in Polish and is used in a way similar to "fuck" 
or "fucker" in English. 
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learn and use Polish, Karl embodied Gemany's economically superior position vis-a-vis 
Poland, and in the local context of Slubice/Frankfurt, not learning the neighboring 
language is an economically-supported privilege available only to the German side. 
Furthermore, by moving to Poland, Karl also reversed the "normal" hierarchal flow of 
individuals from the "poor" East to the "rich" West. In this way, Karl's experiment with 
displacement was out of step with local norms—kurwa— on both sides, even as he was 
ostensibly enacting the EU principle of free movement between member states. 
Conclusions 
Language proficiency is one of the primary gatekeepers for individuals to fluidly 
function in the EU's transnational spaces, including the cross-border space of 
Frankfurt/Slubice. Multilingualism is at the core of the contemporary conception of EU 
cultural citizenship, not only because it enables the free movement of workers within its 
common market, but also because it helps provide individuals with a common ground 
from which to assert a transnational "European" identity that supersedes the ethnic and 
nationalist differences—differences in which language has historically played a central 
role. 
By "creating new possibilities of identification within and about Europe" 
(Borneman and Fowler 1997:489) which can encompass multiple ethnicities, 
nationalities, and languages, EU educational initiatives and EU-oriented degrees help 
establish and promote emerging forms of "European" cultural citizenship. In this way, 
education is a key site where the processes of Europeanization can be observed, as 
individuals, institutions, and governing bodies work to shape a definition for a common 
"European" community that "fundamentally [reorganizes] territoriality and peoplehood, 
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two principles of group identification that have shaped modern European order" 
(Borneman and Fowler 1997:487). 
As is demonstrated by the difficulties the Viadrina and CP have encountered in 
creating a locally integrated cross-border university, establishing this sense of European 
community is fraught with conflicts, accommodations, and compromises in even the most 
enthusiastic of environments. However, this context makes the Viadrina and CP a dress 
rehearsal for students preparing to live and work in the transnationally mobile 
environment expected of tomorrow's "European" elite. United by the normative values 
of multiculturalism and transnationalism, students with "European" degrees like Viadrina 
and CP's MEPS might fulfill a role for the EU similar to Benedict Anderson's (1983:47-
65) notion of "Creole pioneers," who provided the leadership for national independence 
movements in the Americas once their similar administrative experiences and common 
language coalesced into a shared cultural identity. In Frankfurt and Slubice, most 
students already take for granted the existence of "Europe" as a coherent cultural field, 
and while they may have only have a second (or third) language in common, these EU 
pioneers share the kind of transnational experience that is at the core of what it means to 
be an EU citizen. 
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Chapter 3 
Inventing a City: Cultural Citizenship in "Slubfurt" 
Introduction 
In September 2004, an information center opened in Frankfurt for a city that 
didn't exist. Located among the many empty storefronts of Grosse Scharrnstrafie, a 
pedestrian zone running most of the distance between the bridge and Viadrina University, 
the "Stubfurt Information Center" resembled any typical tourist information office. At 
one end of the center's long street-level space, a counter held Slubfurt-themed brochures 
and souvenirs, such as wine, postcards, t-shirts, videos, and newspapers. The remainder 
of the space was devoted to a meeting and exhibition area. When I visited, the walls 
were covered with informational displays, including maps of the city, newspaper 
clippings, the results of a Slubfurt "mental map" survey,1 and excerpts from Frankfurt's 
analysis of a proposed cross-border tram or bus line (See Chapter 4). 
A visitor to the information center would also find someone to explain the almost 
entirely invented history of the city; 
Slubfurt arose from the cities of "Slub" and "Furt" on the German-Polish 
border with its two cultures, two languages and two realities in two 
countries. It was founded on November 8,1999 at a cooperative city 
council meeting and on November 29,2000 was entered on the Register of 
European City Names. Slubfurt is one of the youngest cities in the world. 
Today everyone who settles down here is a Slubfurter equally, whether 
coming from Asia, Africa, America, Australia, or Europe. 
1
 For the full results of the mental map survey, see Garand (2002) 
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The city government of Slubfurt is composed of two city 
parliaments, one from Slub and one from Furt. Both municipal authorities 
collectively constitute the city council of Slubfurt, and from its members 
the mayor is chosen in four-year cycles, alternating between a person from 
Slub and one from Furt. The current incumbent mayor is Mr. Wladyslaw 
Miiller, a genuine Slubfurter. Born in Slub and raised in Furt, he studied 
European law and city planning at Collegium Pollonicum in Slub. Today 
he holds office in the newly built Slubfurt town hall on the Oder bridge 
between Slub and Furt.2 
The Slubfurt Information Center was part of a series of projects undertaken by the NGO 
"Slubfurt," a cross-border cultural organization formed in 1999 to promote the 
transnational character of Slubice/Frankfurt's urban space. As an organization, Slubfurt 
is about both art and activism, supporting not only artistic installations and performances, 
but also community events, research projects, and even university seminars. As 
Slubfurt's name implies, almost all of these activities are aimed at promoting 
identification with, and cultural citizenship in, Slubice/Frankfurt as a unified cross-border 
city. 
Cultural citizenship describes an individual's sense of belonging within a 
particular group or society, most often in relation to the dominant cultural community of 
a nation-state (Soysal 1996:17, cf. Flores and Benmayor 1997, Flores 1997, Rosaldo 
1989, Stevenson 1999). In establishing this feeling of a "right to belong," Flores 
emphasizes the importance of claiming not only a physical, geographic space, but also a 
2
 This explanation, as well as a great deal of additional information about Slubfurt, is available at 
www. slubfurt.net. 
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place for "creative expression, self-representation, and engagement," where groups can 
"define themselves, define their membership, claim rights and develop a vision of the 
type of society that they want to live in" (Flores 1997:263). Slubfurt endeavors to 
establish a forum for making this type of claim on the transnational social space created 
in Slubice and Frankfurt by the opening of the border to visa-free travel in 1991 and 
encouraged by the EU's subsequent interest in de-emphasizing and deterritorializing its 
future internal borders. 
Although it focuses on the local expression of transnational citizenship practices 
rather than "European" citizenship per se, Slubfurt is very much a product of the 
"European" moment, as well as the social and cultural funding initiatives that support the 
promotion and deployment of EU citizenship. This relationship demonstrates a second 
aspect of cultural citizenship, which "consists of two mutually-determining dimensions; 
specifically, as a strategy of cultural politics and as a set of techniques of 
governmentality" (Stevenson 1999:66, cf. Ong 1996 ). 
For the EU, policies sponsoring cultural initiatives have a specific purpose 
directly related to its governing efforts. By encouraging EU citizens to feel a sense of 
belonging anywhere in Union, cultural programming is intended to provide support for 
the smooth functioning of the common market by making meaningful the rights, 
privileges and social benefits guaranteed by the EU at the supranational level. To this 
end, the EU's involvement in cultural politics increased dramatically after 1992, when the 
Maastricht Treaty established a legal basis for EU interventions in the cultural field (Art. 
151).3 As of the EU's 2007-2013 budgetary cycle, this involvement has grown to an 
3
 Specifically, the Treaty tasked the Community with bringing to the fore Europe's common cultural 
heritage, contributing to the "flowering of the Cultures of the Member States, while respecting their 
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allocation of about EUR 400 for cultural initiatives, about three-quarters of which is 
intended for cooperation between cultural organizations such as theatres, museums, 
professional associations, research centers, universities, cultural institutes. EU citizens 
affirm the importance of these efforts. According to a 2007 special Eurobarometer 
survey, 89% of EU citizens indicated that they either "totally agree" or "tend to agree" 
with the statement, "Culture and cultural exchanges should have a very important place in 
the EU so that citizens from different member states can learn more from each other and 
feel more European" (Eurobarometer 2007a:35). Nevertheless, a slight majority of EU 
citizens also agreed that a common culture is presently lacking. 53% said the statement, 
"There is no common European culture because European countries are too different 
from one another," reflected their personal view either very well or fairly well. 
(Eurobarometer 2007a:64). 
Given the historically ambivalent and contested location of the Polish-German 
border (See Chapter 1), divided cities like Slubice/Frankfurt are locations of particularly 
high symbolic value for demonstrating the success of the EU's supranational governing 
project in overcoming old divisions. Markus, the director of an NGO dedicated to 
teaching and preserving the history of the Polish-German border region, argued that this 
symbolic status of the cities had ironically become an obstacle to effective cross-border 
cooperation: 
One thing I observe.. .when you look [at Slubice/Frankfurt] from the outside 
[people] have big expectations. It's a symbol of Polish-German cooperation, but 
national and regional diversity, improving "the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of 
the European peoples, and the "conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European 
significance." 
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objectively it's a small Polish city and a medium German city, both with high 
unemployment, where the fittest [people] leave.. .People know [cooperation] is 
an expectation and some are sick of it.. .1 don't think we have to force people, it 
will either happen or it doesn't. That's one thing I learned from history. Without 
this pressure from the outside, I think Frankfurt and Slubice would be better off. . 
.[Slubice/Frankfurt] is a political symbol. In the media there is [a lot of] 
observation— like it's a barometer for Polish-German relations—but its not. 
That's the point of view of the outside. 
Part of this outside attention on Slubice/Frankfurt results from the sustained funding the 
region has received from the EU's INTERREG program for cross-border cooperation. In 
2000-2006, the EU allocated EUR 132.25 million in INTERREG funds to Brandenburg 
and Lubuskie.4 National and local governments provided another EUR 44.11 million in 
matching funds, for a total to EUR 176.36 million. While infrastructure development 
received the highest proportion of these monies (34.7%, or 61.45 million Euros), EUR 
14.7 million (8.3%) was spent on co-operation in cultural and social affairs, including 
EUR 9 million on 1738 small projects aimed at building connections between individuals 
(The remaining funds were distributed among 56 larger projects) (Euroregion Pro 
Europa Viadrina 2007:8,58). 
As is suggested by the sheer number of projects and events funded by 
INTERREG, cultural events are an extremely cost effective way to promote EU 
4
 These funds are administered through the "Pro Europa Viadrina" Euroregion, an NGO established in 1993 
by an agreement between the Verein Mittlere Oder (Central Oder) e.V. (a conglomerate of smaller 
associations, trade unions, administrative districts and municipal governments) in Germany and the 
Association of Lubuskie Municipalities and the Association of the Municipalities of Gorzow in Poland. The 
Euroregion is therefore comprised of the Eastern part of Land Brandenburg in Germany (specifically the 
two administrative districts of Markisch-Oderland and Oder-Spree), and the Lubuskie Voivodship in 
Poland. 
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citizenship goals and practices directly to individual citizens, and to generate a 
participatory dynamic that is not usually a characteristic of more capital-intensive 
infrastructure improvement initiatives. Perhaps for this reason, cultural events play a 
conspicuous role in cross-border cooperation efforts of the municipal governments of 
Slubice and Frankfurt. Of the 44 events and initiatives specifically mentioned in 
Frankfurt's 2005 report on cross-border cooperation, half were in cultural or recreational 
fields.5 
Community improvements and cultural events also provide a vehicle through 
which the EU can promote its "brand," and the 
EU flag routinely appeared in the sponsors' 
ii:ORB ANTENNE W/hm M> sections of event advertisements and materials 
E!5SfE5Se!"!"l ^ m § ''"--" like any other corporate logo (Fig. 3.1). To 
oi*B»bn if] r'l'it".,.. Jp assure that the EU receives appropriate credit 
Fig. 3.1: The sponsors' section froma
 for i t g c o n t r i b u t i o n s a n d t o m a i n t a i n a system 
brochure for the 2003 Europagarden 
festival in Frankfurt and Slubice. Along with 
the EU, the sponsors include television and of brand continuity, the European 
radio stations, newspapers, a bank, and the 
German railway system. Commission issued a regulation in 2000, 
which outlined the rules and guidelines for the publicity of EU-funded projects and 
included requirements for billboards, commemorative plaques, posters, publications, and 
websites. As a result of this regulation, residents of Slubice and Frankfurt were 
constantly reminded of the EU's financial presence in the cities' public spaces, at 
5
 Specifically, 17 were cultural events and five were recreational (including sports). Of the remainder, four 
events were focused on market or economic development, seven were cooperative meetings between 
government functionaries, eight were types of educational cooperation, and three were related to health and 
welfare. 
6
 EC 1159/2000 (OJL 130/30, 30 May 2000). 
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construction sites (Fig. 3.2), on buildings (Fig 3.3), and even in books at the library (Fig. 
3.4). 
^ * f c ^ - • ' V * *•-.. "Nv?<''?! •••. 
Fig. 3.2: A billboard erected during the renovation of Siubice's Friendship 
Square (Plac Przyjazn) that conforms to the EU publicity rule requiring at least 
25% of the total area must be devoted to the EU's contribution (European 
Commission 2000:35). 
floro stwieiKki .Arcadia' n»-.l-ir w^fauiiawany 
pity finonsrjwijm uilziale Unii EuiD[iejski»j 
w reimifih pnqifimu Pl'am 
Ths- -.f.j:*iirit \MV"\ .Airadia rat b*pn hu • 
IMJI. i ! . i- cin'ciu! ii'itiicipntian of the 
Eui'ii • 'Inion .mdw ihe P W ^ nioqioTim-^ 
Fig. 3.3: A plaque in one of the residences of Siubice's 
student campus the commemorating EU's role in its 
construction. 
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Fig. 3.4: A bookplate in Viadrina University's copy of 
Fredrik Barth's Ethnic Groups and Boundaries indicating 
that the book was purchased with the help of INTERREG 
funds. 
While the EU provides a large proportion of the funds supporting "European" 
cultural programs, it typically depends on the planning and initiative of local 
governments and NGOs for the execution of these projects. This symbiotic relationship 
between the EU and organizations like Slubfurt contains an inherent tension between the 
supranational goals of the European Commission when it allocates funds, and the local 
goals of the people and organizations taking part in the projects. Shore observes that 
much of the high-level discourse of EU cultural policy involves a type of 
"departicularization" in which national cultural icons, (such as Beethoven, Rembrandt, 
Shakespeare, or Venice) are "appropriated, re-interpreted, and then offered up as indices 
of a unitary 'European' history" (Shore 2000:54, cf. Alonso 1988:45). However, in the 
context of Slubice/Frankfurt, most EU-sponsored cultural events—and in particular those 
E"l \ K (..K'JJI -. - -D 
„
J
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organized by Slubfurt--were more concerned with re-particularization, that is, the 
shifting of old local symbols from both sides of the border into a transnational frame and 
the establishment of new transnational symbols, practices, and traditions for the local 
space. The remainder of this chapter focuses on an in-depth examination of Shibfurt's 
efforts to establish these forms of cultural citizenship by engaging the cities' residents in 
an ongoing series of performances and projects aimed at redefining the cities as a unified 
multinational space. 
Slubfurt: "The first German-Polish city on the Oder" 
Michael Kurzwelly,7 the organizational force behind "the first German-Polish city 
on the Oder," describes himself a conceptual artist working in the medium of "social 
sculpture." When he arrived in Frankfurt in 1998, Kurzwelly was surprised by the 
division he observed between the cities, and decided to use art as a way to address the 
issue. He explained: 
To me, Slubfurt started when I came here and I wanted to define my space 
for me personally, because I do not feel that I live in Frankfurt, I feel that I 
live in Slubfurt. I use both sides and I came here because of both cities... 
When I came here, I felt nearer to the Polish culture than the East German 
culture. I had lots of problems of integration in the first years here, 
[because I was] seen as a West German [Kurzwelly grew up in Bonn]. It 
was, and sometimes even now is, difficult for me to understand people 
from here. So for me, the space was Slubfurt, because in my identity I felt 
7
 Because Kurzwelly is so closely identified with Shibfurt, it is impossible to discuss the organization 
without making him easily recognizable. For this reason, I have not replaced his name with a pseudonym 
and have limited myself to materials collected during public events and in formal "on the record" 
interviews. 
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in between. It's a kind of hybrid identity, or even more, a layered identity. 
. . Each time you are in a place with a different culture where people have 
a different point of view on life, you start adopting elements—not all, but 
you start adopting [some]—and you change yourself. So to me, identity 
isn't something which is stable, it is something.. .in movement, in 
process.. .1 feel culturally in-between, and to me this is a question of 
identity, and that is why I created Slubfurt. I created the word Slubfurt to 
define my identity, and that is why I am from Slubfurt when you ask me. 
In pursuing this identification with Slubfurt, Kurzwelly has become a kind of 
"ethnopolitical entrepreneur" who "may live 'off as well as 'for' ethnicity (Brubaker 
2004:10), or, in Kurzwelly's case, the self-consciously multi-ethnic "Slubfurt." Drawing 
on Bourdieu (1991), Brubaker explains that these individuals often display "a 
performative character. By invoking groups, they seek to evoke them, summon them, 
call them into being. Their categories are for doing—designed to stir, summon, justify, 
mobilize, kindle and energize" (2004:10); goals that describe the mission of Slubfurt 
well. 
Performative elements comprised of "those enactments and processes that forge 
a sense of community and belonging, lead to renewed experiences of identity, and 
provide a social space for the formation of collective practice and its concomitant forms 
of power" (Flores 1997:125) are likewise central to the concept of cultural citizenship. 
Slubfurt explicitly attempts to provide these types of identity-forming events through its 
model of combining of art, activism, and education to engage people in a cross-border 
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dialog about the cities. In this way, Slubfurt encourages residents of the two cities to 
develop a critical perspective that questions the nature of identity and belonging. 
Kurzwelly outlined some of these questions while discussing his view of 
Slubfurt's goals: 
To me, as an art project, [Slubfurt] is a project of asking about identity and 
who defines i t . . . Is it a reality that [here in Slubice and Frankfurt], we 
[have] two states, and that we are citizens of these states? . . . Is it really 
the nationality that decides? Or, somebody making you a passport [and] 
telling you that you are a German or a Pole? [It is] the same [about] the 
body of a city. Who defines this body? Well, you could say society, but 
who defines society? It's a group of people, and then you go down to each 
[individual], and each person has a different kind of mental map. Lots of 
[people] adopt a vision of the world given [to them] by others, but one 
also has the chance to build up one's own space, which does not have to 
exist for others. So for me, Slubfurt already has the right to exist at the 
moment when I say Slubfurt is there.. . Then I started working with this 
idea, trying to show my space. . .This is why I tried to develop Slubfurt. 
But I think Slubfurt has different aspects, it could have political aspects, it 
could have social aspects, but to me it is especially about the conversation 
between people. 
The new transnational space of "Slubfurt" offers an antidote to a profound sense 
alienation that characterizes many residents' relationship with the two cities. 
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Kurzwelly described this condition as "an identity crisis on both sides of the Oder" {Eine 
Sinnkrise aufbeiden Seiten der Oder) (Szrek and Kurzwelly 2005:6), that has its origin 
in the a lack of "roots" in both cities resulting from Frankfurt's near complete destruction 
during World War II (only about 600 people remained by April 1945 (Gramlich, et. al. 
2002:42) and Slubice's post-war history of expulsion and resettlement. 
For Kurzwelly, this "identity crisis" destabilizes a sense of Heimat within the 
cities. "Literally translated as the home or homeland, the term Heimat refers to a 
discourse of belonging in which identity becomes grounded in place" (Berdahl 1999:82). 
Referring as much to an emotional concept as a physical space, Heimat has neither a 
single meaning, nor an adequate direct translation to Polish or English. It does, however, 
share a great deal with the concept of cultural citizenship. "[Heimat] is both inherently 
linked to notions of Germaneness and an imagining of a local community. It [provides] 
emotional as well as ideological common ground for the construction and maintenance of 
local identities... " (Berdahl 1999:82-83). Like Slubfurt, the notion of Heimat also 
stems from a desire to invent a place in which to belong within the context of 
destabilizing social change. As Appelgate observes, "Heimat has never been a word 
about real social forces or real political situations. Instead it has been a myth about the 
possibility of a community in the face of fragmentation and alienation" (1990:19). In 
Frankfurt and Slubice a lack of this feeling of community contributes to the persistence of 
divisions between the cities and fundamentally weakens residents' sense of cultural 
citizenship in a shared community. 
Opposition on both sides of the border regarding the use of Slubfurt as a 
collective name for the cities is illustrative of this continued division. According to 
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Kurzwelly, many Poles initially thought Slubfurt was advocating a return to Germany, 
while many Germans thought he was destroying "their" city's name. City names occupy 
a particularly ambivalent position within the cultural politics of the Polish-German border 
regions. Within Poland's "recovered" territories, almost all cities have both Polish and 
German names , as do many cities throughout Poland. These names are linked not only 
to specific periods of historical rule, but also to ethnic and national claims to place. 
Because of this, the use of a particular name today can be employed to make implicit 
(and sometimes explicit) claims about the "rightful" ownership of a city, which is often 
based on a selective reading of history. The historical complexity of the settlement and 
rule of Western Poland by both Slavic and Germanic groups usually provides ample 
evidence for both Poles and Germans to assert primeval ethnic ties to any given location 
(see Chapter 1). An informational brochure about Slubice distributed by the city's 
administrative office provides an example of this strategy, emphasizing a Slavic 
settlement on the site of the city during the Middle Ages, as well as Piast Poland's loss of 
the lands bordering the Oder River (ziemia lubuska) to Brandenburg in 1250 (Urzajd 
Miejski w Slubicach 2003:5). 
By renaming the cities, Slubfurt makes an internationalist claim to their common 
space and asserts a basic parity and ethnic equality between the Polish and German sides. 
Slubfurt also tends to de-emphasize the cities' potentially problematic history, and its 
website makes no mention of the cities prior to Slubfurt's foundation in 1999. Instead, 
Slubice is actually exceptional in its lack of a German antecedent since as "Dammvorstadt" it was a 
district of Frankfurt(Oder). 
9
 Two of the best-known examples are Breslau(German)/Wroclaw(Polish), and 
Danzig(German)/Gdansk(Polish). 
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Shibfurt focuses on starting anew with concerted efforts to invent traditions (Hobsbawm 
and Ranger 1983) for its newly imagined bi-national and "European" city. 
This approach is not universally accepted, even among those who are committed 
to the transnational idea of Slubice/Frankfurt. Markus (the NGO director mentioned 
above) observed that he didn't really believe in Slubfurt. When I asked him why, he 
answered: 
First, I don't like the name. Like Slubice—its 60 years old and the real city 
is Frankfurt. It's attractive to have a city with two equal partners, but its 
not going to work in Frankfurt; they think [Slubice's] a smaller city. 
That's typical of Germans; they look at a small city and [its] poor Poles, 
and think that [the Poles] have to apply to get into Frankfurt again—[the 
Germans] don't think it is one city with equal rights. 
In contrast to Slubfurt, Markus's NGO prefers to deal with the region's past directly and 
focuses on educating people about the history of the cross-border region. Markus 
explained: 
[Our projects are about] rediscovering history, it's a forgotten one, even 
people in Frankfurt don't remember Neumark [the old German region 
located mostly east of the Oder River]. In Slubice they remember only the 
recovered territories. Not many people do real research... [There are] a 
lot of stereotypes and prejudices—this structure has roots in history. It 
seems obvious, but people aren't aware of it. The reason Poles and 
Germans are living here—it wasn't this way here [before the war], it was 
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because of the war. If you don't know the history, you don't know what 
is happening today. You have to trace the effects back. 
Slubfurt and Markus's NGO thus represent two different, although not necessarily 
irreconcilable,10 approaches for overcoming the perceived lack of a strong identification 
with the cities and their history. Where Markus's NGO attempts to use history as a way 
to illuminate and provide context for today's social problems and structures, Slubfurt 
attempts to establish a new history for a unified city space—a space that last existed only 
in the national context of pre-war Germany. 
StUBFURT 
Inventing Slubfurt City? 
According to Hobsbawm, the invention of tradition tends to occur when processes 
are sufficiently novel (e.g nationalism and its institutions) that previous symbols can no 
longer be stretched to embody and represent these new social processes (1983:5-7), or 
"when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the 
social patterns for which 'old' traditions had been designed" 
(1983:5). The collapse of the socialist regimes in Poland and 
East Germany in 1989, followed by their subsequent 
reorientation toward the EU and the deregulation of their 
common border, placed Slubice and Frankfurt in precisely 
this context. In the EU and Slubfurt's internationalist 
approach to cultural citizenship, references to the city's 
unified past as a German city becomes highly problematic 
• v ? 
Fig. 3.5: The Slubfurt coat of 
arms. The rooster is common 
symbol in the heraldry of both 
Frankfurt and Slubice, as well 
as other cities throughout both 
sides of the border region, while 
the egg represents birth and 
new possibilities. 
' In fact, I met Markus during the planning of a Slubfurt event. 
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because this history lacks the transnational and multi-ethnic associations required of the 
"new" Polish-German city. 
For this reason, Slubfurt tends to eschew history in favor of an elaborate and 
open-ended performance in which Slubfurt members consciously apply symbols 
normally associated with municipal governments to Slubfurt in an effort to create a 
potential space of social cohesion and identification. In addition to the city information 
center, alternative city history, and entry of Slubfurt on the Register of European City 
Names {Register der europdischen Stddtenamen) discussed above, Slubfurt also adopted 
a coat of arms, depicting a rooster standing on an egg (Fig. 3.5), and began issuing 
Slubfurt identity cards. Kurzwelly viewed these ID cards as particularly successful: 
"Every month I get people coming, and wanting to have an identity card. This seems to 
be something very important to them. In a way it expresses their feeling. This is the kind 
of thing that works. When people start to be proud of being from Slubfurt and show their 
identity card and so on, it starts creating something." 
Slubfurt also occasionally publishes newspapers, which are particularly useful in 
helping establish a sense of simultaneity and common experience that are critical to the 
circumscription of local identity and the creation of an "imagined community" (B. 
Anderson 1983). In Slubice and Frankfurt, no multi-lingual newspaper currently exists to 
serve both sides of the border region, and it is extremely difficult to find any Polish 
newspaper in Frankfurt or any German paper in Slubice. While the Slubfurt newspaper is 
probably not published often enough to truly provide a sense of simultaneous community 
that a local daily newspaper might provide, its rigorous bilingualism, with every text 
11
 Seven issues in 2000, four in 2004-2005, and one in 2006. 
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published fully in both Polish and German (a principle Slubfurt generally tries to follow 
in all contexts) provides a model that might eventually take root. 
Slubfurt expanded on these performances in 2004-2005, during its year-long 
"Slubfurt City?" project, which directly addressed the question of creating of a common 
social space in the cities. Organized to celebrate Slubfurt's 5-year anniversary, the 
project invited a group of artists from throughout Europe to create art installations and 
performance events that investigated the idea of "coexistence" 
(Zusammenleben/wspolzycie) in the two cities. While all of these projects focused on 
community building in Slubfurt, I will focus my attention on two particularly 
symbolically apt projects: the minting of Slubfurt coins and the construction of the 
Slubfurt city wall. 
Slubfurt Money 
Slubfurt coins appeared without warning on the streets 
of Slubice and Frankfurt in April 2005. The coins had the 
same color pattern as two Euro and five Zloty coins (a silver 
ring around a gold center) (Fig. 3.6). The front side depicts 
the EU's circle of 12 stars and the inscription "Slubfurt City 
2004-2005," while the reverse side is inscribed with the 
numeral " 1 " surrounded by the motto "It depends on you" 
{das berifft dich/To dotyczy ciebie), but no currency 
denomination. 
The artist, Roland Schefferski, left the coins in 
public spaces throughout Slubice and Frankfurt, and waited to candidly film and 
Fig. 3.6: (From top to bottom) 5 
Zloty, 2 Euro (German design), 
and 1 Slubfurt coins. 
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photograph the reactions of people to finding them. Once viewed up close, the coins are 
easily identifiable as non-currency, but their incongruous nature and unexplained 
appearance is meant to underscore the symbolic value of money within the everyday 
transactions that help build a community. This is a particularly salient point in Frankfurt, 
which has experienced the disorienting effects of two currency changes since the collapse 
of socialism: from the East German to the West German Mark in 1990, and the Mark to 
the Euro in 2002. 
Typically depicting nationally important people, places, or events, modern 
currencies have been a valuable symbol for the demonstration of state sovereignty and 
national identity, or in the case of the EU, the pooling of this sovereignty into a common 
market represented by the Euro (Shore 2000:111-118, Borneman and Fowler 1997:498-
500). With this in mind, Euro banknotes were consciously designed to be non-national, 
and their generically stylized bridges, gateways and windows are meant to signify the 
"European" values of connection, openness, and cooperation (Euro coins, however, have 
one common face and one face of unique national design). By representing a common 
economic space, a coin as a material object also evokes the shared social space where it is 
agreed the currency has value and can be used for exchange. The adoption of the Euro 
for general use was one of the EU's most significant achievements, and the Euro itself is 
one of the key public symbols of European identity (Shore 2000:115). Aside from 
language, the different currencies in use in Frankurt(Oder) and Slubice are also one of the 
most apparent markers of continued difference and lack of integration between the cities, 
even after Poland joined the EU (See Chapter 4)12. 
12 
Poland is not projected to adopt the Euro until sometime around 2012, after it has fulfilled the debt to 
GDP ratio, interest rate, and inflation requirements of the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact. According to 
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According to Schefferski's description of the project, the goal of his intervention 
was to emphasize personal responsibility within the contexts of the border cities and the 
common past, present, and future of the EU, as is pointed out to the coin's discoverer by 
the inscription "It depends on you". What exactly depends on you was left purposefully 
ambiguous in the hope of provoking dialog and reflection about the meaning of social 
spaces. The sudden and unannounced appearance of a "Slubfurt" coin was therefore 
doubly incongruous, as it was not legal currency on either side of the border, and it 
represented a transnational imagined space that few residents of Slubice and Frankfurt 
identified with, or in some cases even knew existed. One of the films accompanying the 
project displayed the uncertainty provoked by the coins. The film takes place in a 
Frankfrut(Oder) Doner13 shop, and documents the exchange when the filmmaker attempts 
to buy a sandwich with Slubfurt coins: 
Server: What's this? (Reading off the coin) "It depends on you" . . 
.(sounding out Slubfurt incorrectly) "Slub-feert. . .2004." (Looking 
confused) Is this new money, or what? From which country? 
Filmmaker: From Slubfurt. 
Server: (In English) From. . .? 
Filmmaker: From Slubfurt. Slubice and Frankfurt together. 
the European Commission's 2006 convergence report, Poland currently fulfills the price stability and long-
term interest rates convergence criteria, but not the criteria for its government budgetary position and 
currency exchange rates. Once these conditions are met, Poland will be permitted (and obligated) to 
participate in the third and final stage of the EU's economic and monetary union (EMU) and to adopt the 
Euro for general use (European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
2006:24-25). 
13
 A doner is a type of a flatbread sandwich consisting of meat roasted on a vertical spit, and topped with a 
selection of salads and sauces. It is itself a product of globalization and cross-cultural interaction between 
Turkey and Germany, and was invented by Turkish immigrants in Germany as an adaptation of an "ethnic" 
Turkish dish tailored to Germany's (and especially Berlin's) fast-food market (Caglar 1995) 
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Server: Ah, okay. But its not good in the market [i.e. its not legal]. They 
don't know it at the bank. 
Filmmaker: It is [good]. I'm giving you two, and I would like a Doner 
Server: (Laughing incredulously) Really? 
Filmmaker: Yeah. 
Server: It's not a Euro. 
Filmmaker: It's Slubfurt. Here, from Slubfurt. 
Server: (Smiling) From Slubfurt. . .Okay, I'll give you a Doner. 
Filmmaker: Great! . . . Thanks. 
This exchange encapsulates not only the confusion an unexpected type of currency 
instills, but also the lack of identification with Slubfurt as a common space, so much so 
that the server doesn't even recognize the word. While the situation is meant to be 
humorous, on film the exchange is palpably uncomfortable, and while the server 
eventually (and graciously) plays along, the scene could have just as easily ended badly 
(Frankfurt's shopkeepers are not generally known for their good humor). Slubfurt's 
attempts to destabilize and challenge people's assumptions about the cities' organization 
routinely produce decidedly mixed reactions, as is shown by Kurzelly's contribution to 
the Slubfurt City project, the "Slubfurt City Wall." 
The City Wall 
The Slubfurt City Wall is a 25m long and 50cm high section of red brick (Fig. 
3.7) located mplac Bohaterow (Heroes' Square), a small park just outside Slubice's city 
center. Given the symbolic baggage of building a wall so close to Berlin, Kurzwelly 
encountered a great deal of opposition when he first sought approval for the project in 
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section in Slubice. To 
Fig. 3.7: The Slubfurt City Wall determine the 
approximate route of a wall surrounding the hypothetical city center of Slubfurt, 
Kurzwelly drew two congruent circles around the centers of Slubice and Frankfurt and 
used overlapping space to find the center of a third circle that represented the wall and 
encompassed most of both city centers. 
Despite the negative connotations that often accompany the building of walls, 
Kurzwelly pointed out that borders are required to define any space, and a closed or 
bounded space can also provide physical and psychological security. He told me: 
Walls or borders not only have a negative meaning, but also can have a 
positive meaning... to show this is "our" place, to define it in a way.. . 
Borders can become prisons, but they can also link things together. . .[I 
don't] really [want] to create a wall, but to create a kind of sign. So, I 
only created 25m here [in Slubice] and in spring [2006] 25m on the 
German side (this section was not completed until over a year later in 
November 2007), so it is more like opening brackets and closing brackets 
and within there is Slubfurt. 
In his published description of the project, Kurzwelly continued: 
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We create our borders for ourselves. These borders are above all in our 
minds, before they manifest themselves physically. They define our space 
of action and our identity. They can halt or also confine.. .Therefore, I am 
building the Slubfurt City Wall — A new borderline that defines my 
living space... It is a metaphor for my mental map. Slubfurt is this space, 
my self-chosen home (Szrek and Kurzwelly 2005:6). 
By placing a border in the middle of Slubice's city space, the Slubfurt City Wall attempts 
aS^v^Sw?! t o c n aM e nS e and subvert 
residents' presumptions about 
.1 . • i . • 11 ' the cities as separate national 
spaces by physically 
suggesting the existence of an 
Jj.V ^ ;^-*;.:.*l..*e}St.>Vsj.r-.: . , j . j ' -. _ alternative and unified living 
• A...; c^V.:?v>: Vfe* « ' ^ \ : i4Stffe8£ I 
area. However, because the 
wall is only 50cm high-
Fig. 3.8: The Shibfort City Wall's informational plaque. 
"more a bench than a wall"~ 
it creates a border that is easily traversed, and while its slight curve indicates the direction 
of Slubfurt's center, its intention is to define and give shape to space rather than to create 
a barrier. Indeed, the wall became a relatively unassuming part ofplac Bohaterow 's 
landscape, and can be easily overlooked among the park's bushes. The wall is also not 
immediately identifiable as an artistic installation, nor is its symbolic goal readily 
apparent to passersby without closer investigation of the plaque affixed at one end (Fig. 
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3.8). The space ofPlac Bohaterow is instead dominated by a post-World War II 
monument, Braterska Walka (Fraternal Struggle). 
Installed in 1949, Braterska Walka presents a column topped by a Soviet and a 
Polish soldier storming the West (Preiss, et. al.:2003:121), and is similar in design to 
other Braterstwo Broni (Fraternity in Arms) monuments throughout western Poland. 
Meant to memorialize the comradeship of the Polish and Soviet armies, the monument's 
original inscription read, "We offered our lives together. Let our tie stay forever (Nasze 
zycie ofiarowalismy wspolnie. Niech nasza wiez pozostanie na zawsze), but this was later 
replaced with a new inscription dedicated to all World War II victims: "To the memory 
of the dead of World War II (Pamiqci polegfym w czasie Ilwojny swiatowej) (Preiss, et. 
al.:2003:121). 
Like the Slubfurt City Wall, Braterska Walka was also about claiming space. 
Braterstwo broni monuments formed part of the symbolic vocabulary developed and 
deployed by Poland's socialist government as part of its efforts to define and structure the 
spaces "recovered" from Germany after World War II, to link Poland politically to the 
Soviet Union, and to reinforce Poland's new socialist traditions. Braterska Walka's 
prominent position in a public square was therefore aimed at mobilizing the sentiments of 
local inhabitants, supporting the ideological foundations of the socialist state, and 
legitimising the new, Soviet-dominated, geopolitical position of Poland after World War 
II (Asher and Janczak 2008). 
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The landscape of Plac Bohaterow thus juxtaposes a monument representing a past 
that divided the cities with one 
i. -. 
Fig. 3.9: The Braterska Walka monument. 
representing a potential future which 
reunites them in a European space. 
Nevertheless, while the Slubfurt City 
Wall is symbolically suggestive, it 
does little to create the sense of social 
belonging that is so critical to cultural 
citizenship and the future of Slubfut 
as a unified city. The next section 
focuses on a Slubfurt event that was 
designed with precisely this identification in mind. 
The Slubfurt Oderfest 
The Slubfurt Oderfest was one of Slubfurt's most significant projects of 2006 and 
was envisioned as a tradition-inventing and cultural citizenship-building event. The 
planning for the Oderfest began in January at a "City Residents Forum" 
{Stadtbilrgerforum) meeting organized by Slubfurt and held in Slubice's cultural center. 
A surprisingly diverse group of 21 people attended the meeting, ranging in age from 
college students to retirees and about evenly split between Poles and Germans. In 
keeping with Slubfurt's commitment of equal access for residents of both cities, the 
discussion was conducted in both Polish and German simultaneously, with Kurzwelly 
interpreting (he is fluent in both languages). The festival was organized within the 
framework of a "city game" in which people would travel between different locations 
Page 86 
around the cities to complete a game piece. Each station would be based on ideas from 
organizations in the communities and staffed by volunteers from these groups. 
Enabling this participation was the central idea in Slubfurt's vision of the Oderfest 
as a community-building event. Kurzwelly explained: 
[When] I meet people individually, I see there are lots of people with 
creative energies, who have something to say, have ideas, and could 
realize their ideas, but maybe they just [lack] a kind of forum.. . I thought 
maybe there is a way to somehow link these energies and to give them a 
place and a space to express themselves. Because to me, they are the 
positive energies which could give the city a new kind of perspective. 
And if it works out, then we will have this fest as a kind of a game. The 
game will link all the different energies. If it works out, people will feel 
happy, [and] this could somehow become a kind of tradition. [People] 
would wait for the next fest, and start creating it right after the last fest . . . 
And if you start having something like this, then this gives a strong feeling 
of identity. . .This is us. Our city is the sum of all these different 
activities. 
The prevailing ethos of the Oderfest was therefore one of maximal inclusion. 36 
locations representing various landmarks and cultural sites of Slubice and 
Page 87 
Frankfurt were initially identified as potential locations for stations in the game. A 
variety-show type performance by groups from the cities and a bonfire at the Slubice 
harbor were also planned for the evening after the game in the hope of further increasing 
participation. 
Over the course of four months, the Oderfest slowly took shape. Fifteen 
organizations agreed to participate, providing ten stations in Frankfurt and five in 
27. Mai 2006 
Stubfurter Oderfest 
Fig. 3.10: The map of the Slubfurt Oderfest's "City Game." 
Slubice. Each competitor was given a game card showing the "board," a hand-drawn 
map of Slubfurt with each of the stations numbered, but no street names (Fig. 3.10). At 
each station a player could accumulate between one and six points depending on how 
well he or she completed a task. Competitors then rolled a die numbered 1-3 to 
determine how many stations to proceed along the game's path. Six stations had to be 
visited to complete the card, and the person accumulating the most points would win a 
prize presented at the evening performance and bonfire. 
The Oderfest took place on a Saturday in May during the "Oder days" (dni Odra); 
a festival consisting of three days of open-air concerts in Slubice's city center. When I 
began the game at 2 pm, the bridge was busy with its usual weekend traffic. As I waited 
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in the line for passport control, several of the red bicycle rickshaw taxis that were being 
used to link the game's stations and decrease the walking demand for participants passed 
by, advertising free rides around Slubfurt. One person waiting in line joked, "I think I'd 
like to take it to Berlin." Meanwhile, the "Slubfurt Bruckenhahn " (Bridge Rooster), 
another "Slubfurt City" project, played on the bridge's loudspeaker, as it does on each 
hour between 7 am and 7pm. The Bruckenhahn's call is a recording of the winner of a 
contest for the best rooster cry performed by a Slubfurt resident, and it was installed on 
the bridge with the intention of linking a unique sound with Slubfurt's city scape, in a 
manner similar to the chimes of Big Ben in London, or the bugle call of Krakow.14 
After crossing the bridge, I started the game at Frankfurt's Friedenskirche (Peace 
Church), with a quiz sponsored by the European Ecumenical Center. I earned three 
points and rolled a one, taking me to Rosa Luxemburg Strafie, where I was required to 
write and sing a city anthem for Slubfurt. The remainder of my route took me to the 
Polish-German Literature Office, a museum installation on the history of the Oder River, 
the Slubfurt Jungendklub (Youth Club)15, and a photographic gallery set up on the bridge. 
Above all, the Slubfurt game was designed as an exercise in claiming space. By 
requiring participants to complete a long walk around the cities, the formal aspects of the 
14
 The Krakow bugle call is played to each of the cardinal directions every hour on the hour, 24 hours a 
day, 365 days a year, from the tower of the St. Mary's church in Krakow's central square, and is broadcast 
at noon live on Polish national radio. According to tradition, its distinctively abrupt ending commemorates 
a bugler shot through the throat while warning the town during the Tatar invasion of 1241. This legend is 
itself an excellent example of invented tradition, and its popularization is likely attributable to a version of 
the story told in a 1928 Newberry award winning children's book by Eric Philbrook Kelly, The Trumpeter 
of Krakow: a Tale of the Fifteenth Century (Kelly 1928:3-8). 
15
 The Slubfurt Jungendklub opened in January 2006 in Frankfurt as a cooperative project between Slubfurt 
and an established German youth club as a gathering space for students from both sides of the border. The 
EU provided two years of funding from the INTERREGIIIA program for 75% of the club's costs while the 
municipal governments of Frankfurt and Slubice paid for the remaining 25%. 
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game encouraged participants to use unusual or unfamiliar routes that might reveal 
overlooked aspects of the cities or alter participants' normal perception of the city scape. 
The structure of the game also provided a source of advertising for Slubice and 
Frankfurt's NGOs, as well as a way of connecting the NGOs with potential members. 
Sybila, the organizer of the Slubfurt Jungendklub, pointed this out when I spoke to her a 
few weeks after the festival, "I [thought] it was good that different institutions could 
make themselves visible on the map. Many people said they didn't know about the club 
so it was good for advertising. I think the border played a role, because not so many 
Poles came." 
Turnout for the game was generally weak. On my route, I encountered only a few 
fellow players, and the Jungendklub recorded visits by only 22 players. Attendance at the 
evening performances was also modest, with only about 50 people in attendance when 
the program started. The organizers later estimated that a total of about 100 people 
participated in the game, while about 200 people came to the evening program. 
Attendance at the same evening's Oder Days concerts was much higher, a particularly 
disappointing, if unsurprising, result given that the Oderfest was planned in part as an 
alternative to more commercially oriented social events. Kurzwelly told me, "I generally 
observe -[and] not only here—the commercialization of.. .let's say the whole creative life 
of a city. This is a process which I feel very negative [about]. People stop creating 
something for themselves, they just go to have a sausage and a beer, and consume 
something often of very low quality." 
At the Oderfest's evaluation meeting, the game's organizers and participants 
discussed the lackluster attendance, and identified several logistical issues. Publicity was 
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a primary problem: more posters were needed, and due to editing delays the Slubfurt 
newspaper, which contained an explanation of the game and articles about each of the 
stations, arrived too late to be effective. Some participants (including myself) also 
reported difficulty reading the game map and finding some of the locations, while others 
suggested that the game itself might have been too complicated or might have required 
too much time commitment. Even so, the organizers and participants at the meeting 
viewed the Oderfest as an overall success, and the decision was made to produce another 
version the following summer. 
While most of the Oderfest's participants were realistic about the difficulties, 
time, and work required for building a cross-border community, almost all agreed that 
actively pursuing a transnational sense of cultural citizenship was central to achieving 
this goal. Markus observed, "Even if only one-third [of cooperative projects] work, its 
better than it was before and [some of] the results stick... People in Frankfurt and 
Slubice won't unite in Europe if you just wait, you have to have people with a vision. 
Likewise, Peter, a member of a international student housing co-op that sponsored an 
Oderfest location, observed the importance of gradual progress, "It's like a snowball, 
some people meet and go on to make a bigger cooperation. You can't expect from just 
one meeting that the cities will be closer." Event by event, Slubfurt thus helps provide 
the contexts and structures necessary for intensifying and expanding this cooperation in 
the hope that it will eventually become a community. 
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Conclusion 
Until 1991, the impassibility of the border between Frankfurt and Slubice made 
the idea of unified Polish-German city essentially unthinkable, and it is unlikely that 
authorities would have tolerated an organization that actively supported this 
identification. Even today, only a few residents would self-identify as "Slubfurters," and 
the cities continue to lack the sense of shared historical continuity that is often central to 
building feelings of solidarity and belonging within a community. The creation of a 
rigorous cultural citizenship in a transnational and multi-ethnic "Slubfurt" will therefore 
require the development and naturalization of new symbols, events, practices and 
traditions for the new cross-border space. In this way, the efforts of the Slubfurt 
organization dovetail with EU-wide policies aimed at establishing "European" 
citizenship identities. 
Frankfurt and Slubice's border location has also made the cities a focal point for 
the funding of EU cultural initiatives. Because the EU derives so much of its political 
legitimacy from the values of integration and multiculturalism, it can ill afford to fail to 
deliver on these goals at its internal borders, since their high potential for transnational 
contact and cooperation are natural locations for the development of a rigorous everyday 
transnationalism. Nevertheless, the local resistance and indifference toward Slubfurt's 
efforts to establish a new social space or a shared Heimat in Slubice/Frankfurt shows the 
difficulty in overcoming entrenched national divisions. Like the cities themselves, which 
play a central role in the EU's efforts to deterritorialize its borders, but are also 
economically, politically and socially marginal in the national contexts of Germany and 
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Poland, Slubfurt can also be both central and marginal to an individual's experience of 
the cities depending on his or her stance toward the project of integration. 
While it remains to be seen if Slubfurt's vision of the cities as a shared space will 
eventually take hold, the organization has successfully incorporated itself into the cities' 
cultural fabric. Today, Slubfurt is not only tolerated, but also actively supported by both 
cities' administrations, although it is probably unrealistic to believe that Frankfurt and 
Slubice will ever adopt a single city government like the one described in Slubfurt's 
alternative city history. However, judging by the enthusiasm and dedication of Slubfurt 
members, there does seem to be great potential for the development of a more inclusive 
sense of cultural citizenship within the cities, particularly as the demands of the EU's 
common market continue to dismantle formal and legal barriers between Poland and 
Germany, and the memories of the impermeable border grow ever more distant. 
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Chapter 4 
Spaces of Commerce: Citizenship Regimes and Local Economics in 
Frankfurt(Oder)/SIubice 
Introduction 
Despite diverse efforts on both sides of the border to promote identification with 
Frankfurt/Slubice as a transnational "European city," and more than fifteen years of visa-
free travel between Poland and Germany, most of the residents I spoke with continued to 
construct the cities principally as two separate spaces with populations distinguished by 
differences in language, ethnicity, nationality and citizenship. 
Although crossing the border between Frankfurt and Slubice has become a routinized and 
often banal experience for the cities' residents, they remain highly conscious of its 
function as a transforming, "territorial" passage, where one moves from the identity of a 
citizen to that of a foreigner (Berdahl 1999:4). 
Material and economic differences between the cities reinforce this sense of 
disconnection, and contribute to the creation and maintenance of social asymmetries and 
ethnic boundaries. According to Comaroff and Comaroff, the construction of "ethnicity 
has its origins in the asymmetric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a 
single political economy" (1992:54). This description fits the relationship between 
Frankfurt and Slubice within the EU almost perfectly. In Frankfurt and Slubice, EU 
policies aimed at establishing a single "European" social and market space through the 
deregulation of the Polish-German border have simultaneously created a local context 
where the economic disparities between Poles and Germans are readily apparent through 
everyday cross-border interactions. These disparities encourage the development of 
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variable and unequal "citizenship regimes" within the two cities in which the interaction 
between socio-cultural systems and governing institutions, laws, and regulations, 
categorize individuals into groups that are subject to different citizenship practices (D. 
Anderson 1996, Humphrey 1999). By authorizing the members of a group to behave in 
certain ways within particular social contexts, citizenship regimes configure the terms by 
which individuals have access to, and can make demands for, the entitlements, privileges, 
and rights of citizenship (D. Anderson 1996, cf. Wiener 1998:30). 
Ironically, in Frankfurt/Slubice, EU citizenship provisions intended to enable 
transnational citizenship practices and encourage a sense of "European" citizenship that 
might transcend national divisions have instead produced citizenship regimes that 
continue to reify national citizenship identities and divide the cities' residents according 
to ethnicity and nationality. In this chapter, I utilize four overlapping and interrelated 
domains of cross-border citizenship practice in Frankfurt/Slubice to illustrate these 
processes: shopping and consumption, public transportation, housing, and work.1 These 
domains are particularly important areas for the further development of the cities' 
transnational economy, and as such are at the crux of the success or failure of the EU's 
local project. They are also areas where the lack of economic convergence and 
integration between the cities has especially impeded Slubice's residents from exercising 
the mobility rights guaranteed by the EU. It is this link between economic difference and 
the creation of citizenship regimes in Frankfurt and Slubice that asymmetrically 
structures the ability of Poles and Germans to access EU citizenship rights, and 
1
 These domains also crosscut the domains of practice Borneman and Fowler (1997:498) identify as 
particularly salient for studying the processes of Europeanization: languages, money, tourism, sex, and 
sport. Like Borneman and Fowler, I also see my list as far from exhaustive. 
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demonstrates one way in which the EU's emphasis on economic viability within its 
citizenship policies and practices can translate economic inequalities into inequalities of 
civil rights (Peebles 1997:592, 597). Since the borders of relative economic prosperity, 
nationality, and ethnicity are so closely correlated in Frankfurt/Slubice, these inequalities 
introduce hierarchy into the local experience of EU citizenship that reinforces ethno-
national divisions which are directly at odds with the EU's vision of a transnational and 
multiethnic citizenship identity. 
Shopping without Borders 
Like many border regions, (cf. Berdahl 1999, Donnan and Wilson 1999, Thuen 
1998, Wilson 1993, 1995), shopping and the consumption of goods and services are two 
of the foremost cross-border activities in Slubice and Frankfurt, and nearly half of my 
correspondents specifically mentioned shopping as the primary reason they cross the 
border. The importance of cross-border shopping between Frankfurt and Slubice is also 
not a recent phenomenon. During the socialist period, when hard to find items were 
sometimes available in one country but not the other, the ability to shop across the border 
was one advantage of living in the Polish-German border regions (Durrschmidt 
2002:136). Even though the border was normally closed to the general population, scarce 
goods routinely found their way across through personal networks that included people 
who had special authorization to travel between the cities. In Slubice, one of these 
groups consisted of Polish women hired to work at Frankfurt's semi-conductor plant 
{Halbleiterwerk) (cf. Berkner 2005:121-123). Later, when border controls were relaxed 
somewhat in the 1970s, many people in Slubice recalled crossing the border to shop in 
Frankfurt's better supplied stores. Gosia, a retired seamstress, described her experience: 
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There was a factory for semiconductors, which worked three shifts, and 
women from Siubice worked there. They were paid in Marks. We asked 
them to do shopping for us. You needed a passport and currency books. It 
was an event to go to Germany from Siubice—they had wonderful shop 
windows. We went to buy things for children at second hand shops— 
prams, [for example]. When there were ration cards in Poland, you could 
buy sugar, [and so forth,] there if [you] could afford to change currency. .. 
When I went shopping in the GDR, Poles couldn't buy more than 
was allowed, and the Germans would just take it out of your basket. 
Times have changed, and now they come here to buy everything, butter, 
sugar... Lots of people went to West Germany to sell cigarettes after the 
wall came down. There used to be such lines, that you'd have to arrive at 2 
a.m., [wait] 2-3 hours in line, then go to Berlin to earn West German 
Marks.. .The Germans caught them in a suka (a paddy wagon, literally, a 
"bitch"). Once I saw this, I stopped wanting to earn money in this way. 
Tomik, a retired mechanic and teacher, recalled a similar narrative of 
shopping in Frankfurt: 
In '72 there was a great difference in the standard of living [between 
Poland and East Germany]. East Germany had everything, especially 
[things] for children. Also tools. [We] went to the Russian shops— the 
Russian army was [in Frankfurt]—it was easier to shop there than in 
German shops, because of language issues. 
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The Germans in shops were very unpleasant, because it was the 
beginning of [the economic] crisis. They would take things from the 
baskets. The shop assistants treated you as if it was written "not for Poles" 
on the shelves, and they would take it out of the basket. 
While the character of today's cross-border shopping practices has shifted dramatically 
since the socialist period, it continues to be structured by similar differences in 
currencies, languages and nationalities. 
Unlike the socialist economy, when the ability to purchase goods was of 
paramount importance in Frankfurt/Slubice (as was typical throughout Eastern Europe), 
following the shift to the market economy, the tendency has been for price to take 
precedence (cf. Berdahl 1999, Dunn 2004a,Verdery 1996, Wedel 1992). This has 
resulted in a reversal of the ethnic flow of individuals crossing the border to purchase 
basic necessities. Whereas Poles went to Germany during the socialist period to buy 
goods that were more difficult or impossible to obtain in Poland, today Germans go to 
Poland in search of lower prices. For many residents of Frankfurt/Slubice, shopping was 
the only reason they crossed the border, and relative prices and the best places to buy 
particular items were topics of frequent discussion and debate. Nearly everyone had at 
least one product they bought exclusively on the other side of the border, either because 
of price, preference, or availability.2 
For residents of Frankfurt, the most common cross-border purchases were 
cigarettes, grocery items—especially fresh produce and other perishable products—and 
gasoline, all of which are significantly less expensive in Slubice. For Slubice residents, 
2
 Highly sophisticated calculations are often involved in these decisions. For a detailed description of the 
complexity of buying detergent in Frankfurt/Slubice see Appendix A. 
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the most common items were clothes, cosmetics, drugstore items (e.g. soaps, personal 
hygiene products, etc.), and detergents, usually for reasons of selection and preference 
rather than price, although clothes are often cheaper in Germany. Service products, such 
as hairdressers and beauty salons, dentists, restaurants, bars, and "nightclubs" featuring 
dancers and often prostitution, were also almost always less expensive on the Polish side, 
and for its size, Slubice had a disproportionately large numbers of these businesses, many 
of which expressly cater to German customers. The daily exchange rate between Euros 
and Zloty3 further influenced purchasing decisions, most notably on higher-ticket items 
such as electronics, or used automobiles, two products Poles often purchase in Germany. 
Carrying of two currencies was also commonplace, and often a necessity, particularly for 
Poles shopping in Germany. While many businesses in Slubice would conduct 
transactions in Euros, few businesses in Frankfurt accepted Zloty, making the division in 
currency a continuing indicator of economic difference between the cities. 
European Shopping in Local Spaces 
Because cross-border consumption is such an integral part of everyday experience 
in Frankfurt/Shibice, the role of the EU citizen as transnational consumer is a natural one 
for many of the cities' residents. After visa requirements were dropped between Poland 
and Germany in 1991, transnational consumption expanded rapidly in the two cities. 
However, the cities did not immediately develop into a unified local market, and the 
social interactions of producers, consumers, and service providers continued to structure 
the spaces and practices of consumption in ways that were linked to ethnic and national 
3
 Poland is not projected to adopt the Euro until sometime around 2012. 
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identities. Consumption practices routinely facilitate the creation and maintenance of 
social distinctions as well as the organization of these differences into hierarchies of 
political and cultural value (Appaduri 1986, Berdahl 1999, Bourdieu 1984, Howes 1996). 
This is particularly true for cross-border consumption, which provides exceptionally apt 
contexts for the ascription of similarity and difference simply by facilitating contact 
between individuals from varying social groups and backgrounds (Berdahl 1999:104-139, 
cf. Barth 1969). As is reflected in the purchasing habits discussed above, in a border 
region, what you buy, and where you buy it, can be an important indicator of your 
membership in an ethnic group (Kelleher 2003:71-73). 
In Slubice, many consumption spaces have become closely associated with 
German consumers. Within these spaces, ethnic roles tend to be well defined, and 
interactions limited to a narrow 
economic sphere. The pedestrian 
zone immediately preceding the 
bridge on ulica Jednosci 
Robotnicze (United Workers 
Street) in Slubice is one example 
of this type of space. Known on 
both sides of the border as the 
'**&•£•!& ^t^fUftk* 
•ilii^Qpav. 
Fig. 4.1: The Slubice bazaar. 
"Zigarettenstrafie," (Cigarette Street) a German nickname derived from the many stores 
selling cigarettes at about half the price in Frankfurt, the street was a reflection of the 
cross-border demands of German consumers and was lined with convenience stores, 
tobacco and alcohol shops, hairdressers, currency exchanges, and a few restaurants and 
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beer gardens. As a site of primarily German consumption, the shops on the 
Zigarettenstrafie almost always accepted Euros, had German-speaking clerks, and 
German signs and advertising, as well as slightly higher prices than elsewhere in Slubice. 
Due to less restrictive regulations on retail sales in Poland, these shops were also open 
longer hours than their counterparts in Frankfurt (as were most shops in Slubice), and late 
in the evening or on weekends and holidays it was common to see Frankfurters making a 
quick cross-border shopping trip. 
The Slubice bazaar (Fig. 4.1), sometimes called the "Polenmarkt" (Polish 
market), was an even more exclusively German consumption space than the 
Zigarettenstrafie, and has provided a ^-r^ T ^ -VL^M, 7 
vital source of income for many 
residents of Slubice since it opened 
in 1991. The bazaar was a 
freestanding roof covering 1.6 
hectares and containing about 1200 
stalls offering a wide variety of 
goods, including clothes (much of 
which were counterfeits of well known designers and trademarks), bootleg DVDs, 
ceramics and porcelain, leather goods, fishing gear, bicycles, groceries (especially 
vegetables, meats and cheeses) alcohol, cigarettes, kittens and puppies, and even one 
stand of Nazi and military memorabilia (Fig. 4.2). Prices were almost always marked in 
Euros, and the merchants generally approached potential customers in German first. For 
the Germans who shopped there, a trip to the bazaar was often part of the recreation 
Fig. 4.2: Inside the Slubice bazaar. 
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planned during a weekend outing—an atmosphere that was promoted by the bazaar's beer 
gardens and grill stands. However, for the Slubice residents who worked there, the 
bazaar represented a way of extracting profits at the expense of their more wealthy 
neighbors. One of my correspondents who had worked at the bazaar said that the few 
Poles who shopped there received lower prices, while another observed that the Polish 
salespeople saw the German shoppers simply as "walking wallets." 
While distinctions in ethnicity and nationality were also present in cross-border 
consumption practices in Frankfurt, divisions in its consumption spaces were less 
pronounced. Frankfurt's shopping district was dominated by German and European 
franchises, and while most of my Polish respondents indicated they regularly shopped for 
clothes in Frankfurt, most of these stores are only just beginning to court Polish 
consumers by hiring Polish speaking staff and advertising in Poland. Frankfurt's 
discount outlet of Germany's Karstadt department store has probably taken this practice 
the furthest, actively serving Polish customers by printing all of its in-store signs 
simultaneously in both Polish and in German, and by stocking products such as bulk 
detergent that were aimed specifically at Polish consumers. 
Frankfurt merchants initially saw Polish consumers more as a liability than a 
potential source of sales, and my correspondents from Slubice continually complained of 
shop assistants who shadowed them around stores and treated them like thieves. The 
assumption that all Poles steal is a common stereotype in Germany, and was featured in a 
well-known television advertisement for the German electronics retailer Media Markt as 
part of a series of ads that featured foreign consumers visiting Germany for the 2006 
World Cup. In the advertisement, three Media Markt employees meet three Polish 
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consumers with electronics-laden shopping carts, and following an exchange about the 
store's excellent prices and selection, the six men embrace and the Poles leave. 
Afterwards, one of the Media Markt employees says, "Those Poles are nice guys, 
(pointing to his watch) see I still have my watch." The camera then pans back and 
reveals that all three of the employees' pants have been stolen. 
It is difficult to ascertain how much truth there is to this stereotype in the local 
context of Frankfurt/Slubice. Crime data does suggest that foreigners4 account for a 
higher proportion of property-related crimes (e.g. thefts, "car-related" crimes, and street 
crimes) in Frankfurt than in other cities in the state of Brandenburg, such as Brandenburg 
and Potsdam, which are located far from the border regions (Dascher 2003:20). 
However, crime in Frankfurt is still quite low, especially when compared to large cities 
like Berlin (Dascher 2003:20). Nevertheless, theft from Germany was frequent enough 
that residents of Slubice commonly described the practice using the slang term "Junta" 
(Yuma). Junta can refer to acts of theft or petty crime committed abroad, or to the items 
procured by these acts, and is most often used to describe goods stolen in Germany and 
sold in Poland.5 Maja, a Slubice education administrator, described Junta as "when you 
steal in Germany... Society allows it. Theft and stealing is not called theft. It's stealing 
from the enemy. It used to be very common, but now happens less. Lots of people in 
shops [used to] ask if you would like to buy something [that was stolen] at half price, and 
also if you would ask your friends [if they wanted something]." While a few of my 
correspondents suggested that the use of Junta in Slubice derived from Yuma, Arizona, 
one of Slubice's partner cities, as a metaphor for the one-sided "partnership" that theft in 
4
 The nationalities of these suspects were not given. 
5
 Junta can also be used in verb form (jumac/zajumac). 
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Germany represented, the term was already in widespread use by the mid-1990s, well 
before the conclusion of Slubice and Yuma's partnership agreement in 2000.6 It is 
therefore more likely that Slubice's partnership with Yuma contributed an additional 
layer of ironic symbolism within Junta's the local use and practice. While most of my 
correspondents agreed that theft from Germany continues to decline, the persistent the 
link between Poles and crime acts to orient (and orientalize) Poland as not quite as 
"civilized" as Germany or the EU (See Chapter 6). A common joke told on both sides of 
the border about car theft in Germany demonstrates this positioning: "What is the slogan 
of the Polish tourism office in Germany? Come to Poland—Your car has already arrived!" 
Disharmony and Economy 
Czeslaw, a retired border guard living in Slubice, summarized his view of 
consumption and cross-border relations, "Services in Poland are much cheaper than in 
Germany—hairdressers and others. That's why Germans come here. They are friendly, 
but [only] "so-called" friendly, because it's cheaper. But without them, the bazaar 
would close and many workshops would collapse. There used to be three barbers and 
three hairdressers [in Slubice], now there are 70.7 The engine of development for Slubice 
is Germans coming here and being served." 
On the evening of January 11, 2007—about six months after I completed my 
fieldwork—a fire almost completely destroyed the Slubice bazaar. Although almost 200 
firefighters responded from fire departments in both Slubice and Frankfurt, problems 
6
 An alternate (and possibly apocryphal) etymology for the term is that it referred to the train between 
Wroclaw and Berlin—a well-known smuggling route—which departed at 3:10, the same time as the prison 
train in the classic 1957 American western 3:10 to Yuma. 
7
 According to the Slubice Mayor's Office, as of 2006 there are 75 beauty salons and hairdressers in 
Slubice (Urzaji Miejski w Slubicach 2006) 
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with the water supply lines hindered their efforts to control the blaze, which eventually 
resulted in an estimated PLN 50 million in damages and lost inventory, almost all of it 
uninsured (PAP 2007). According to the subsequent newspaper accounts, the bazaar was 
the largest employer in the region, and contributed to the support of around 6000 people 
(counting both workers and their families) (Gazeta Lubuska 2007a, PAP 2007)—an 
astounding figure for a town with a total population of about 20,000 people and a 
testament to the importance of cross-border consumption to Slubice's economy as well as 
its lack of other industries. Because it owned the site, the Slubice municipal government 
also stood to lose about PLN 2 million per year in rent and tax revenue, and Slubice's 
mayor immediately pledged to rebuild the bazaar (Bielecka 2007). Unfortunately, the 
city found itself unable to obtain the estimated PLN 24 million necessary to cover 
construction costs, and eventually reached an agreement with the bazaar merchants' 
association in which the merchants agreed to pay for the reconstruction costs while the 
municipal government agreed to waive their rent and taxes for nine years and eleven 
months (Bielecka 2008, Gazeta Lubuska 2008). Almost a year after a temporary bazaar 
with 430 stalls reopened in the old bazaar's parking lot on March 31, 2007, the 
merchants' association was finally seeking bids in the hope of completing construction 
sometime between November 2008 and March 2009. 
Even before the fire, many residents of Slubice expressed their concern regarding 
the town's dependence on German consumers, as well as the long-term reliability of the 
cross-border price differences driving their shopping practices. Anecdotal evidence from 
my correspondents also suggested that bazaar-type trade peaked in Slubice in the mid-
1990s, and has been in gradual decline ever since (cf. Gazeta Lubuska 2007b). In this 
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regard, Poland's recent EU accession and the expansion of the EU's common market was 
seen as a threat to the local economy by putting further inflationary pressure on local 
prices, prices which many people complained were already higher than elsewhere in 
Poland because of the proximity of German consumers. Given that Lubuskie had the 
third highest aggregate consumer price level 8and the third lowest average earnings9 of 
Poland's 16 voivodships in 2005, this explanation seems plausible (although a causal 
relationship is difficult to determine). 
Markus, the director of a local NGO, explained a commonly held view of 
Slubice's precarious economic situation: 
I think in Slubice they are relying on tourism—shopping from Germany— 
and it's going to decline, and people will have to find something new. It's 
a monoculture in the economy and when it stops, [Slubice's residents] will 
have to reinvent themselves, and I don't know how much Frankfurt will 
[be able to] help because they too have been reinventing themselves since 
1990. 
Darek, an English teacher in Slubice, put it even more bluntly, underscoring the 
economic dangers of fully opening the border: 
In the 1990s, the problem [in Slubice] was unemployment. Companies 
collapsed and many people worked in the bazaar and speculated. Many 
people did things illegally to keep living and make money. Many people 
supported those sharks. Now, [the problem is still] unemployment. 
Slubice doesn't have any industry. The worst was when we joined the 
8
 Source: Calculated from 112 consumer prices available from the Regional Data Bank of the Central 
Statistical Office (GUS) of the Republic of Poland. 
9
 Source: GUS Regional Data Bank 
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[EU's] common market and many transport firms collapsed because 
business moved to the East. Many people who were employed by the 
border, customs officers for example, had to leave. Only a few stayed. I 
don't know what keeps people living here because there is no industry. 
Probably they opened some kind of business. From the economic point of 
view, Slubice may be facing another crisis. We are in the middle of 
Europe and the border is moving to the East and that will create many 
problems. 
Here we see the paradox in the relationship between Slubice's economy and the 
integrationist goals of the EU's expansion. While Slubice's businesses require an open 
border to enable cross-border consumption, they also depend on the economic 
differentials that the border helps maintain. A more Europeanized local space marked by 
price convergence, fully opened borders, and increased multiethnic intermixing, might 
have the side-effect of driving many of Slubice's enterprises out of business by 
eliminating the impetus for German consumers to cross the border. While a few Slubice 
businesses serve an almost exclusively Polish customer base (in particular small 
neighborhood shops), most depend on German consumers for a significant percentage of 
their total revenue. In an informal survey I conducted of eighteen Slubice businesses, 
eleven estimated revenues from German consumers in excess of 20%, and two of these, 
including one large furniture manufacturer, estimated the figure at 70% (the most 
common estimate was 40%). For individuals and business owners who depend on the 
patterns of cross-border consumption produced by local citizenship regimes that 
emphasize a social structure in which inexpensive goods and services are provided by 
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Poles and consumed by Germans, there are therefore strong disincentives for pursuing the 
more unified "European city" advocated by the cities' Europhillic residents. 
A Few Hundred Meters Short 
Determining how Frankfurt and Slubice should respond to the challenges and 
opportunities presented by the structural adjustments surrounding Poland's EU accession 
is one of the most important issues currently facing the cities' residents and policy 
makers. Frankfurt's mayor, Oberbiirgermeister Martin Patzelt,10 believed that intensive 
cross-border economic cooperation is the a key to the cities' future development. He 
elaborated: 
In the area of business, cooperation is beginning, and Slubice is a part of 
[Frankfurt's] economic development community 
{Wirtschaftsfordergesellschafi). It is one community. This is important 
because the businesses are actually in competition. However, that is only 
at first glance. When you look at it again more closely, you'll see that the 
development of Frankfurt can only happen, or can happen much better, 
with the cooperation of Slubice. Every investment in Frankfurt or Slubice 
is important for the future of both towns... I think that business and 
industry are the driving forces that are bringing the towns together. 
In 2005, a plan to extend Frankfurt's tram network to include Slubice became one test 
case for public commitment to the vision of the cities as an integrated urban space. The 
proposed tram line would reestablish the service that had served Slubice (then 
10
 Because of his position as an elected official, I conducted my interview with Oberbiirgermeister Patzelt 
"on the record" and therefore do not replace his name with a pseudonym. 
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Dammvorstadt) from 1900 to 1945 (Baranski 2006), and would follow a circuitous route 
across the bridge and through Slubice's main commercial streets, making stops at its 
shopping areas, student residences, and Collegium Polonicum before returning to 
Germany. In addition to making cross-border shopping trips much more convenient, the 
tram would connect the campuses of the cities' two universities, as well as the Slubice 
bus station and the Frankfurt railway station, making travel from Frankfurt simpler not 
only for Slubice residents, but also people traveling from outlying towns. 
With a population that has declined over 25% since 1989 (from 87,123 to 64,656) 
(Stadt Frankfurt(Oder) 2005), Frankfurt can no longer support its existing public 
transport network, while Slubice, with about 20,000 residents, currently has no local 
public transport. Extending one of Frankfurt's tram or bus lines to incorporate Slubice 
would help alleviate both problems. In 2004, a feasibility study was conducted, which 
estimated the number of weekday public transport passengers between Slubice and 
Frankfurt in 2015 at between 3,300 and 4,800 people per day, a level comparable to 
several of Frankfurt's existing tram routes (Sommer and Klipphahn 2004:25). When 
forecasting Frankfurt's costs for 2015, the study also counterintuitively concluded that 
operating a tram on the route to Slubice would actually be about EUR 94,000 per year 
cheaper than a bus (Sommer and Klipphahn 2004:36). This conclusion assumed that 
Frankfurt would shoulder only EUR 2.7 million of the tram's approximately EUR 7.6 
million capital investment costs and would be responsible for building only 450 meters of 
the 3.4 kilometers of track required for the new route, while Slubice would cover the 
remaining construction costs, ostensibly with the help of EU funding initiatives (Sommer 
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and Klipphahn 2004:9, 34-36). Frankfurt's public referendum on whether or not to build 
these 450 meters of track would eventually determine the outcome of the project. 
Oberbiirgermeister Patzelt supported either a tram or a bus, arguing that while he 
believed connecting the two cities was an important urban development goal, he had no 
ideological position on how it should be done. Slubice's mayor, Burmistrz Ryszard 
Bodziacki, supported only the tram, probably because of the political strength of 
Slubice's taxi drivers, who had reportedly blocked all previous attempts at connecting the 
cities' via public transport, and vehemently opposed a bus as a threat to their livelihood. 
Unlike a tram, a bus line could be easily changed to include the taxi drivers' most 
profitable routes, such as between the bridge and the bazaar; routes that were sure to be in 
demand by public transport customers (the planned tram line did not include service to 
the bazaar). The taxi drivers notwithstanding, most of the people I spoke with in Slubice 
generally supported either a tram or a bus, while in Frankfurt, the tram was widely 
perceived as too expensive, and a commonly expressed feeling was that Frankfurt would 
pay, but Slubice would benefit.11 
Based on the support of both administrations, a public referendum was held in 
Frankfurt on January 22, 2006 to approve the construction of its portion of the tram 
connection across the bridge. In a devastating symbolic blow to the vision of a single 
integrated city, the referendum was defeated by an overwhelming margin of 83% against 
(on a 30% turnout) (Markische Oderzeitung 2006). Several months later, Patzelt used 
11
 The following websites archive various aspects and opinions of the tram/bus debate: Frankfurt(Oder)-
Shibice: Pro Bus Contra Bahn, http://www.rotofo.de/frame a.htm; Slubfurter Strassenbahn, 
http://www.slubfurt.org; Strafienbahn nach Slubice, http://tram-
ff.de/index.html?/tramffinhalt/tramnachslubice.html. 
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the referendum as an illustration when I asked him if he thought Frankfurt/Slubice's 
history as a divided city was a problem for social relations today: 
[History] always plays a role in the unconsciousness of people, and the 
sentiments and fears that are involved with these [intercultural] feelings, 
but in public and direct communication you don't notice it as much. I'd 
like to it make clear with an example: the tram that was supposed to go 
across the border. It was opportune from all logical arguments, but it was 
rejected by one in four Frankfurters (based on the number of votes against 
compared to Frankfurt's entire population). And the arguments to reject it 
weren't correct—they weren't factual. And it is a phenomenon, because if 
we were going to build 350 meters of track on the German side—if we had 
built this amount anywhere else—no one would blink an eye. This gives 
me the impression that there are other reasons for [the result] that are 
actually there but aren't communicated. . . There is a double situation, the 
public one and the reality that underlies i t . . . 
[AA: What could be done to overcome these problems of 
cooperation?] 
I think that we have to create many and different forms of meeting 
that include cooperation on concrete projects.... In my experience here, 
when you make concrete projects and plans, they grow into greater 
cooperation. Those who were very reserved about [cross-border 
cooperation] at the beginning are now the protagonists in this cooperation. 
And it is not so much an ideological statement, but concrete action. 
Page 111 
Sometimes it works, and sometimes it doesn't work. In the example of the 
tram, Germans and Poles were sitting together who might not have come 
together in other situations. In these spontaneous meetings, things are 
normalized. That is just an example. There are other examples of people 
who take their car to a Polish mechanic, or go to a Polish beauty salon for 
a manicure or pedicure, or to the dentist, and these experiences have 
changed their opinions from what it would have been three years ago, and 
I see many Poles who spontaneously and without thinking about it, use 
Frankfurt as part of their free time, and as part of their recreation. 
Exercising the right to vote in a referendum about the future of one's town is one of the 
most exemplary expressions of local citizenship practice, and as such, Frankfurt's 
referendum on the tram project demonstrates several important aspects of transnational 
citizenship in the two cities. First, the referendum can be interpreted as an example of 
boundary maintenance, and it would seem from the results that many, if not most, 
residents of Frankfurt do not yet see the cities as a single space, at least not enough to 
invest in integrating the public transport system. For many Frankfurters, building a tram 
to facilitate cross-border movements seemed less like investing in economic 
development, and more like funding a potential threat to Frankfurt's already marginal 
business environment by further enabling competition from Slubice. 
Second, the referendum demonstrates a weakness in cross-border governance in 
Frankfurt/Slubice, in particular the lack of mechanisms beyond mutual cooperation by the 
cities' administrations for deciding policies that simultaneously affect both sides of the 
border. Even for a project as explicitly transnational as a cross-border tram requiring the 
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participation, planning, and financial commitment of both sides of the border, the vote on 
starting construction polled only the citizens of Frankfurt. Once Frankfurters (or "the 
Germans") had refused to build the connection across the bridge, it was irrelevant if 
Slubicers, (or "the Poles") were still committed to the project (a referendum in Slubice 
was never held). Under these circumstances, the citizenship regimes of the cities clearly 
gave Frankfurters more decision making power over both cities than Slubicers. Had both 
sides of the border voted in the referendum, the outcome might have been different, and a 
more equitable situation might have been to hold referendums on both parts of the project 
simultaneously, so the overall opinion of the residents of both cities could have been 
ascertained. 
Creating more rigorous governing structures and policy-making institutions that 
could truly serve both sides of the border equally would require a radical structural 
change not only in local politics well beyond today's level of administrative cooperation, 
but also in the citizenship practices of the cities' residents. As Patzelt noted, by 
attending common meetings to discuss and debate the tram proposals, the cities' residents 
demonstrated an emerging transnational public space that does suggest a gradual shift in 
citizenship practices. That this space was not quite robust enough to produce an 
integrated public transport solution for 2015 is perhaps not surprising given the long-term 
Euroregions are one unique type of local cross-border governing institution that have been established to 
provide transnational administrative frameworks for managing EU funding initiative for transnational 
regions. Euroregions are voluntary associations of municipal and local governments rather than official 
governing bodies, and while they blur the boundaries between levels of government by brokering 
relationships directly between local member governments and the EU bureaucracy, they can generally be 
understood as civil society institutions. Four Euroregions were created along the Polish/German border, 
including Pro Europa Viadrina in 1993, which encompasses Frankfurt and Slubice. The Viadrina 
Euroregion plays an extremely important role in the distribution of funds for transnational and interregional 
cooperation through the INTERREG A program of the EU's European Regional Devlopment Fund 
(ERDF). In 2000-2006 the INTERREG III A provided EUR 132.25 million in co-financing for programs 
in Brandenburg and Lubuskie (Inforegio 2007). 
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tensions and divisions between the cities. If this transnational public space continues to 
expand, it might eventually provide a substrate for a sustainable sense of cultural 
citizenship in, and identification with, Frankfurt/Slubice as a single transnational city. 
Until this occurs, one of the most effective ways for Slubicers to gain a voice in 
Frankfurt's politics (and vice versa) is to exercise their rights as EU citizens to move 
across the bridge and vote in municipal elections. So far, very few people have exercised 
these prerogatives. 
A Flat in Frankfurt(Oder) 
According to official records, only 1239 Poles lived in Frankfurt (1.9% of its 
population) at the end of 2005 , and only 38 Germans lived in Slubice (0.2% of its 
population) in 200614. As these figures suggest, cross-border residency has failed to 
materialize as a transnational citizenship practice in Frankfurt/Slubice, a failure resulting 
directly from cross-border economic inequalities and the citizenship regimes they create. 
In contrast to Slubice, one of the distinguishing features of Frankfurt's cityscape 
is the remarkable number of vacant flats and storefronts, even in its most central districts. 
This is a common feature of post-unification East Germany, which has some 1.4 million 
vacant flats as a consequence of the widespread emigration of its population to West 
Germany in search of better economic prospects (Dascher 2005:1). Despite this 
oversupply, rents in East Germany have actually increased to levels approaching those in 
West Germany as local public housing corporations and cooperatives—which own about 
two-thirds of East German housing stock—have subsidized the modernization of some 
13
 Down from 1420 at the end of 2003. Frankfurt(Oder) Biiro des Oberburgermeisters, personal 
communication with the author, March 8, 2006 
14
 Urza^ d Miejski w Shibicach, personal communication with the author, August 4, 2006. 
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flats by increasing rents for all flats (Dascher 2005:2-4, 29). Unmodernized flats are 
therefore overpriced and oversupplied, making the buildings potential maintenance 
liabilities for their owners. To counteract this problem, approximately EUR 3 billion has 
been set aside by German policymakers to support the demolition of around 350,000 
"socialist-style" flats, even though most of these flats are in perfectly useable condition, 
and are sometimes still occupied (Dascher 2005:1-2, 5-6). 
With two companies controlling around 80% of the city's housing stock, rents in 
Frankfurt are inflated well above what the local market should support, even to the point 
that it is sometimes cheaper to commute from Berlin.15 As a result of this incongruous 
economic environment, new housing continues to be built in Frankfurt, even as literally 
thousands of flats stand empty and apartment blocks in convenient, centrally located 
districts are torn down, including several buildings less than 100 meters from the border 
crossing. Meanwhile, because its border location has made it more economically 
attractive than surrounding communities in Poland, Slubice is experiencing an acute 
housing shortage, and has at least 500 low income families waiting for housing 
(Frankfurt(Oder) Sonderbeauftragter des Oberburgermeisters fur Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 2005:1), and probably many more individuals, such as adult children 
living with their parents, who would seek different living arrangements if the opportunity 
existed. After unemployment, Slubice's shortage of flats was the second most maligned 
of the city's problems among my correspondents, and many expressed the hope that 
15
 Coupled with Berlin's cultural attractiveness, this fact has resulted in a tremendous number of Viadrina 
University's students, professors, and staff to prefer living in Berlin, so much so that the typical three-day 
university workweek when faculty can (usually) be found on campus is nicknamed "DiMiDo" after 
Dienstag-Mittwoch-Donnerstag (Tuesday-Wednesday-Thursday). Heavily subsidized public transport 
passes for students and regional express trains that make the 1-1.5 hour trip to Berlin twice hourly also 
facilitate this practice. 
Page 115 
Frankfurt's abundance of housing might offer a solution, if only it could be made more 
affordable. 
Piotr, a Slubice handyman, commented jokingly, but without exaggeration, "I 
didn't wait long for a flat, only 16 years! . . .The mayors had talks about getting flats for 
Poles [in Frankfurt], but it would cost too much [for the Poles to live there]." Jarek, a 
member of the university staff, made a similar observation when talking about what he 
would like to see in the future for Slubice, "I know there are many places in Frankfurt 
where Poles could live, but because of the costs it isn't as popular or realized as it could 
be, so you have many Poles who don't have any place to live or live with their parents 
because prices are too high or they can't find a place. There are many buildings in 
Germany which could be used for this but aren't." 
While explaining the difficulties in undertaking cross-border urban planning, 
Oberbiirgermeister Patzelt echoed these comments: 
There is a joint plan for the use of land, but the readiness to cooperate on 
this isn't well developed on either side. It isn't any good to have good 
plans if, in the realization of these plans, both sides go their own way. 
There are two examples of this. The first is the [hot water] heating of the 
towns. Frankfurt has too much capacity, but Slubice is building a new 
heating unit. This is because Frankfurt~in the short and medium term— 
can't offer Slubice an attractive price. Second, in Frankfurt there are 7000 
empty flats, and in Slubice there are about 700 families that desperately 
need a flat. However, in Frankfurt we are [spending a lot of money] 
demolishing flats. This is because the Poles can't pay the rent that they 
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have to pay in Frankfurt. Even if we reduce the rents, they have to pay 
high costs for energy and water. The disproportion in income between the 
Poles and Germans, and in social aid (Sozialsicherung), is why town 
planning between Frankfurt and Slubice is not making much progress. 
By obstructing the development of a more open and transnational housing market and 
preventing a common solution to the social problems of excess housing in Frankfurt and 
the scarcity of housing in Slubice, the persistence of cross-border economic difference 
reinforces a citizenship-based division of the cities. This barrier also demonstrates a 
shortcoming of the economic emphasis contained in the EU's model of citizenship 
(Peebles 1997, cf. Chapter 1). It matters very little if Poles from Slubice have the right as 
EU citizens to live in Frankfurt, if income inequality makes finding affordable housing 
impossible. 
A few of my Polish correspondents did take advantage of the possibility to 
establish "official" residency in Frankfurt in order to gain access to Germany's higher 
wages and better social services. For example, when Jakub and Joanna, a Polish couple 
living in Slubice, learned that Joanna was pregnant, they decided to use the better and 
more modern medical facilities available in Frankfurt. Due to Jakub's cross-border 
position at the cities' universities, both he and Joanna were insured in Germany, but once 
their baby was born, it would not be eligible for German insurance unless they lived in 
Germany. To circumvent this requirement, Jakub and Joanna registered at the apartment 
of a friend in Frankfurt, although after three months they needed the certification of the 
apartment's owner in order to maintain their status—a certification that would be 
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impossible for them to obtain. Fortunately, the timing went smoothly and their daughter 
was born during their three-month "residency" in Frankfurt. 
Bernard, who also lived full-time in Slubice, used a flat in Germany as a location 
from which to officially register his residency so that he could operate a tile installation 
company in Frankfurt. He explained that it was not difficult for him to open a business in 
Germany; he only had to register at the town hall and state the kind of work he would do, 
and then apply for a residency card for EU citizens. Although Bernard had crossed the 
border every day for work since before Poland's EU accession, he said that the right to 
free movement provided by the EU Treaties had made the process easier: 
Before joining the EU, there was a law [in Germany], that you were 
supposed to have at least DM 50 [for expenses], and if I didn't have the 
money, I wasn't allowed to cross. When I used to go to work [before 
accession].. .the official would generally ask me questions every day. 
[Now,] he can't do anything, but kiss your ass. He can ask questions, but 
you can answer, "I'm going to France," because its your right. He knows 
it's a stupid question and that I am going to work. . . 
Commuting across the River 
Like shopping, limited cross-border work developed between Frankfurt and 
Slubice during the socialist period. By the end of the 1970s, about 500 Poles were 
bussed daily across the border to work in Frankfurt's Halbleiterwerk (Berkner 2005:121). 
Similar to wage levels today, when pay in Brandenburg tends to be at least four to five 
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times higher than in Lubuskie,16 socialist-period wages at the Halbleiterwerk —as well as 
at other jobs in Germany-were relatively high. Czeslaw and Magdalena, my neighbors 
in Slubice, described how they were able to utilize working in Frankfurt to provide their 
family with supplementary income: 
Czeslaw: [In the 1970s and 80s] Poles started to get to know the GDR, 
[and work] at the Halbleiterwerk, in gardening, or in restaurants. That's 
how many families' situations got better; when a family member worked 
in Germany. Speaking about us in those years, there was generally certain 
life stability. You were sure of what you had, work, etc. In 1980,1 
finished army service and retired. That's why our financial situation got 
worse, because of the difference in my salary and pension. After a year of 
rest I started to work again. 
Magdalena: I worked in Germany, and I didn't speak German at 
all. First, I was angry and I didn't want to learn German, but then I did. It 
was a good experience. 
AA: Where did you work? 
M: At a hotel in Frankfurt. 
AA: How did you decide to work in Germany? 
M: It was in 1986, in March. Some other Poles also worked there, 
not many, six or seven. I had worked at the kindergarten, but it was very 
stressful for me, and then [I worked] in a military commissary. It was very 
difficult work because I was the director of a district shop, and it was too 
16
 Unfortunately, the categories used by the statistical offices of Germany and Poland to calculate average 
wages are not equivalent, and more accurate comparison is not possible. 
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difficult for my nerves. After working in the shop, I had nine months 
medical leave and then I decided to work in Germany.. .1 can't complain 
about Germans treating me badly. After I worked a bit, they gave me the 
best floor in the hotel, working with Germans. When we had meeting and 
the boss spoke I didn't understand, but a co-worker explained it to me 
again in German, so it was easier.. . 
I worked two years after unification. These years were rich for me 
personally. Finances were better. I was working in the hotel and Germans from 
the FRG came as guests to visit. They came to give workshops, and they lived in 
the hotel for three months. When they went for the weekend home, they left five 
or ten, or even once, 50 Marks for us. Once a German left laundry, a shirt and 
pants. It didn't take long [for me to do it], and he gave me 20 Marks, and left 20 
Marks at reception for me, because he couldn't believe I did it. They were nice 
and generous. 
While cross-border work provided an extremely important source of income for 
individuals like Magdalena, for the most part the labor markets of Frankfurt and Slubice 
remained separate. Even today, Germany's restrictions on the employment of workers 
from the eight Eastern European countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 (A8) continue 
to make Frankfurt's labor market highly regulated and restrictive towards workers from 
Slubice. In order to provide the fifteen "old" EU member states (EU15) a way of 
managing the employment-driven immigration from the A8, the EU15 were allowed to 
implement an up to seven-year transitional period during which measures restricting 
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labor market access could be applied unilaterally toward A8 citizens.17 These policies 
follow a "2+3+2" format, meaning that they must be reviewed after two years and an 
additional three years, and must be dropped altogether after seven years (i.e. in 2011) 
(European Commission 2002a:6). Only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden fully 
opened their labor markets in 2004. Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain followed 
in 2006, as well as the Netherlands and Luxemburg in 2007. The labor markets of the 
remaining five countries, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany remain 
restricted.18 For this reason, Poles from Slubice can not be employed in Frankfurt 
without special permission19—a point that was often cited as unfair by my correspondents. 
By bolstering the right of individuals to provide services outside their country of origin, 
the passage of the EU services directive by the European Parliament and European 
Council at the end of 2006 facilitated one way to circumvent these employment 
restrictions, assuming the individual is willing to follow the regulations and labor laws of 
the country where the service is provided (and the service is not one that is excluded from 
the directive). 
Transitional arrangements apply to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. Malta and Cyprus were not included in this portion of the accession agreements. 
Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary applied reciprocal labor market restrictions in 2004, but Slovenia and 
Poland dropped these restrictions in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Due to concerns about foreign land 
purchases (especially from Germany), Poland also negotiated a transitional period limiting EU citizens' 
right to purchase property in Poland for twelve years for agricultural and forest lands, and five years for 
secondary residences (European Commission 2002a: 14). 
18
 After experiencing the immigration of nearly 400,000 Eastern European workers after the EU's 2004 
expansion (Home Office 2006), the United Kingdom placed restrictions on workers from Romania and 
Bulgaria after their EU accession on Jan 1, 2007. 
19
 In order to be employed in Germany, Poles (and other foreigners) must obtain permission from the local 
labor office {Arbeitserlaubnis). Permission will only be granted if employer/employee "match is not 'to the 
disadvantage of local labor market,'.. .there are no German workers with similar qualifications while 
unemployed and willing to work, and... the wage paid to foreign worker does not fall below going wage 
for German worker with similar qualifications" (Dascher 2003:28, summarizing the requirements of the 
Sozialgesetzbuch, Part III, Sec. 284-5). 
20
 See OJ L 376/36, Dec. 27, 2006. Unfortunately, my fieldwork ended before the Services Directive was 
passed, and I was unable to assess its impact in Frankfurt/Slubice. 
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Along with wages that give German citizens little incentive to work in Slubice, 
Germany's labor policies contribute to a difference in citizenship regimes in which 
citizens from each side of the border consume, but do not produce, on the opposite side, 
and the vast majority of the cities' residents work on the side of the border where they 
hold national citizenship. At the end of 2005, there were 127 Polish businesses registered 
in Frankfurt, accounting for only about 2.6% of businesses in the city,21 and only about 
10% of my correspondents crossed the border for work (no official data on cross-border 
employment was available). All of these individuals worked in service industries (both 
skilled and unskilled) and commuted from Slubice to Germany, and only one was 
German. Coupled with consumption practices that map Poles as providers of inexpensive 
domestic services (e.g cooking, cleaning, haircuts, or prostitution), these cross-border 
working relationships facilitate a sense of German superiority within the local space, as 
well as the perception of Poles as second-class Europeans—the hired help in the "House 
of Europe." Alicja, a Slubice resident who worked illegally in Frankfurt, felt that 
Germans routinely treated Poles who work in Germany with a superiority complex: 
[Germans] only hire Polish people to do certain kinds of jobs, because 
[Poles] don't have a chance to find a job in Poland. They let you know 
your place. They wear a mask of friendliness but feel superior. The only 
way out is for Poles to pretend they don't notice. [AA: What kind of 
jobs?] Gardening, cleaning, building for men. Under the table. They pay 
half of [a normal] salary. It's ridiculousfly] [low] for Germans, but 
enough for Poles. Germans understand that it's significant money for 
Poles. It degrades the [social] level of the work. 
21
 Frankfurt(Oder) Bilro des Oberbiirgermeisters, personal communication with the author, March 8, 2006. 
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By helping establish a transnational space in which cross-border consumption and 
production of services is possible, but simultaneously structured by citizenship regimes 
that assign roles according to nationality, EU policy has ironically contributed to an 
experience of national-citizenship-based hierarchies within the local practices of its 
supranational citizenship in Frankfurt/Slubice. This feeling that Poles are treated as 
inferior EU citizens was widespread among my Polish correspondents (see Chapter 6). A 
wry pre-accession joke perhaps best summarizes their perception of Poland's position in 
relation to the EU's promise of prosperity for all: "Once Poland joins the EU every Pole 
will have a Mercedes.. .to wash." 
Conclusions: Harmony and Disharmony in a European City 
Cross-border economic and social difference frames nearly every aspect of daily 
life in Frankfurt/Slubice. Nevertheless, this difference is dynamic, and even as 
distinctions in currency, prices, income, housing, and employment opportunities all work 
to construct the cities as separate social spaces, the constant cross-border movements and 
interpersonal contact of the cities' residents act to break down these divisions and 
construct a more unified, or "European," space. This tension is at the core of citizenship 
practices in Frankfurt/Slubice, as the efforts of EU and local-level policymakers to 
harmonize both sides of the border meet up with a variety of structural, financial, and 
social barriers which operate to maintain disharmony; a disharmony which helps 
maintain the cross-border economic differentials that provide the impetus for many of the 
consumption patterns that fuel Frankfurt/Slubice's local economy. 
As is demonstrated by the domains of practice examined in this chapter, the 
factors promoting harmony and disharmony operate simultaneously at a variety of levels, 
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ranging from local and regional, to national and supranational. For example, the high 
relative cost of housing observed in Frankfurt was not intended to exclude Polish citizens 
from exercising their supranational right to live in Germany, but instead resulted from 
local patterns in the ownership of housing stock, population and migration trends in 
Frankfurt and Slubice, and Germany's national and Lander-level public housing budgets 
and policies. This amalgam of overlapping and competing jurisdictions, institutions and 
interests is characteristic of the variable geometry of EU governmentality and policy-
making, particularly in border regions where close proximity necessitates international 
cooperation at the local level. One outcome of this "graduated" (Ong 1999), or "gothic" 
(Asad 2002), construction of space is the complexity of compromises, accommodations, 
and limitations that produce citizenship regimes which vary between social groups. 
Because the opportunities available to Polish citizens are limited in comparison to their 
German counterparts within the common transnational space of Frankfurt/Slubice, the 
cities' citizenship regimes repeatedly map Polish citizens as holders of a weaker set of 
rights and privileges; a situation that lends itself to the continued division of the cities by 
nationality and ethnicity and the persistence of citizenship-based hierarchy within the EU. 
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Chapter 5 
Schengen's Excluded: Third Country Nationals on the Polish-German Border 
Introduction 
"I don't have a visa... I dream about going to Germany, but I don't know how." 
Nadia, a Ukrainian student living in Slubice was continually reminded of this frustration 
by the panoramic view of Frankfurt that accompanied her daily walk along the Polish-
German border to her university. In contrast to her Polish and German contemporaries, 
who have enjoyed visa-free travel between their countries since 1991, Nadia was unable 
to obtain a Schengen zone visa and had therefore never been permitted to make the five 
minute trip across the Oder River to visit the German side of the cities' cross-border 
urban area. Like many citizens of non-EU states, or "third country nationals," living in 
Frankfurt and Slubice, Nadia experienced the everyday proximity of the border as a type 
of social exclusion; a limitation on her freedom of movement that distinguished her as an 
outsider not only in the cities' locally transnational spaces, but also in the supranational 
spaces created by the EU. 
Poland's EU accession on May 1,2004, and subsequent adoption of the Schengen 
acquis—the EU's common policies on visas, cooperation in law enforcement, the 
management of its external borders, and the elimination of its internal borders1--was 
1
 The Schengen acquis was incorporated into the EU's legal framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which came into effect on May 1, 1999. It collectively contains the provisions of the 1985 Schengen 
Agreement and the 1995 Schengen Convention, as well as later decisions. Although there is not an exact 
correspondence between Schengen and EU member states—the United Kingdom and Ireland are EU 
members, but not Schengen signatories, while Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are Schengen signatories, 
but not EU members—the Schengen border protocols treat all citizens of the European Economic Area 
(EEA), which includes Ireland and the United Kingdom, in the same way as citizens of Schengen member 
states. The slippage between the two memberships is small enough that in terms of EU identity politics, 
they can generally be understood as coterminous, and they are routinely treated as a single entity in both the 
media and everyday discourse. Because the distinction in memberships is not essential to my arguments, 
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supposed to make border controls between Shibice and Frankfurt obsolete. However, 
because Poland had not fully implemented the acquis's requirements prior to its EU 
accession on May 1, 2004, it remained outside of the Schengen area's border-free zone 
for a little over three-and-a-half more years. For this reason, the border checkpoint on the 
bridge between the cities stayed anachronistically in place until December 21, 2007 
(Council of the European Union 2006b: 13), and third country nationals continued to 
require both Polish and Schengen visas in order to maintain access to both sides of the 
city space. 
Michel Foucault observes that the effective operation of the apparatuses of 
security, that is, the mechanisms and calculations modern forms of governmentality use 
to determine the optimum parameters within which to manage the well-being of a 
population, both requires and creates freedom of movement, specifically, "the possibility 
of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of people and things" 
(2007:48-49, cf. 6,63, Gordon 1991:20-21). In the course of establishing its common 
market, the EU has scaled up this concept for use at the transnational level. Indeed, the 
principle of free movement is one of the most fundamental of the EU's governing values 
and one of the core rights of EU citizenship (cf. D'Oliveira 1995). The EU's 
foundational document—the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU, commonly known as 
the Maastricht Treaty)—requires member states to "maintain and develop the Union as an 
area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured,"2 
and create "an internal market characterized by the abolition. . . of obstacles to the free 
for the purposes of this chapter I also treat EU citizens and Schengen member state citizens as 
interchangeable groups. 
2
 TEU Art. B (Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version) Art. 2). For the aid of the reader, when 
an EU Treaty is cited in this article, I indicate the original version first, followed by the most recent 
consolidated versions in parentheses. 
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movement of goods, persons, services and capital."3 The Maastricht Treaty goes on to 
make free movement of persons a hallmark of its newly established definition of EU 
citizenship, stating, "Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States."4 
EU citizens also appear to regard mobility as one of the Union's most important 
attributes. In response to a 2006 Eurobarometer question, "What does the European 
Union mean to you personally?" 50% of EU citizens answered "freedom to travel, study 
and work anywhere in the European Union,5" a rate of response more than twice as high 
as "democracy" (at 24%) and five times higher than "social protection" (at 10%) 
(Eurobarometer 2007b:73). Nevertheless, because the Maastricht Treaty grants EU 
citizenship automatically and exclusively to the citizens of the member states,6 the 
principle of free movement is not extended to the approximately 16 million third country 
nationals who reside within the EU.7 For these individuals, the Maastricht Treaty 
powerfully demonstrates the exclusionary function of citizenship as a membership 
category which divides those who are entitled to full participation in a community from 
those who are not (Brubaker 1992, Cohen 1999, Soysal 1994, Tilly 1996). 
This chapter utilizes the lens of mobility to respond in two ways to Andrew 
Kipnis's recent call for increased anthropological focus on the legal structures of 
citizenship in order "to lay the basis for the theoretical construction of citizenship as an 
3
 TEU Art. G, Para. 3 (Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version) Art. 3). 
4
 TEU, Art. G, Para. 9 (Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version) Art. 17). 
This right is, however, "subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in [the TEU] and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect." 
5
 The Eurobarometer survey allowed respondents to give multiple responses to this question. In Poland and 
Germany, the percentage answering "freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union" 
was even higher, at 62% and 57% respectively. (Eurobarometer 2007b:Table of Results QA14) 
6
 TEU, Art. G, Para. 9 (Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version) Art. 18). 
7
 As of 1/1/2003. Source: Eurostat. 
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independent axis for the analysis of both social difference and inequality" (2004:258). 
First, this chapter examines how the techniques and technologies of governmentality 
(Foucault 1991, 2004) contained within the Schengen acquis's regulations and 
procedures systematically constitute third country nationals and EU citizens as separate 
legal categories that are subject to different degrees of mobility, security, and 
surveillance. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller describe governmental technologies as the 
"complex of mundane programs, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and 
procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental 
ambitions (1992:175, cf. Inda 2005:8). In this way, the institutionalization of the 
Schengen acquis at Slubice/Frankfurt's border checkpoint reveals one aspect of an EU-
wide enactment of varying and unequal "citizenship regimes" (D. Anderson 1996, 
Humphrey 1999) for EU and third country citizens. By subjecting the members of each 
group to different citizenship practices, these citizenship regimes configure the terms 
under which individuals have access to, and can make demands for, the entitlements, 
privileges, and rights of citizenship (D. Anderson 1996, cf. Wiener 1998:30). 
Second, this chapter investigates how the presence of a Schengen border between 
Slubice and Frankfurt obliged third country nationals to respond to the regulations it 
imposed either by accepting limits on their freedom of movement, or, more often, by 
strategically managing their citizenship statuses. By so doing, these individuals 
exhibited a type of "flexible citizenship," whereby economic calculation becomes "a 
major element in diasporean subjects' choice of citizenship," as they "both circumvent 
and benefit from different nation-state regimes" (Ong 1999:112). In Slubice/Frankfurt, 
where the local economic space was divided between two national markets, this 
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flexibility was often a matter of financial necessity, and many third country nationals 
sought EU citizenship through naturalization in Poland or Germany simply as a way to 
guarantee continuous access to economic opportunities in both cities. 
At the beginning of 2005, Frankfurt had a foreign population of 2,824, accounting 
for 4.4%8 of its total population of 64,656, or a level about half of Germany's national 
average of8.8%.9 In comparison, 230 foreign residents10 were registered in gmina 
Slubice as of 2006, amounting to 1.1% of its total population of 20,212, or a proportion 
similar to Poland's national average of about 1.8%.12 80% (185) of Slubice's foreign 
residents were third country nationals, 66% (152) were from former Soviet republics 
(excluding EU members Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), and 44% (102) were from 
Ukraine.13 Although it includes individuals living in both cities, the breakdown of 
citizenships in my sample also roughly follows this distribution. All but two of the 
seventeen correspondents I interviewed for this chapter originated in the former Soviet 
Union, and eleven originated in Ukraine. As the above figures suggest, Slubice and 
Frankfurt are not destinations for large migrant populations. Nevertheless, because they 
lack citizenship in any of Slubice/Frankfurt's three local spaces—Poland, Germany, and 
the EU— third country nationals are particularly "good to think with" as they document 
one instance of the considerable "degree of 'illiberality' in [the] supposedly neoliberal 
world" (Kipnis 2004:266, cf. Torpey 2000:166) of EU citizenship by virtue of their 
exclusion from it. 
8
 Kommunale Statistikstelle der Stadt Frankfurt(Oder) (2005) 
9
 As of 12/31/2005. Source: Federal Statistical Office of the Republic of Germany 
10
 Urzajd Miejski w Slubicach (Municipal Government of Slubice), personal communication with the 
author, August 4, 2006. 
11
 The regional district containing the city of Slubice. 
12
 As of 1/1/2003. Source: Eurostat. 
13
 Unfortunately, a similar breakdown of Frankfurt's foreign population by citizenship was not available. 
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Everyday Exclusions 
As the physical location of the Schengen border checkpoint, the bridge linking 
Frankfurt and Slubice was a liminal space where individual mobility between the two 
cities was regulated personally and directly, and where third country nationals were 
differentiated from their Polish and German neighbors. For third country nationals who 
were authorized to cross it, the bridge was sometimes experienced as transcendent and 
deterritorialized space that invoked a sense of freedom. Lyudmyla, a Belarusian graduate 
student who lived in Frankfurt and held both Polish and Schengen visas, described this 
sensation, "There aren't borders for me now.. . I [enjoy] the feeling of freedom here. On 
the bridge, I feel like I am in Neverland, neither Germany nor Poland—in between." 
Olena, a Russian student in European Studies, echoed this experience, "I have a feeling 
of freedom on the bridge.. .1 don't know where I am. I never had that feeling before." 
Conversely, the inability to cross the bridge brought into sharp relief the EU's 
exclusionary policies toward third country nationals, as well as the importance of 
freedom of movement to the full exercise of citizenship within the EU. Perhaps because 
of this experience, almost all of my correspondents had, at one time or another, applied 
for a visa to visit the side of the border "across from" where they lived. For residents of 
Frankfurt this was a relatively straightforward matter, requiring a trip of a little over an 
hour to the Polish consulate in Berlin. In contrast, for Slubice residents, obtaining a 
Schengen visa necessitated a journey of about four to six hours to the German consulate 
in Wroclaw, a trip that routinely demanded two full working days due to the consulate's 
schedule and the lack of public transport connections from Slubice. Coupled with 
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unpredictable results, the expense in time and money of this trip made it extremely 
difficult for third country nationals living in Slubice to continuously maintain a valid 
Schengen visa. 
An individual who lacked a visa for one side of the border was subject to a host of 
small and seemingly banal exclusions that, when taken together, fundamentally altered 
the experience and quality of life provided by the two cities. For example, a third country 
national who resided in Slubice without a Schengen visa could not shop in Frankfurt's 
larger and often cheaper clothing stores, watch a film at the cities' only movie theater, 
attend a play or a concert at Frankfurt's performing arts center, spend an afternoon on 
the beach at the nearby Helenesee, or travel from the region's nearest major airport in 
Berlin. Similar exclusions applied to third country nationals living in Frankfurt without a 
Polish visa, but given Slubice's smaller size and less developed infrastructure, the list 
was not as extensive, and primarily included a loss of access to cheaper restaurants, 
services, groceries, gasoline, cigarettes and other products on the Polish side of the border 
(cf. Asher 2005:133-135). As an intrinsically transnational space, an individual who 
lacked access to both cities was prevented from fully participating in local social and 
economic life, a situation that often gave rise to a profound sense of alienation. 
Aleksandra, a Ukrainian secondary school teacher who lived in Slubice and held a 
Schengen visa intermittently, explained, "It feels better when you can cross the border. 
You can buy things with better quality and at a lower price. It was always difficult when 
friends cross the border for festivals, concerts, the Helenesee .. .and you can't go. I 
could live without [crossing the border], and I still can live without i t . . . and I will have 
to [her current visa was just about to expire]. But it is better when you can go." 
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Codifying Difference 
Third country nationals' experience of alienation at the Polish-German border was 
far from accidental. In fact, the Schengen acquis's border procedures were explicitly 
intended to have an identity-generating component (Wiener 1998:115,185-186,229). The 
process of passing through a Schengen checkpoint is meant to foster a personal 
identification with EU citizenship as a membership category by promoting a sense of 
community, solidarity, and fraternity among EU citizens as they are physically separated 
from non-citizens and subjected to less rigorous levels of surveillance and regulation. 
The EU citizen/non-citizen binary is formally codified in the Schengen Common 
Manual,14 which mandates different protocols for third country nationals as part of its 
uniform border procedures. According to the Common Manual (Part 2, Point 1.3.1), only 
a "minimum check" involving a "rapid and straightforward" verification of the validity of 
travel documents is necessary for nationals of Schengen member states, while third 
country nationals require "thorough checks" involving "detailed" verification of travel 
documents, visas or residence permits, the individual's origin and destination (and 
supporting documents if necessary), sufficient means of subsistence, and finally, that "the 
person, his vehicle and the objects he is transporting are not likely to jeopardise public 
policy, national security or international relations" of the member states.15 
14
 Common Manual, 2002/C 313/02, (OJ C 313, 16.12.2002, p. 97). As of 13 October 2006, the Council of 
the European Union regulation 562/2006 (OJ L 105 , 13.4.2006, p. 1) establishing a Schengen Borders 
Code superseded the Common Manual. Although this fieldwork was completed before the Schengen 
Borders Code came into effect, the provisions that are relevant to my arguments are contained in both 
documents. For the sake of continuity and the aid of the reader, I therefore reference both documents. 
15
 See also Schengen Borders Code, Art. 7, Para. 2. The Schengen Borders Code specifically invokes the 
principle of free movement of persons by calling for a minimum check on "persons enjoying the 
Community right of free movement." It also adds the examination of entry and exit stamps to verify that a 
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Unlike most Schengen border crossings, the Slubice/Frankfurt checkpoint did not 
have the requisite separate lanes for member state and third country citizens.16 However, 
it still achieved the effect of physical separation by following the Common Manual's 
prescription of placing the documents presented by third country nationals under greater 
scrutiny. During the day-to-day operation of the checkpoint, the identification cards or 
passports of Poles and Germans (the vast majority of EU citizens crossing at between 
Frankfurt and Slubice) were rarely checked electronically and were usually only given a 
brief visual check before the individual was waved through—a process which took only a 
few seconds for each side of the border. While rarely subjected to the full requirements 
of the Common Manual's thorough check, non-Schengen passports were almost always 
scanned electronically, visually checked, verified for visas and previous entry/exit 
stamps, and finally stamped again, usually by both the Polish and German border guards. 
This process could take several minutes or longer depending on the officer's level of 
suspicion. During this time long and impatient lines of EU nationals quickly formed, 
making the position of the third country national as an outsider plainly and 
uncomfortably clear. A feeling of embarrassment or humiliation was one of the most 
common complaints third country nationals made about the border checkpoint, and are 
feelings I experienced personally during many of my trips between the cities with my 
own—albeit still comparatively privileged—third country passport from the United States. 
Through this more intense surveillance, Schengen border practices effectively reinforce 
the status of third country nationals as potentially dangerous and untrustworthy 
third country national has not exceeded the maximum duration of an authorized stay to the criteria of a 
thorough check. 
16
 This is likely because the Slubice/Frankfurt checkpoint was already scheduled to be eliminated before 
2009, the date by which the Schengen Borders Code (Article 9) required these lanes to be in place. 
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"foreigners" who must continually justify and verify themselves and their movements. 
This is the essence of the difference in citizenship regimes produced and reinforced by 
the Schengen acquis, and is a dynamic reflected in the results of a survey I conducted in 
2005 on frequent border-crossers at the cities' two universities,17 in which 48% of 
respondents from non-Schengen countries characterized the border as "very strict" or 
"strict" compared to only 18% from Schengen member countries (primarily Germany) 
and 11% from Schengen signatory countries (primarily Poland).18 
The Power of Stamps 
Even for third country nationals who held both Polish and Schengen visas, 
specific aspects of the Schengen acquis's practices of governmentality, such as variations 
in the stamping of passports, functioned to limit their cross-border mobility and further 
structured distinctions between EU citizens and non-citizens. Entry and exit stamps were 
a ubiquitous part of the Slubice/Frankfurt border checkpoint, and were a lasting reminder 
that even as EU citizens are allowed to travel freely with no record of their journeys, the 
cross-border movements of third country citizens must be documented and verifiable. A 
2004 Council of the European Union (henceforth Council) regulation requires "the travel 
documents of third country nationals . . .[to be] systematically stamped on entry and 
exit,"19 while the Common Manual simultaneously assures that "no entry stamp shall be 
affixed to the documents of nationals of the Member States of the European 
17
 Collegium Polonicum in Shibice, and European University Viadrina in Frankfurt. 
18
 Only 7% of non-Schengen passport holders rated the border checkpoint as "easy" or "very easy," 
compared to 58% from Schengen member states and 76% from Schengen signatories. 
19
 Art. 2, para. 2 of Council regulation 2133/2004 (OJ L 369, 16.12.2004, p.5), amending Art. 6 of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 19). See also Schengen 
Borders Code, Art 10 Para. 1. 
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Community." When placed in the transnational context of Slubice/Frankfurt, this 
simple difference in a routine border procedure was transformed into a powerful device 
for limiting the movements of third country nationals. This power worked through what 
would seem to be an almost inconsequential aspect of Foucaultian governmentality: the 
dimensions of a passport. 
A standard machine-readable international passport measures approximately 125 
by 85 millimeters (IACO 2003), and an EU entry/exit stamp about 43 by 30 millimeters. 
This provides space for only four non-overlapping stamps per visa page, but between six 
and eight if they are overlapped (as is common practice). Given these constraints, 
passports of third country nationals attempting to use both sides of Slubice/Frankfurt's 
urban space were filled extremely quickly if the EU's stamping regulation was fully 
observed and they received two entry and two exit stamps for each round trip across the 
border. For example, a Ukrainian passport contains 32 pages, 27 of which are visa pages 
available for stamps. Subtracting two pages for visas, this leaves enough space in a new 
passport for about 50 round trips. The situation for United States passports is even 
worse, with space for only about 25 round trips on 13 pages. At a rate of only one cross-
border trip per week—about average for the cities' residents—a new Ukrainian passport 
would last at a little less than a year, and a United States passport only about six months, 
even though both documents are designed to be valid for 10 years. Perhaps with this 
problem in mind, the border guards at the Slubice/Frankfurt checkpoint rarely followed 
the stamping regulation completely, and some of my correspondents reported occasional 
20
 Common Manual Part 2, Point 2.1.1, See also Schengen Borders Code, Art. 10 Para. 2. 
21
 United States citizens are, however, allowed to add supplemental pages to their passports at United States 
consulates in sets of 24 pages, with theoretically no maximum limit. This option is not available to 
Ukrainian citizens. 
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success in convincing an individual officer not to apply a stamp. Nevertheless, stamping, 
and the subsequent need to renew passports, were widely considered by third country 
nationals to be significant problems introduced by Poland's implementation of the 
Schengen acquis, as well as Germany's stricter enforcement of its protocols. 
Prior to, and even immediately following, Poland's EU accession, stamps appear 
to have been less frequently applied at the Slubice/Frankfurt checkpoint. In my survey of 
frequent border crossers, 90% of non-Schengen passport holders reported receiving 
stamps either "always" or "often" in 2005, compared to 75% between May 1 and 
December 31, 2004, and 72% prior to Poland's EU accession (May 1, 2004). The 
stamping record contained in my own passport also indicates this increase. In 2003,1 
made 72 round-trips across the border and received a total of 23 stamps (21 from the 
Polish side, and two from the German side), or about one stamp every three trips. In 
2004,1 crossed 18 times and received only three stamps (two Polish and one German), 
and in 2005 and 2006,1 made 43 round trips across the border, and received 88 stamps 
(37 from the Polish side and 51 from the German side), or about two stamps per trip—a 
more than six fold increase over 2003. Like many of my correspondents, even though I 
was legally authorized to travel freely between the cities, in order to conserve space in 
my passport, I was forced to decrease the frequency of my border crossings in proportion 
to the number of stamps I received. Compared to 2003, when I made my 72 trips in only 
86 days, I crossed the border more than seven times less often in 2005 and 2006, when it 
took me 370 days to make the 43 trips. 
A passport with too many stamps can have further negative implications. First, a 
passport lacking enough space to apply a stamp can be cause for a border guard to deny 
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its bearer entry, and must therefore be renewed, a procedure that typically necessitates the 
renewal of all the visas in it. For third-country nationals with both visas, this means a 
minimum of three trips to different consular offices, as well as the expenses, paperwork, 
processing times, and uncertainties of approval that are typical of visa and passport 
bureaucracies. Second, passports with many entry and exit stamps from a single border 
checkpoint can precipitate greater scrutiny at other border crossings and in consular 
offices, where these stamps often translate into suspicions of trafficking activities and 
difficulties in obtaining visas. 
Vasyl, a Ukranian musician living in Slubice, was surprised to be denied a 
Schengen visa when he brought a new passport to the German consulate. He recalled, "I 
had [a visa] last year, but this year the fascists didn't give me one! I brought an empty 
passport to the embassy--! had renewed it—and they said 'you must have done something, 
[that's why] you renewed it' (e.g. a refusal of entry or illegal border crossing indicated by 
a stamp in the passport22). I brought the same documents as last time, but they didn't like 
my face this time." The denial had immediate economic repercussions for Vasyl by 
preventing him from playing concerts in Germany. Consequently, Vasyl decided to 
apply for Polish citizenship, and was eventually approved, pending his renunciation of his 
Ukrainian citizenship. He viewed this decision as a pragmatic way to ensure the mobility 
On June 25, 1995, these "no entry" stamps were one of the causes behind a public demonstration in 
Slubice that gained international attention by blocking traffic across the border bridge. The previous day, 
about 250 Poles from Slubice had gone to Frankfurt in response to an advertisement offering DM 100 for a 
day's work distributing free newspapers. The advertisement was posted at the Slubice town hall and 
appeared to be legitimate, and most of the people who responded assumed that the company had secured 
the appropriate work permits. When the perspective employees arrived in Frankfurt, they were detained by 
the German border police for working illegally even though they had not yet accepted jobs. Several hours 
later, the Slubice residents were deported, and "no-entry" stamps (officially called "administrative visas") 
were placed in their passports, barring their entry into Germany for five years. This decision in particular 
sparked the subsequent public outcry in Slubice, which eventually resulted in the cancellation of most of 
these stamps provided the affected individuals filed official appeals (Bajak 1995a, 1995b, 1995, PAP 
1995a, 1995b). 
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required of his profession, explaining, "Until the time I get Polish citizenship, Europe is 
closed to me." 
Because of difficulties like Vasyl's, most third country nationals residing in 
Slubice/Frankfurt carefully planned and managed their cross-border movements in order 
to minimize the stamps they received. For example, Isabela, a Romanian university 
student who lived in Frankfurt, explained to me that she had to drop out of a course I 
taught at the university in Slubice (ironically, on the topic of European borders) because 
she had decided to schedule all the classes she attended in Poland on the same day in 
order to conserve space in her passport and avoid running out of pages for stamps before 
the end of the semester. Several of my other correspondents reported being forced to 
give up visiting one side of the border altogether. This type of self-limitation on cross-
border movement demonstrates the powerful disciplining effect the Schengen acquis can 
have over the individual, so much so that even when a third country national had de jure 
freedom of movement by virtue of obtaining the proper visas, routine border practices 
and regulations, such as the use of passports to provide a physical record of its bearer's 
movement, placed a de facto limitation on the exercise of this freedom. In this way, the 
administration of the Schengen acquis in Slubice/Frankfurt contributed to a citizenship 
regime in which third country nationals were functionally less mobile than EU citizens; 
an inequality that worked at cross-purposes to the Maastricht Treaty's neoliberal goal of 
transforming the EU into an unimpeded social and market space. 
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A Local Solution 
Recognizing the problem that the Schengen stamping regulation presented for 
third country citizens living in Slubice and Frankfurt, the local border authorities 
developed a limited solution based on a liberal interpretation of another of the Common 
Manual's provisions (Part 2, Point 2.1.6), which reads, "Exceptionally, at the request of 
an alien, insertion of an entry or exit stamp may be dispensed with if insertion might 
cause serious difficulties for that person. In that case, entry or exit must then be recorded 
on a separate sheet indicating the name and passport number."23 While this section is 
more likely intended to protect individuals who might fear repercussions in their home 
country resulting from travel to the EU, such as political dissidents or human rights 
advocates, the obligation to renew one's passport too frequently was considered a serious 
enough difficulty by local border officials to allow third country nationals to request a 
letter on which to receive entry/exit stamps. 
However, the process of obtaining this letter in Slubice and Frankfurt was not a 
simple matter. Because the practice makes use of a discretionary area of the Common 
Manual's regulations (and a somewhat dubious interpretation of its intentions), the border 
guard did not readily advertise the existence of the measure, and an individual was 
required to make separate requests to the local commanders on each side of the border in 
their respective national languages. In my own case, I made requests on both sides of the 
border, but was only able to complete the process on the Polish side, as the German 
officials failed to return my correspondence after an initial reply. Upon receiving my 
23 
Art. 10, Para. 3 of the Schengen Borders Code repeats this regulation, changing only alien to "third-
country national" and indicating that the sheet should be given to that individual. 
Page 139 
inquiry, the Polish regional Komendant required a personal meeting in order to approve 
the letter, at which I was asked to provide proof of my affiliation with Slubice's 
university (through a letter of invitation), my status as a researcher in Poland (through 
letters from the United States Department of Education and the United States Embassy in 
Warsaw), and a formal letter of request detailing my circumstances. 
After examining my passport and visa and observing that I should really be 
making the request on the German side since most of the stamps were from the German 
authorities, the Komendant asked for my residency registration card (potwierdzenie 
zameldowania), which I did not have. An uncomfortable moment followed as I 
attempted to explain why, after living in Slubice for more than six months, I had still not 
obtained the card without openly admitting that I had failed to properly register my 
residence with the local police. He apparently decided this was not a major infraction, 
and after a few more questions, he agreed to approve my request. Once my documents 
were photocopied for their records, I was given two sheets of standard A4 paper bearing 
my name, citizenship, passport number, the stamp of the Komendant, and an expiration 
date that corresponded to the last day of my visa. I was instructed to present these papers 
only on the Polish side of the checkpoint between Slubice and Frankfurt, and never to 
present them to the German officials or at any other border checkpoint in Poland, since 
they could potentially be construed as false documents. 
Because they were often unable to follow the exact requirements of Poland's 
residency registration system, or were disinclined to voluntarily subject themselves to the 
additional scrutiny and surveillance involved in completing the request, only a handful of 
third country citizens I met had obtained a letter. Even so, the existence of a local border 
Page 140 
policy that used of one aspect of the Schengen border regulations to circumvent another 
less convenient aspect of these same regulations—even if it applied only to the third 
country citizens that were able to justify their need to frequently cross the border— 
illustrates the extent to which Frankfurt and Slubice's border authorities were willing to 
accommodate the imperatives of the cities' unique transnational space. The next section 
examines the personal compromises and citizenship strategies many third country 
nationals were also willing to make in order to accommodate the requirements of living 
along a Schengen border. 
Strategies of Citizenship 
Within the modern nation-state system, restrictions on personal freedom of 
movement are inherently linked to the question of "how the economic advantages 
available in a particular area [are] to be divided up, whether these [involve] access to 
work or to poor relief (Torpey 2000:19). This is also true within the EU's common 
market, where efforts to enable transnational labor mobility and market access for 
member state citizens through the expansion EU-level citizenship rights simultaneously 
necessitated supranational policies to manage the movements of third country nationals 
(Wiener 1998, Kostakopoulou 2001). Indeed, one of the core functions of the Schengen 
acquis is to push outward the regulatory nexus of market access from the borders of the 
member states to the external borders of the Schengen area. 
Unlike EU citizens, who are allowed—with certain exceptions 24~ free access to 
all the national labor markets within the EU, third country nationals are limited to the 
24
 Although citizens of the 2004 accession countries were immediately granted the right to travel and reside 
anywhere in the EU after May 1, 2004, their right to work was subject to qualification for a transition 
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terms of their work and residence permits, which almost always restrict them to work 
available in their country of residence, and sometimes to a single firm. 
In Slubice/Frankfurt, the question of economic advantage for third country nationals 
therefore took the form of how to gain access to the financial opportunities afforded by 
cross-border travel. All except one of my correspondents moved to Slubice/Frankfurt 
either for immediate economic benefit, or for the future advantages provided by the 
"European" degrees available at the cities' universities. A third of my correspondents 
also depended on cross-border access for at least part of their income, despite the 
tenuousness of their visa situations. Among my correspondents living in Slubice, 
residence in Poland was viewed as economic opportunity in its own right and as stepping-
stone for gaining access to the Schengen area, and it was generally agreed that receiving a 
Schengen visa in Poland (with its status as an EU member state and Schengen signatory) 
was considerably less difficult than in their home countries. This conclusion was 
supported by considerable anecdotal evidence gleaned from personal experience and 
from the reports of friends, family, and acquaintances. 
Acquiring Polish citizenship was also regularly used both as a way to guarantee 
an individual's economic position in Poland, and as a way to gain access to EU 
citizenship rights through the automatic conferral of EU citizenship. In keeping with 
Aihwa Ong's assertion that dynamics of globalization have produced a more flexible 
approach to citizenship in which economic calculation is a central element, (1999:112), 
period of up to seven years. Only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden fully opened their labor 
markets in 2004, while Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain followed in 2006, and the Netherlands 
and Luxemburg in 2007. The labor markets of the remaining five countries, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, and Germany remain restricted. Cyprus and Malta were excluded from these transitional 
agreements, and their citizens enjoyed immediate access to all labor markets within the EU. Slovenia, 
Poland, and Hungary applied reciprocal labor market restrictions in 2004. Slovenia and Poland dropped 
these restrictions in 2006 and 2007 respectively. 
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three-quarters of my correspondents who lived in Poland had either naturalized as Polish 
citizens or had applied and were awaiting a decision. Like Vasyl, the economic 
imperatives generated by differences in the EU's citizenship regimes created a powerful 
pull towards obtaining EU citizenship for these individuals. Guaranteeing a position in 
Slubice/Frankfurt's labor markets and strategies to maximize economic benefits featured 
prominently in their immigration narratives, as is demonstrated by the following three 
examples. 
Dmytry, a Russian secondary-school teacher from Kazakhstan, immigrated to 
Poland in 2000 after experiencing ethnic discrimination and becoming afraid that he 
might lose his job. His wife, Beata, is ethnically Polish, and because her maternal 
grandmother was deported from eastern Poland (now western Ukraine) in 1939, she was 
eligible for a Polish repatriation program and automatic citizenship. After deciding to 
move, Beata and Dmytry wrote over 50 letters to different Polish cities, and were 
eventually invited to settle in Slubice, where, as a Polish citizen, Beata was able to begin 
working immediately. As a foreign national, Dmytry had difficulties findind a job in his 
field, and during the four years he waited to receive Polish citizenship he "worked 
everywhere" in a series of short-term manual-labor jobs. Dmytry was finally able to find 
a teaching position at a school in Slubice only after he r was granted citizenship. For 
him, citizenship was ".. .the most important thing... Before, it was difficult to get a job, 
since permission is given for a specific firm or school. Now I can change jobs quickly, 
and Fm not dependent on a piece of paper." 
Ivan, a Ukrainian who traded in used appliances, was also pursuing Polish 
citizenship as a way to ensure access to the EU's economic markets. Ivan immigrated to 
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Poland in 2000, and was in the process of making a heritage-based application for Polish 
citizenship, even though he did not identify himself as ethnically Polish. He chose to 
pursue Polish citizenship for economic reasons, and claimed that if he could apply for 
American or German citizenship he would eagerly do so. Ivan held a temporary 
residence card for Poland that had to be renewed yearly and did not grant him work 
authorization, but did help him, along with an invitation from a German colleague, to 
obtain a three-month Schengen visa. Ivan attributed the possibility of getting a Schengen 
visa directly to his residency in Poland, and said that it would have been much more 
difficult to receive the visa if he still lived in Ukraine. Holding a Schengen visa allowed 
him to purchase used appliances in Germany, which he transported to Ukraine for 
resale—a grey market activity that enabled him to exploit cross-border price differentials 
by virtue of his access to Polish, Ukrainian, and EU spaces. 
Similarly, Larisa, a Ukrainian IT analyst, chose to live in Slubice as a way to 
strategically utilize the current Schengen border policies to her maximum benefit. 
Slubice's location permitted her to compete for work available on the German side of the 
border, while still allowing her parents to visit relatively easily from Ukraine. In order to 
secure both her position in Poland's labor market and her cross-border access to 
Germany, Larisa entered into a fraudulent marriage to obtain Polish citizenship. She 
found this arrangement preferable to marrying a German citizen and living in Germany, 
since she believed her parents might have problems getting a Schengen visa in Ukraine. 
All of these narratives demonstrate the importance of acquiring EU citizenship to 
the full exercise of economic rights within the Union. The rights of labor market access 
and freedom of movement are fundamentally intertwined within the concept of EU 
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citizenship, and exclusion from one can imply exclusion from the other. In order to 
function, the EU's transnational labor market requires the right of free movement. 
However, because economic self-sufficiency without the aid of social benefits continues 
to be a de facto requirement for the full exercise of this freedom— particularly with 
regards to the right of residency —labor market access is essential to assuring mobility 
(Peebles 1997: 601-604). Without a legal claim to either of these rights, third country 
nationals are doubly disqualified, and must appeal to national citizenship policies in order 
to gain supranational citizenship rights. This dynamic reveals a central tension within EU 
citizenship. Even as EU citizenship policies and practices challenge its member states' 
monopoly on the management and regulation of their populations, because national 
citizenship regulations determine the conditions under which a third country national can 
obtain EU citizenship, these same transnational policies continue to reinforce national 
understandings of citizenship identities. 
In locations like Poland and Germany, where the concept of nationhood privileges 
common ethnicity and descent, and citizenship laws are based primarily on jus sanguines, 
proving a link to the ethnic nation through familial descent, or establishing a familial 
relationship by marriage to a citizen, is often the fastest and simplest way to achieve 
citizenship. These links, whether based on an advantage of personal history like Beata 
To be eligible for naturalization, a foreigner must have lived legally in Germany for eight years, seven 
years if he or she completed an integration course, or three years if the person is a spouse or a same sex 
partner of a German citizen (German Nationality Act as amended 15 July 1999, Sect. 9 and Sec. 10 Para. 
1). Individuals must also demonstrate knowledge of German, declare their allegiance to the German 
constitution, and prove that they can support themselves. A foreigner is eligible for naturalization in Poland 
after five years of residence on a permanent residence permit, which is usually granted only after a three-
year period of temporary residence, for a total of eight years. In the case of marriage to a Polish citizen, 
only three years of residence are required (Statute on Polish Citizenship, Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej (Official Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland) No. 28, Item 353, 5 December 2000). Poland 
does not have a language requirement, nor does it recognize same sex partnerships. Both Germany and 
Poland make provisions for granting citizenship to repatriates: Germany in Article 116 of the Basic Law 
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or Ivan's demonstrably Polish ancestors, or a willingness to enter into a marriage of 
convenience like Larisa, become a form of social capital that helps determine which third 
country nationals will have the potential of gaining access to citizenship in an EU 
member state. 
In many cases, this "trading up" of citizenship regimes also implies a loss, as 
member state regulations frequently require applicants for naturalization to give up their 
previous citizenship. Anastasiya, a conductor and instructor at Slubice's music school, 
immigrated to Poland in 1994 and was naturalized six years later. She wanted to 
maintain dual citizenship, but was required by the Polish authorities to renounce her 
Ukrainian citizenship. Because Anastasiya regularly crossed the border to participate in 
collaborative musical projects undertaken by Slubice and Frankfurt—many of which were 
sponsored by EU funds—her continuous need to maintain a Schengen visa made keeping 
Ukrainian citizenship an impractical option. In effect, the difficulties imposed by the 
Schengen acquis eventually forced Anastasiya to choose between two exclusive 
citizenship regimes and compelled her to seek EU citizenship in spite of her professed 
fear of cultural assimilation and a lack of identification with either Poland or the EU. For 
Anastasiya, lacking the ability to cross the border presented an economic handicap was 
simply too costly to bear. 
Because of the definitional link between EU citizenship and citizenship in a 
member state, the EU citizenship model, even with its emphasis on transnational and 
(Grundgesetz), which establishes the right of return, and Poland by the Repatriation Act of 9 November 
2000 (See Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 5 December 2000). 
26
 As a general rule, Germany requires individuals to renounce their previous citizenship before 
naturalization, although dual citizenship is possible in certain narrow circumstances. In Poland, dual 
citizenship is permitted, but an individual can be required to renounce his or her previous citizenship prior 
to naturalization (as was the case for Vasyl and Anastasiya). 
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neoliberal ideas of economic viability (Peebles 1997), ultimately fails to supersede jus 
sanguines and jus soli-based models of national citizenship, and despite attempts to 
imagine the EU as a transnational or supranational community (Shore 2000 cf. B. 
Anderson 1983), the legal apparatuses of the member states remain the institutions with 
which actors "must negotiate in the final instance" within the domain of citizenship 
(Kastoryano 2003:194, 2002:170-172). Etienne Balibar has warned that this tacit 
incorporation of member states' exclusionary citizenship practices within EU citizenship 
has the long-term potential of expanding the scope of the discrimination against third 
country nationals by fostering the development of a sustained system of asymmetric 
power relations distinguished by the restriction of third country nationals' relative 
freedom of movement and access to economic spaces (2004:43-44, 121-124). The 
power of this discriminatory potential was displayed by my correspondents' great desire 
to gain EU citizenship and the lengths they would go to attain it. However, as is also 
demonstrated by my correspondents, for those who have the necessary social capital, the 
layering of EU citizenship onto national citizenship can provide a way to convert their 
status from categorical outsiders to citizens. In this way, Vasyl, Beata, Dmytry, Ivan, 
Larisa, and Anastasiya all made strategic use of the inclusionary aspects of Poland's 
national citizenship laws as a way to gain citizenship privileges in both national and the 
transnational spaces, including, perhaps most critically, full access to the local cross-
border space of Slubice/Frankfurt. 
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Conclusions: Schengen's End 
In 2007, the Council of the European Union determined that Poland had 
sufficiently implemented the requirements of the Schengen acquis, and the border 
controls between Poland and Germany were eliminated at midnight on December 21. 
In Frankfurt and Slubice, a crowd of around 5000 people gathered on the border bridge to 
celebrate with music and fireworks, and Frankfurt's mayor rode ceremonially in the last 
car controlled at the border checkpoint (Markische Oderzeitung 2007a, 2007b). Only 
Frankfurt's border guard, which stood to have 800 of its 1600 officials withdrawn from 
the region, seemed to object to the situation, and a month earlier many of its members 
had participated in a protest march through Frankfurt warning that the Schengen 
expansion was premature and presented significant security concerns; claims that 
Germany's interior minister, Wolfgang Schauble, flatly denied (Deutsche Welle 2007, 
Markische Oderzeitung 2007a). 
While both countries continue to maintain mobile surveillance patrols along the 
Polish-German frontier, the focus of Poland's border security apparatus has shifted to 
its eastern borders, completing a process that began in 2003 when Poland reintroduced 
visas for Ukrainian (as well as Russian and Belarusian) nationals as part of its 
harmonization with the Schengen acquis.30 In contrast to the Polish-German border, 
All of the 2004 accession countries except Cyprus were also included in this decision. 
28
 This included only controls at Poland's land and sea borders. Controls at airports were not eliminated 
until March 2008. 
29
 All areas within 30 km of an internal Schengen border continue to be patrolled by the respective member 
states' border guards. 
30
 See Council regulation 539/2001 (OJ L 81, 21.3.2001, p. 1), and Art. 3, Para, and Annex I of the 2003 
Act of Accession (OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, p. 33). This ended a bilateral policy of visa-free travel between the 
two countries. Ukraine, maintained its visa-free policy towards Polish citizens, and as of September 1, 
2005 dropped the visa requirement for citizens of all EU member states, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. 
Despite the additional bureaucratic hurdles required to obtain a visa, the requirement does not appear to 
have curtailed travel between Ukraine and Poland, and Poland continued to provide visas to Ukrainian 
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where waiting times were measured in minutes and searches were rare, as an external EU 
border, checkpoints on Poland's eastern frontier are being reinforced and expanded. 
According to several of my correspondents, these are the "real" borders of the EU, where 
travelers are subjected to full customs control, routine luggage and vehicle searches, and 
waiting times of several hours—practices that powerfully assert the exclusionary 
dynamics of the EU's citizenship regimes, as well as the differentiation of the EU as a 
separate economic and security space. For the EU, this is where the sorting and 
processing of third country nationals is supposed to occur: outside of the Schengen area 
and outside the common market. 
For this reason, between 2004 and 2007 the checkpoints in Slubice/Frankfurt and 
elsewhere on the Polish-German border were already structurally out of place in the 
midst of the EU's theoretically open market. However, the experience of third country 
nationals living in Slubice/Frankfurt during the transition period between Poland's EU 
accession and the deregulation of the border is also instructive, as it acutely demonstrates 
how Schengen acquis systematically excludes and separates EU insiders from third 
country outsiders. At the Polish-German border, the implementation of the Schengen 
acquis increased surveillance for third country citizens, making the supposedly neoliberal 
moment of Poland's EU accession a disappointment as many people found their 
nationals free of charge in order to alleviate some of the policy's effects. While cross-border traffic 
initially fell 70-90% in the days immediately following the introduction of visas (PAP 2003), the total 
border traffic between Poland and Ukraine increased 3.74% between 2003 and 2004 and 46.5% between 
2004 and 2005 (Source: Straz Granica Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej). Since the Polish border guard does not 
report the nationality of individuals crossing the border, it is ultimately unclear what country's citizens are 
responsible for this dramatic increase in border traffic. In 2004, Poland issued 575,471 visas to Ukrainian 
citizens, and 217,935 visas at the L'viv consulate alone (the Polish consulate closest to the border), making 
it the busiest Polish consulate in the world (Ministerswo Spraw Zagranicznych 2004). L'viv retained the 
title in 2005 issuing 273,565 visas, while Ukrainian citizens were issued around 600,000 visas in total 
(Ministerswo Spraw Zagranicznych 2005). In accordance with the visa facilitation agreement signed 
between the EU and Ukraine, Poland began charging Ukrainian nationals a reduced fee of 35 Euros for 
Schengen visas as of December 2007. Visa fees continue to be waived for several groups, including 
students, journalists, pensioners, disabled persons and close relatives of people in the EU. 
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movements further limited by the acquis's practices and procedures. This experience 
reveals a more generalized reality facing third country nationals within the EU, one in 
which they are unequal to EU citizens in the realm of transnational citizenship. Although 
a single Schengen visa will now suffice for both sides of the border and restrictions on 
third country nationals' mobility between Frankfurt and Slubice have been lifted, third 
country nationals are still not extended other EU-wide economic rights, such as the right 
to work and the right to reside, and their construction as a structurally "foreign" group 
remains. Like any citizenship, the creation of the EU citizens simultaneously created 
non-citizens, and as social and economic rights expanded transnationally for these new 
EU citizens, the relative level of citizenship rights declined for third country nationals 
because they received no corresponding expansion. 
By emphasizing freedom of movement for its citizens while simultaneously 
limiting resident third country nationals from accessing this freedom, the EU's 
citizenship regimes underscore the power differential that globalization creates between 
mobile and non-mobile subjects (Ong 1999:11). With a conception of citizenship 
organized around access to economic markets and economic viability (Peebles 1997), the 
neoliberal approach taken by EU policy encourages an entrepreneurial and flexible 
assessment of citizenship (Ong 1996:739), an approach that was exhibited by many third 
country nationals in Slubice/Frankfurt as they utilize aspects of their personal histories to 
strategically gain access to EU citizenship through citizenship in a member state. 
Two dynamics therefore illustrate the critical differences between the EU 
citizenship regimes experienced by third country nationals and EU citizens. First, EU 
citizenship policies segregate EU citizens and non-citizens through practices and 
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regulations that construct EU citizens as freely mobile while simultaneously subjecting 
third country nationals to surveillance, verification, regulation, and limitation. In 
Slubice/Frankfurt, this process strongly divided third country nationals from their Polish 
and German counterparts by fundamentally altering the way they could experience the 
cities' spaces. Second, the citizenship regime applied to third country nationals provides 
them with recourse to fewer transnational rights within the EU, especially with regard to 
the economic activity and mobility that is so important to the EU's neoliberal conception 
of the citizen. This distinction represents a type of "status inequality" (Schnapper 
1998:117) that is an anathema to the creation of a supranational citizenship community 
within the EU, but nevertheless threatens to become one of its permanent features. 
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Chapter 6 
New Citizens of a New Empire? EU Imperialism and Euro-orientalism 
Introduction 
At a July 10,2007 press conference, European Commission President Jose 
Manuel Barroso caused a minor media stir when he explicitly compared the EU to an 
empire.1 The purpose of the press conference was to announce the Commission's 
position on the proposed revisions to the EU's failed Constitutional Treaty, and as part of 
a lengthy answer to a journalist's question, "What will the EU be when the new treaty has 
been concluded?" Barosso said: 
Sometimes I like to compare the European Union as a creation to the 
organisation of empires. The empires... because we have the dimension 
of empires. But there is a great difference. The empires were usually 
made through force, with a center that was imposing a diktat, a will, on the 
others. And now, we have what some authors call the first non-imperial 
empire. We have, by dimension, 27 countries that fully decided to work 
together, to pool their sovereignty- if you want to use that concept of 
sovereignty~and work together toward values. I believe it is a great 
construction and we should be proud of it. At least, we in the Commission 
are proud of it. 
Amidst the debates and political turmoil surrounding the initial rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and its eventual revival two 
years later as the Reform Treaty (later renamed the Lisbon Treaty), the question of what 
1
 This is not the first time Barosso has made this comparison. He also made a reference to the EU's 
"empire of law" in an earlier speech to the Italian Senate on March 23, 2007 (Barroso 2007). 
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the EU is becoming seemed to be on everyone's mind. Despite Barosso's assertion of the 
"non-imperial" nature of the EU, in Slubice and Frankfurt, my correspondents regularly 
described their discomfort with aspects of the EU's 2004 expansion in imperial terms. 
While discussing her country's EU accession process, Diana, an economics student from 
Latvia who studied in Frankfurt, typified this unease, saying, "We were in the Soviet 
Union, and not European, for 45 years, and then the EU came. First [it was] the Soviet 
Union and then the EU. [People] think we are not independent anymore." In just a few 
sentences, Diana made two particularly incisive points about the ideological and political 
location of post-socialist Europe. First, the Soviet Union is located decidedly outside of 
"Europe," and to be part of the Soviet Union is to be automatically excluded from the 
category of "European," and second, for many people living in post-socialist Europe, the 
limits EU membership place on their countries' state sovereignty are often reminiscent of 
the not-too-distant experience of Soviet domination. 
Given that the Soviet Union shared the EU's goal of creating a cooperative 
international economic and political system—albeit one based on international socialism 
rather than neoliberal market integration—it is perhaps not surprising that the 
comprehensive economic, legal, and political reforms implemented by East European 
states as part the requirements of EU accession are sometimes perceived a similar 
imperial imposition. Several theorists have recently begun to evaluate the imperial 
qualities embedded within the processes of EU governance, even if these processes are 
based on principles of consent rather than conquest, and are evaluated as positive 
developments by the states and populations involved (J. Anderson 2007, Anderson and 
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Shuttleworth 2007, Armstrong & Anderson 2007, Borosz 2001, Wasver 1997, Zielonka 
2006). 
Borosz identifies four mechanisms of control as the defining features of an 
imperial order, all of which are present in the relationship between the fifteen "old" EU 
member states (EU15) and the ten 2004 accession countries (A10): 
1. Unequal exchange—the sustained centripetal funneling of economic 
value, 
2. Coloniality—the cognitive mapping of the empire's populations, 
creating a fixed system of inferiorized otherness, 
3. Export of governmentality—through the launching of the normalizing, 
standardizing and control mechanisms of modern statehood, 
4. Geopolitics—fitting the above into a long-term global strategy of 
projecting the central state's power to its external environment (2001:18). 
Because they are divided by a 2004 accession border, Slubice and Frankfurt are a 
location where the imperial aspects of the EU are readily experienced through everyday 
cross-border interactions that encourage expressions of EU coloniality. Like elsewhere in 
the EU, hierarchies of economic and political value contained within the EU accession 
process in Slubice/Frankfurt have rearticulated already-established orientalist discourses 
(cf. Said 1979, Wolff 1994) which evaluate East European countries and their citizens as 
less developed, less civilized, and ultimately less "European" than their West European 
counterparts. Within the local context of Frankfurt/Slubice, the significantly superior 
material and economic position of the German side of the border often translates into 
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social privilege that reinforces a cognitive link that equates economic power with social 
status in the EU. 
While many Slubice residents viewed cross-border inequality as a problem that 
will be gradually overcome through Poland's sustained economic growth, others 
attempted to subvert this form of EU coloniality by displacing blame for their experience 
as second-class EU citizens onto the lingering effects of Soviet imperialism, and by 
asserting counter-claims of higher social status on the basis of moral or ethical criteria. 
For residents of Slubice/Frankfurt, two forms of EU imperialism were therefore 
experienced as interrelated, with the EU-wide systemization of economic and 
governmental mechanisms of imperial control reinforcing cultural forms of imperialism 
by enabling orientalizing representations of EU citizens from Poland and the rest of the 
A10. In order to contextualize this discussion, I begin with an evaluation of the extent to 
which the EU exhibits the characteristics of unequal exchange and export of 
governmentality in its relationship with the 2004 accession countries. 
Valuing the Empire 
Borosz's first criteria might be better phrased as a sustained attempt at the 
centripetal funneling of economic value. Empires are expensive to administer, defend, 
and maintain, and their economic benefit to the imperial centers is often unclear. In the 
case of the EU, net transfers to the A10 (primarily from funds contributed by the EU15) 
amounted to a little over EUR 6.5 billion in 2006 (Table 6.1), while overall expenditures 
in the A10 accounted for about 11% of the EU's total spending in 2006 (about EUR 11.5 
billion). As with other empires, value derived by the "old" EU members from trade and 
new investments is expected to more than offset these expenditures. While a 
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Table. 6.1: Funds transferred between the EU and A10 in 2006 (in EUR millions) (European 
Commission 2007:27,31). 
comprehensive review is not possible here, it is useful to utilize several examples from 
the British Empire in the late-19th and early 20tb centuries as a foil to help illustrate how 
well the economic relationship between the EU15 and the A10 approximates the imperial 
model. 
In his classic work on British imperialism, Hobson (1965 [1902]) concludes that 
the benefits of Great Britain's trade with its empire were not worth the additional costs 
required for its maintenance, particularly when compared to the value of foreign trade 
outside the empire during the same period.2 In a more comprehensive statistical review, 
Clark (1936) comes to a similar conclusion not only for the British Empire, but also for 
2
 Hobson goes on to argue that while the British Empire might not have been very profitable for Great 
Britain or the British people, it could be very profitable to members of the capitalist class, who received the 
revenues from foreign investments and had considerable influence on government policy (1965 [1902] :52-
53). According to Davis and Huttenback, who examine the profitability question in detail, return on 
investments in the empire from 1860 tol880 were much higher than in Great Britain. However, after 1885, 
empire returns never again exceeded domestic returns, and in general were lower than returns in other 
foreign markets (1986:106-108). 
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the empires of Germany, Italy, France, and Japan. However, even if the value of this 
trade was not worth the costs incurred, Clark does demonstrate that the volume of trade 
between Great Britain and its empire was quite significant, accounting for 30.42% of its 
total foreign trade in 1894-19033 (Clark 1936:75). It appears that the EU15's trade with 
the A10 is also significant. While there is only aggregate data available for total trade 
between the Euro-area and Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, trade with these 
three countries has ranged between 8.0% of the Euro-area's external trade in 2003 and 
8.7% in 2006 (Table 6.2). Since these three countries represent only about 80% (in 2005) 
of the AlO's total population, and the Euro-area does not include Great Britain, Sweden 
and Denmark, actual trade between the EU15 and A10 is probably much higher. 
In addition to trade, the British Empire was also an important location of foreign 
investment for the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom's investment in its empire 
increased steadily during the second half of the 19th century, from a conservative estimate 
of about 25%o of its total capital investments in 1865-1869 to about around 45% in 1910-
1914 (Davis and Huttenback 1986:40-41). The EU15's investment in the A12-the A10 
plus Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007—is approaching this level, at 
17% if its total extra-EU15 investment in 2005, compared to only 4% in 2003 (Table 
6.3). In actual Euros invested, this represents a more than six-fold increase in only three 
years, and suggests that one useful way of interpreting the EU's eastward expansion 
might be provided by Luxembourg's (1951[1913]) thesis that imperial expansion stems 
3
 Trade between France and its empire was also significant at 10.49% of total foreign trade in 1894-1903. 
However, for the other imperial states, the volume of trade within their respective empires was quite small 
at 2.15% of total foreign trade in Japan, 0.21% in Germany, and 0.16% in Italy during the same period 
(Clark 1936:64-68). 
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Partner Imports from F.\ ports 
to 
Total Trade Trade balance 
2003 
Poland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Sum of PL, CZ, HU 
Extra-Furo Area Total 
26.82 
27.04 
23.71 
77.57 
988.82 
33.94 
28.3 
24.3 
86.54 
1058.39 
60.76 
55.34 
48.01 
164.11 
2047.21 
7.11 
1.26 
0.59 
8.96 
69.57 
2004 
Poland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Sum of PL.CZ, lit" 
Lxtra-Fiiro Area Total 
29.63 
27.48 
24.68 
81.79 
1081.32 
38.75 
31.04 
25.86 
95.65 
1152.82 
68.38 
58.52 
50.54 
177.44 
2234.14 
9.12 
3.56 
1.18 
13.86 
71.5 
2005 
Poland 
Czech Republic 
Hu n nary 
Sum of PL, CZ. III! 
F.xtra-Furo Area Total 
32.66 
31.45 
26.61 
90.72 
1225.81 
45.33 
35.05 
27.62 
108 
1241.93 
77.99 
66.5 
54.23 
198.72 
2467.74 
12.68 
3.6 
1.01 
17.29 
16.13 
2006 
Poland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Sum of PL.CZ. HU 
Extra-Euro Area Total 
41.14 
38.93 
29.63 
109.7 
1389.09 
58.36 
41.22 
31.36 
130.94 
1379.86 
99.5 
80.15 
60.99 
240.64 
2768.95 
17.23 
2.29 
1.73 
21.25 
-9.24 
Table 6.2. External trade (in EUR billions) of the Euro-area, 2003-2006. Source: Eurostat 
from the pressure created by capitalism's persistent need to reinvest the surplus value not 
consumed in the production cycle in order to avoid a crisis of over-accumulation (cf. 
Bukharin 1929:28,79). According to Harvey (2003), this structural problem can be 
redressed in two ways. Surpluses must either be displaced spatially, through expansion 
into new markets, development of new production capabilities, or utilization of new 
resources (including labor), or temporally, through investment in long-term capital 
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projects or social expenditures (e.g. education and research) (Harvey 2003:109). In short, 
the capitalist system must either intensify or expand. 
IK'sliiKilinii 
lExtra-EU15 
A12 
Share of Extra EU15 
Poland 
137.949 
5.147 
4% 
1.663 
21104 
149.884 
18.324 
12% 
6.081 
211115= 
194.820 
32.426 
17% 
2.639 
Table 6.3. FDI Outflow (in E U R billions) from the E U 1 5 , 2003-2005. Source: 
Eurostat (2007:2) . 
By facilitating further capital investment in the A10 and integrating a little over 
74 million people—a population that until 1989 had only been peripherally involved in the 
capitalist system—into its common market, the EU's expansion into Eastern Europe 
provided opportunities for both types of displacement. Along with the approximately 
EUR 32.7 billion in pre-accession aid provided by the EU to its candidate countries 
between 1990 and 2006, a considerable proportion of the EUR 22 billion in 2004-2006 
and EUR 151.5 billion budgeted in 2007-2013 for EU regional development in the A10 
supports precisely the type of capital and social expenditures that Harvey classifies as 
temporal displacement. 
Perhaps even more significant for the EU15, however, are the tremendous new 
low-cost labor resources provided by the A10. High levels of wage inequality between 
the EU15 and A10 facilitate the exploitation of these resources. In the seven economic 
sectors where comparative data was available, labor costs in the A10 tend to be only 
about 20-25% of levels in the EU15 (Table 6.4). In imperial terms, lower wages allow 
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for greater extraction of surplus value between the center and the periphery (Luxembourg 
1951[1913]:38-39), particularly within a system where commodities and capital are 
\1initlil\ l.nlmr ( HM-. in 2004 
EU15 
A10 
Difference 
A10 Costs 
as a 
Percentage 
ofEU15 
Costs 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
3615.5 
686.8 
-2929 
19.00% 
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
 
3347.4 
663.4 
-2684 
19.82% 
W
ho
le
sa
le
 
an
d 
re
ta
il 
tr
ad
e;
 
re
pa
ir 
o
f 
v
eh
ic
le
s, 
an
d 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
go
od
s 
3006.4 
690.7 
-2315.7 
22.97% 
H
ot
el
s 
an
d 
re
st
au
ra
nt
s 
2302.8 
504.8 
-1798 
21.92% 
T
ra
ns
po
rt
,
 
st
or
ag
e
 
an
d 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 
3569.7 
880 
-2689.7 
24.65% 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
tio
n
 
5206 
1406.8 
-3799.2 
27.02% 
R
ea
l e
st
at
e,
 
re
n
tin
g 
an
d 
bu
sin
es
s 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
3681.5 
802 
-2879.5 
21.78% 
Table 6.4. Monthly labor costs for selected industries in the EU15 and A10 in 2004 (in EUR). Source: 
Eurostat. 
universalized while labor remains immobile (Amin 1977:40). Table 6.5 shows a rough 
measure of differential labor exploitation within the EU by comparing the ratio of 
average individual income to per capita GDP in the member states. This ratio indicates 
the relative amount of an economy's produced value that is returned to its population. A 
higher ratio result therefore indicates a lower relative level of labor exploitation, but not 
necessarily a higher income. With the exception of Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta, the 
other seven 2004 accession countries show the highest levels of labor exploration in the 
EU. Here, the imperial nature of the transitional limits that the EU15 were allowed to 
place on the labor mobility of A84 citizens comes into full focus (See Chapter 4). 
Because labor mobility between the EU15 and A8 remains limited while capital and 
4
 These transitional agreements applied to all the A10 countries except Cyprus and Malta (A8). 
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commodities are allowed to flow freely, the expansion of the EU's common market 
enables capital investments from the EU15 to effectively exploit A8 labor by paying 
workers according to the local wages while simultaneously taking advantage of a 
reduction in the other marginal costs (in both time and money) normally associated with 
offshore production (such as shipping costs, tariffs, etc.). In this way, surplus economic 
value is tunneled from the A8 to the EU15, and is no doubt part of the explanation behind 
the sudden post-accession influx of capital to the new member states from the EU15. 
Country Mean income (FUR PPS) 2005 
C>pilLS 1 , 6 7 6 2 
I 'nitoil Kingdom 
Malta 
Germany 
Portugal 
Slovenia 
Austria 
Greece 
Italy 
France 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Denmark 
Spain 
Sweden 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Czech Republic 
Poland 
Latvia 
Hstonia 
Slovakia 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
r 2J572 
12432 
18660 
11467 
12734 
19652 
12862 
16095 
16600 
17575 
17876 
15780 
16812 
13464 
15487 
17430 
30675 
8873 
5756 
4957 
5819 
5719 
6397 
4845 
Per capita 
GDP (EUR PPP) 
2004 
19648.4 
26455.5 
15988 
24903.2 
16086.1 
17919.8 
27666.2 
18244.6 
23094.9 
24145.8 
26759.1 
27945.9 
24834.2 
26771.8 
21658.2 
25865.3 
30413.9 
53977.6 
16171.3 
10908.4 
9775.1 
11977.5 
12196.2 
13751.3 
10981.5 
Ratio of Income to GDP 
.853 1 
.8L54 
.7776 
.7493 
.7129 
.7106 
.7103 
.7050 
.6969 
.6875 
.6568 
.6397 
.6354 
.6280 
.6217 
.5988 
.5731 
.5683 
.5487 
.5277 
.M)71 
.4858 
.4689 
.4652 
.4412 
Table 6.5. Differential labor exploitation in the EU. A10 countries highlighted. Source: Eurostat. 
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For the EU as a whole, these vast economic differences between the EU15 and the 
A10 create the potential for the development of a nationality-linked division of labor 
which not only perpetuates unequal development between the two regions (Amin 1977), 
but also risks mapping A10 nationals as the EU's permanent second-class citizens. This 
danger is enhanced by the process of EU accession itself, in which barriers to the 
mobility of goods and capital are removed long before the implementation of labor 
mobility. In fact, as the next section will show, the 2004 EU accession process was 
centrally concerned with establishing EU standards of government in order to ensure a 
stable and predictable environment for the penetration of capital from the EU15. 
Incorporating Eastern Europe 
The EU's export of governmentality into Eastern Europe was one of the most 
publicized and politicized aspects of the 2004 EU expansion. Beginning with the 
Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, the European Council indicated that candidate countries 
would first be required to distance themselves from the socialist system before joining the 
EU by meeting specific economic, political and social requirements. These criteria 
included "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and the protection of minorities, the existence of a market economy as 
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union.5" 
For a potential member state, the lengthy process of EU accession begins with the 
formation of an "association agreement," which indicates the state's willingness to 
implement EU standards. The state then moves on to develop an "accession partnership" 
5
 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, Point 7, Para. A(iii). 
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outlining the reforms necessary to become a member. Once the partnership agreement is 
concluded, a candidate country enters into accession negotiations, which detail the steps 
and actions for the implementation of these reforms and eventually results in the 
finalization and ratification of an accession treaty. 
The common description of the EU accession negotiations as a "structured 
dialog" reveals its clearly pedagogical theme, as applicant countries are gradually 
disciplined into behaving in a manner satisfactory for an EU member state. One of the 
most arduous obstacles for a candidate country to overcome is the requirement to modify 
its national law to incorporate the entirety of the acquis communitaire-the collective 
body of EU law and regulations that consist of at least 80,000 to 100,000 pages of text.6 
This process normally takes several years (a little over 4 14 in Poland) of accession 
negotiations, as candidate countries gradually make their way through each of the acquis' 
topical chapters (31 for the 2004 accession countries, 35 today). In contrast to earlier 
enlargements, when countries were allowed to "opt out" of some aspects of the EU 
treaties, such as the European Monetary Union (EMU) or the Schengen Agreement, the 
2004 accession countries were obligated to join both institutions, and as a result to 
commit to the adoption the Euro and the implementation of the EU's common border and 
visa polices. Finally, as potential member states, all candidate countries were also 
required to accept the supremacy of EU law.7 
6
 After examining the EU's legal database, the think-tank Open Europe concluded that figure is closer to 
170,000 pages of active text (in English) (Open Europe 2007). 
7
 This principle is not codified in the treaties, but established by ECJ rulings, beginning with the Costa vs. 
ENEL ruling on July 15, 1964 (Case no. 6/64). 
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This importation of EU governmentality was a powerful normalizing force for the 
2004 accession countries. With the exception of some minor concessions, the accession 
negotiations were highly one-sided, with applicant countries primarily negotiating how 
fast they would implement the acquis, and how much less of the EU's benefits they 
would receive in comparison to the EU15,9 rather than the content of these laws and 
policies. In this regard, the EU accession process closely resembles the 19th century 
practice of utilizing "standards of civilization," such as the efficient operation of a state 
bureaucracy and legal system, the capacity for self defense, and the ability to fulfill the 
obligations of international diplomacy, as a way to determine the nature of the 
relationship between European and non-European states (Behr 2007:243-244, cf. Gong 
1984). These standards of civilization helped justify the conclusion of "unequal treaties," 
in which non-European states were required to grant unreciprocated rights to foreign 
nationals and the officials of foreign governments (Behr 2007:244). Inequalities were 
supposed to be gradually reduced in subsequent agreements, as the non-European state 
became more modernized and more integrated in international society (Behr 2007:244). 
The stepwise EU accession process is essentially a series of progressively less 
unequal treaties, by which non-EU populations are integrated into EU markets, 
bureaucratic processes, and disciplinary regimes long before they gain any rights within 
these structures of power. In exchange for the potential advantages of EU accession, 
candidate countries must for the most part accept and implement a pre-determined 
governing framework shaped by the goals and interests of other nation-states (i.e. the 
8
 For example, Poland negotiated a transitional period limiting property purchases by EU15 nationals. 
9
 These lesser benefits included the up to seven-year transitional limits placed on the labor mobility of A8 
citizens, and the 10-year phasing-in of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies for the A10 starting at 
25% of EU15 levels in 2004. 
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current EU member states). According to Borocz and Sarkar, "such structural conditions 
of dependence on a foreign authority for laws and regulations make the situation of East 
European applicant states somewhat similar to that of'dependencies', 'protectorates' and 
a form of externally supervised government reminiscent of the history of colonial 
empires' 'indirect rule'" (2005:158-159). 
While it should be pointed out that the imposition of EU governmentality most 
resembles an imperial arrangement before an applicant country gains formal power 
within the EU's institutions, the normalizing aspects of EU governmentality continue 
even after accession. In 2000-2006, 1252 cases were brought against EU member states 
in the European Court of Justice (EC J) for failing to meet treaty obligations. Of the 111 
of these cases concluded in 2006, the court judged that an infringement occurred in 103 
(93%) (ECJ 2007:86,92). If a state still fails to comply after a ruling has been made, a 
penalty payment can be imposed on the member state (Art. 228 of the EC Treaty), 
although this has only occurred on three occasions.10 
The ratification process of new EU treaties also regularly exhibits a coercive 
element within EU governmentality, as is most clearly demonstrated on the occasions 
when a member state rejected a proposed treaty. All EU treaties require unanimous 
ratification by the member states, but as is shown in Table 6.6, in the case of almost every 
major treaty since the Single European Act, one member state has failed to ratify. With 
the exception of the Constitutional Treaty, which failed in two countries, a second vote 
was held— usually after a break for more intensive campaigning—on exactly or essentially 
the same treaty, and in each case the second vote proved successful. Even in the case of 
10
 For a detailed description of the financial penalties imposed on member states by the ECJ, see European 
Commission Memo/05/482. In the extreme case of a "serious and persistent breach" of EU principles, it is 
also theoretically possible to suspend a member state's Treaty rights under Art. 309 of the EC Treaty. 
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the Lisbon Treaty, most estimates agree that about 90% the Constitutional Treaty has 
been retained. In order to guarantee the Lisbon Treaty's ratification, efforts were made 
throughout the EU to avoid popular referendums altogether (France ratified via 
parliament on February 14, 2008). This pattern of voting until the "right" answer is 
obtained not only undermines a sense of democracy in the EU, but also expresses the 
extent of the normalizing power of EU governmentality, in which it is extremely difficult 
for a single member state to dissent against a consensus of the other member states. 
Despite this, Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty in its only public referendum on June 
12,2008, and the Treaty's future status is presently unclear. 
1 l l ' i l l V 
Single European 
Act (1986) 
Maastricht 
Treaty (1992) 
Treaty of Nice 
(2001) 
Constitutional 
Treaty (2005) 
Lisbon Treaty 
(2008) 
KiTi-miiliim Isiils in 
Denmark 
Denmark 
Ireland 
France 
The Netherlands 
Ireland 
Result 
Fails in 
parliament 
(80 votes 
for, 75 
against) 
52% 
against 
53.87% 
against 
54.68% 
against 
61.54% 
against 
53.4% 
against 
Snl»>ci|iii'iit \ iitt-
Popular Referendum 
(1986) 
Second Referendum 
after addition of 
"Edinburgh 
Agreement11" (1993) 
Second referendum 
after national debate 
(2002) 
Renegotiated as 
Lisbon Treaty (2008) 
Renegotiated as 
Lisbon Treaty 
(2008). 
Undetermined as of 
July 1,2008 
Kl-Mlll 
56.2 % in 
favor 
57% in favor 
62.89% in 
favor 
Ratified by 
Parliament 
Expected to 
be ratified by 
parliament 
Table 6.6. Failed EU treaty referendums and subsequent re-voting. 
11
 The Edinburgh Agreement granted Denmark minor exceptions in four areas of the Maastricht Treaty 
including citizenship, economic and monetary union, defence policy, and justice and home affairs. 
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Euro-Orientalism 
Judging by the criteria of sustained funneling of value and export of 
governmentality, the EU appears to thoroughly exhibit the hallmarks of an imperial order. 
However, by extending EU citizenship and EU citizenship rights to citizens of the new 
member states, the EU treaties potentially diffuse this imperial dynamic by expanding its 
body politic concurrently with its political power (cf. Arendt 1968:15). Nevertheless, 
because economic inequality and the results of the accession negotiations made A10 
nationals subject to different citizenship regimes than citizens of the EU15 (See Chapter 
4), EU citizenship also became a mechanism of EU imperialism by helping reinforce a 
system of coloniality, or "Euro-orientalism," in which east European countries and 
populations are persistently mapped as inferior in the hierarchy of "Europeanness." 
The profound restructuring of economies and societies required by Eastern 
Europe's post-socialist "transformation" and reorientation toward the EU created many 
new opportunities for (re)inscribing "Other-ness" within, and especially between, 
national societies (Buchowski 2006 ). In fact, a significant component of the 2004 EU 
accession process can be read as a systematic form of orientalization aimed at "putting 
down and putting off the applicant countries (Borosz and Kovacs 2001, Kovacs 2001).n 
During the accession process, the EU established its authority vis-a-vis Eastern Europe 
by exercising the power of evaluation over, and the production of knowledge about, the 
applicant countries—both central aspects of orientalizing discourse (Sher 2001:242- 243, 
Kovacs 2001:199-200). Said writes, "Knowledge of the Orient, because it is generated 
12
 The orientalizing tendencies of the 2004 accession negotiations have been demonstrated in several 
studies of documents produced by the European Commission about the applicant countries, such as the 
1997 European Commission opinions on the candidate counties (Kovacs and Kabachnik 2001, Borosz 
2001), and the Commission's 1998 and 1999 follow-up reports (Kovacs 2001). 
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out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world" (Said 1979:40). 
For the EU, this production of knowledge took the form of a "topos of discovery" that 
operated as part of the EU's more general strategy of making known the workings of its 
member states, their economies, and their populations (Borosz 2001:105, cf. Shore 
2000:31-32, Scott 1998). Europe was thus separated into the "Europe that [knows] 
things... and the other Europe that [waits] to become known," a conceptual division of 
the continent into a civilized "West" and an uncivilized "East" in need of discipline and 
domination (Wolff 1994:90,100), which has its origins in the Enlightenment, if not before 
(Wolff 1994, Tornquist-Plewa 2002, Strath 2000). 
The idea of "Europe" has never been "a stable, sovereign, autonomous object but 
exists only in historical relations and fields of power.. .The relationship of the European 
to this entity is a form of identification that works simultaneously as a strategy of self-
representation and a device of power. Such a strategy has always been as dependant on 
the externalization or creation of negative others as on the internal dynamics of group 
formation" (Borneman & Fowler 1997:487). Within the EU, multiple levels of 
"otherness" have been fostered and organized by its policies into a widespread hierarchy 
of nations and nationalities. In general terms, this hierarchical geography places nation-
states on different tiers of "European-ness," depending on how fully they have accepted 
and internalized the institutions, governing practices, and values of the EU. At the top of 
the hierarchy is a core of "European countries" represented by the 15 "old" member 
states. Next are the "partially European" countries represented by the twelve 2004 and 
2007 accession countries, followed first by a group of "potentially European" candidate 
countries such as Croatia and Turkey, then by countries in the European "neighborhood," 
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such as Ukraine and Belarus (as well as the Caspian Sea region, North Africa, and parts 
of the Middle East), and finally by countries excluded from the EU altogether (notably 
Russia). With each lower tier, nation-states and their citizens move from more 
"European" to more "non-European," from greater EU inclusion to greater exclusion, and 
are empowered with an ever-diminishing opportunity for incorporation within the EU's 
practices of citizenship14 (See Chapters 4 & 5). This locational subjectivity has become a 
core feature of EU citizenship as well as a new and naturalized form of orientalism. 
As recent newcomers to the EU, Slubice residents were particularly cognizant of 
their location on the EU's second tier, and frequently referenced their Europeanness as a 
way of differentiating themselves both from their non-European neighbors and from their 
own non-European (i.e. socialist) past. In Slubice, the Soviet Union—often represented 
synecdochically by Russia—fills the space of a non-European Other that prevented Poland 
from occupying its rightful place in Europe. Arek, a Slubice electronics technician, 
expressed this position as he explained his opinion on Poland's EU accession, "We were 
always in Europe, like France, Germany—not Russia—a narrow group of countries that 
created Europe for 2000 years. After the communist occupation—and I can call it that—it 
is like returning home, [there was] no other way out. For the old EU, it was admitting 
Poland was always in [Europe]. It was a recognition of us." Iwona, a Slubice Masters of 
European Studies student, also indexed Russia as non-European, "I think [EU accession] 
was a very important step for Poland. After World War II, Poland was very isolated from 
13
 See also Balibar (2004:169) for a discussion hierarchy in Europe using the concept of "concentric 
circles" radiating from a core of "European" countries. 
14
 In a more detailed analysis, each category could probably be further broken down into ranked 
subcategories. For example, Greece and Portugal have long been economically (and politically) 
problematic to the "core" European states, and share many characteristics with the new member states. 
Likewise, the new member states are "integrating" with EU standards at different speeds, and the EU and 
its member states support a myriad of policies and "partnerships" with non-EU countries. The current 
ambiguity in the EU's relationship with Ukraine is but one example that deserves detailed attention. 
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Europe. Before the war it was on [the European] side and not the Russian side. It was 
important, because before the EU, it seemed all the time that [Poland] was a country that 
belonged to the former state of Russia [i.e. the Soviet Union], now it is seen as a western 
country. That is important for Poland." 
Declarations of "Europeanness" like these are equal parts assertion and 
identification, designed to both justify one's place within the EU, and avoid classification 
with an externalized and inferiorized Other outside of the EU's borders. At the same 
time, my correspondents also acknowledged a not quite European subjectivity, a second-
tier status resulting directly from a kind of essentialized pathology deriving from 
socialism and the socialist experience (cf. Dunn 2004a, Asher 2003). Given that the EU 
and its institutions developed during the Cold War not only in opposition to, but also in 
concert with, the institutions of the Soviet Bloc, the continued use of the socialist past as 
Other is perhaps unsurprising. 
The Local Orient 
Several authors have made detailed interventions applying the concept of 
orientalism to Europe's media, intellectual, and historiographic discourses, particularly in 
relation to Europe's East/West divide (Melegh 2006, Todorova 2005, Wolff 1994), the 
philosophic location of the Balkans (Todorova 1997, Bakic-Hayden 1995, Bakic-Hayden 
and Hayden 1992), and the expansion of the EU into post-socialist Europe (Borosz and 
Kovacs 2001, Buchowski 2006, Melegh 2006). These studies identify several recurrent 
themes in discourses about an orientalized Other: economic backwardness, temporal lag, 
social inequality and civilizational inferiority. Each of these themes was clearly visible in 
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SJubice/Frankfurt, as residents of the cities participated in a dynamic process of locating 
and contesting both cities' hierarchical position relative not only to one another, but also 
to the EU's wider system of coloniality. 
Economic Asymmetry 
The significant financial and material differences between post-socialist Eastern 
Europe and the "old" EU member states reinforce hierarchical relationships within the 
EU and between EU member and non-member states. As is shown in Table 6.7, 
Germany's 2005 median income was almost four times higher than Poland's, and its 
2004 per capita GDP was more than double. A similar difference occurs at the regional 
level between Brandenburg and Lubuskie, where the GDP on the German side of the 
border is almost twice the level of the Polish side, even though both regions have lower 
levels than their respective national averages. Expanded to include Ukraine, this pattern 
is replicated in the United Nation's Human Development Index (HDI), a composite 
measure of relative wealth, life expectancy, and education, in which Germany (21) ranks 
16 places higher than Poland (37) and Poland ranks 40 places higher than Ukraine (77) 
(Table 6.8). Poles also appear to suffer more material deprivation than Germans, have 
more difficulty paying bills, and have a higher at risk of poverty rate, as is demonstrated 
in Table 6.9 (comparable date was not available for Ukraine). 
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i'cr capiiu GDI' 
(PPP in Euro, 
2004) 
GDP (PPP) as a 
percentage of the EU 
average (2004) 
Median Income 
(PPS in Euro, 
2005) 
F.U27 
21502.9 
100.0 
N/A 
Germany 
"M<)()1 •> 
115.8 
16482 
Brandenburg 
l " ( U (•, 
81.4 
N/A 
Poland 
109US.4 
50.7 
4796 
Luhiiskie 
9704.9 
45.4 
N/A 
Table 6.7: Economic Asymmetry between Poland and Germany. Source: Eurostat 
(.iTiiKinv I'dhinil I kniim-
2004 HDI Value 
Maximum value =1.0 
Worldwide Rank (out of 177) 
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Table 6.8: 2004 United Nations Human Development Index and Component Variables for 
Germany, Poland and Ukraine. Source: United Nations Development Programme (2006). 
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second day if desired 
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doors, or floors 
Households that are damp or have 
leaks 
Households lacking an indoor 
flushing toilet 
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21% 
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N/A 
6% 
N/A 
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Table 6.9: Material deprivation in Poland and Germany, 2003. Source: 
Eurostat (2005) 
While the broad measures of wealth and quality of life contained in this type of 
aggregate data do not tell the whole story about differences between particular places, it 
does seem that as a general rule, when moving between Ukraine, Poland, and Germany, 
people are wealthier, live longer, and have less material deprivation the further west they 
reside. Not surprisingly, relative rank in the European hierarchy also correlates with 
relative economic wealth. Residents of Frankfurt and Slubice (which includes many 
Ukrainian nationals) readily observe these economic asymmetries, and they are extremely 
important to the construction of everyday forms of difference. 
For residents of Slubice, the routine experience of Frankfurt itself is a powerful 
example of this difference as well as the economic potential that the EU accession might 
Page 173 
provide. Having enjoyed the benefit of large-scale transfer payments from West 
Germany—payments that accounted for up to one-third of East Germany's consumption 
and investment expenditures (Dascher 2003:11)—Frankfurt often appears less "socialist," 
more affluent, more modern, and more "colorful" than Slubice (cf. Galbraith 2004:63). 
Although the gap is gradually diminishing, this difference in appearances makes it easy 
for Slubice to seem "inferior in space and behind in time" (Borneman 1998:110), despite 
the fact that the cities share endemic problems of economic stagnation and chronically 
high unemployment.15 
For many residents of Slubice, asymmetries of wealth translate into feelings of 
marginalization and second-class status in the workplace, and are experiences that 
profoundly affect their sense of cultural citizenship within the EU, a consequence that is 
hardly surprising given the EU's emphasis on economic viability in its citizenship 
practices (See Chapters 1, 4 & 5). When I asked his opinion about Poland joining the 
EU, Marek, a truck driver from Slubice, replied: 
We [Poland] didn't have any way out. I think we are still like Negroes, 
like slaves. There is no industry here. Now we can go somewhere in 
Europe [to work], but the same countries don't open [their labor markets] 
and it is bad for Polish citizens. Lots of people founded "Polish" firms 
(firms that were created to circumvent national labor restrictions by hiring 
East European workers "locally" for lower wages, even though they were 
actually working in another country). I work for a big firm--I don't want 
to say which one—and we were all hired on Polish conditions and 
15
 18.4% in Brandenburg and 23.2% in Lubuskie in 2004 (this level gave Lubuskie the eighth highest 
unemployment level of all EU regions in 2004) (Eurostat 2005) 
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[therefore] work for half price. For example, a driver from Belgium has 
weekends at home, and gets 2000 EUR [a month], I work all month with 
no weekends off and get 1200 EUR. So [we] drivers fight amongst 
ourselves. This is why [we are] like slaves: [the] poor conditions. 
Andrzej, a German teacher in Slubice, also pointed out the importance of economics and 
personal wealth to identification with the EU. When I asked him if he considered himself 
more Polish or more European, he said: 
[That's] a very interesting question... I decide here economically. First, I 
am Polish, and then European. [AA: Why?] Money I think. Not all nations 
in the EU have the same [incomes], the same economic standard. And 
often I feel like a poor relation. And my nation is very proud of its 
history, and all I know [is] we must be patient. But the relation between 
the old European Union nations and us has changed, and every year the 
situation is better, [but] the process needs time. I understand that. 
Temporal Lag 
As Andrzej observed, time and temporality are central to discourses of 
orientalization within the EU. The year by year progression towards "Europe" that 
Andzej experienced is one aspect of a widespread "denial of coevalness" between the 
EU15 and the A10 which contributes to a sense of temporal and spatial distance that is 
often central to the constitution of the Other (Fabian 1983:2-35). This "chronic 
allochronism," is a regular feature of western historiography, "in which the non-western 
world lives in another time" and Eastern Europe is portrayed as perpetually lagging 
Page 175 
behind the West in the historical processes of nationalism, industrialization, 
modernization, and economic development (Todorova 2005:145,147). 
The EU's asymmetrical incorporation of its post-socialist member states therefore 
represents a contemporary iteration of a structural pattern of East European 
"backwardness" relative to Western Europe that originated with agrarian reforms in the 
16th and 17th centuries, if not earlier (Chirot 1989). The cause of this backwardness is 
routinely viewed as external. With the exception of Turkey, "for the rest of eastern 
Europe, it is Ottoman or Russian rule or communism, as imposed by the Soviet Union, 
that has severed Eastern Europe from what is often described as its own evolution within 
its own larger organic space: Europe. The lag is depicted as an artificial one, having 
delayed one's own evolution. In a word, the acceleration of time in the future, the 
catching up, is with one's own 'what might have been.'" (Todorova 2005:160). The 
"cost" of communism's intervention in Eastern Europe can be subsequently evaluated in 
terms of temporal distance from "Europe." An International Monetary Fund working 
paper entitled, "How Far is Eastern Europe from Brussels?" typified this stance by 
concluding: "The cost of the socialist experiment—which lasted roughly two 
generations—was, in terms of lost income, equivalent to about one generation" (Fischer, 
Sahay and Vegh 1998:35). In Poland, the authors estimate that it will take about 24 years 
to "make up" this lost time (Fischer, Sahay and Vegh 1998:34). 
Conclusions like these not only devalue 45 years of Eastern Europe's history as 
merely an ill-conceived "experiment," they also deny Eastern Europe a common 
modernity with the West (cf. Dunn 2004). Isabella, a Romanian student living in 
Frankfurt, was one of the last of the "socialist experiment's" second generation. 
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However, she described even her brief experience with Romania's communist past as a 
hindrance to her self-actualization as a European: "I have a Dutch friend, who said, 'I 
was born a European.' I can't say that, but I want to be acculturated. We had very 
different experiences, [Romanians] can never reach the [EU members]. [There is] a gap 
between [the two] mentalities [because of communism]. For me, communism ended 
when I was 7, so I had a basic indoctrination in communism." The fact that Isabella, who 
was living abroad, spoke several languages, and was participating in the EU-sponsored 
Erasmus student exchange program, still did not feel European almost twenty years after 
the end of communism demonstrates how powerful the temporal distancing between 
Eastern and Western Europe remains. 
The time a country spends between its application for accession and full EU 
membership—when all "transitional" agreements are completed—might therefore be 
understood as a liminal period: a temporal and transitional rite of passage during which 
an applicant country and its citizens are gradually transformed from the status of non-
European to—if not fully European—European enough to join the community of EU 
member states and EU citizens (Borosz 2001:62, cf. Gennep 1960:10-11, V. Turner 
1967:93-110). In Poland, which applied for membership in 1994, and will have the final 
restrictions on its citizens' labor mobility lifted in 2011, this period will have lasted 17 
years. The potential effect of this waiting time should not be underestimated. "The 
longer the waiting time between the onset of 'eastern enlargement' and the completion of 
full accession, the more likely that the attendant 'interim' imbalances [e.g. in economic 
and political power] will become intrinsic to the very structures of these societies, 
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especially since such imbalances are the hallmark of the east European history of 
capitalism" (Borocz and Sarkar 2005:158). 
Within the subjectivity of Slubice residents, allochronism and the denial of 
coevalness have been internalized, as is demonstrated through the routinized use of 
future-oriented statements about Poland's progress within the EU. Typically framed as a 
judgment about when "it will get better," these statements represent Slubice residents as 
citizens from a time somewhere behind their contemporaries in the EU15. When I asked 
her what she thought about Poland's EU accession, Magda, a member of a Slubice 
NGO's staff, explained, "It is good idea, we [Poland] have only two ways: the EU, or 
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The EU is the better way I think. Now we live worse than 
one year ago, but in four or five years I think it will be better." Michal, a customs officer, 
was less optimistic, "I think [Poland's EU 
accession] is good, and the effects will be seen 
in 10-15 years . . . In 10-15 years there will be 
changes for individual citizens." Adam, a 
Slubice secondary student, concurred, "For all 
of Poland, [EU accession] is better, but for 
some people, [it's worse since] they don't 
have a job because [their] firm closed... In 10 
years perhaps it will be better." 
The idea that a future will be better 
was a central argument of the pro-EU 
campaign preceding Poland's accession vote 
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Fig. 6.1: The farmer who is voting yes 
to the EU. 
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in 2003, and was particularly emphasized by one government-sponsored advertising 
campaign. These posters had a standard format, with each showing a picture of an 
archetypical representative of a segment of the Polish population, and a quote attributed 
to that person saying, "I vote yes, because..." (Tak glosuje, bo). A mother with her 
child: "Because our world can be better" (bo nasz swiat moze bye lepszy). A 
businessman: "Because I know what to do so that it will be better" (bo wiem, co zrobic 
zeby bylo lepiej). A farmer: "Because a good farmer plans for the future" (bo dobry 
gospodarz mysli na przyszlosc) (Fig. 6.1). Each of these advertisements emphasized the 
better and more perfect future that could be achieved through EU accession. This 
positive outlook is widespread in Poland. According to the 2005 Eurobarometer survey, 
42% of Poles expect their personal situation will be better in five years (33% said the 
same, 13% worse), despite the fact that 40% said their lives today are worse than five 
years ago (30% said better, 27% the same)16 (Eurobarometer 2006:13-14). 
The comparison of today to a better future in the EU not only reinforces temporal 
distance from the EU, but also implies an economic and social hierarchy in which 
"catching up" is necessary and—now that Poland is in the EU—a foregone conclusion. 
With the EU cognitively mapped in such a way that it represents a civilizational apex, the 
implication of refusing to emerge from socialism's shadow and not joining would be 
tantamount to relegation to the uncivilized world. Ania, a teacher in Slubice, represented 
this argument by referencing a colloquial expression of temporality to describe her take 
on EU accession: "I think it is good because [otherwise] we [Poland] would be '100 years 
In Germany, 25% of people surveyed expect their personal situation will be better in five years, 49% the 
same, and 23% worse. 35% said their lives today are worse than five years ago, 25% said better, and 35% 
said worse. 
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behind the Africans' (Sto lat za Murzynami )—third world." While I doubt that she 
meant it exactly in this way, Ania's statement reveals an important irony of Poland's 
position in the EU, in that, Poland must accept a colonization of sorts by the EU in order 
to avoid the fate of Europe's past colonies. It is better to be a second-class citizen of the 
EU than to be externalized from it. 
Nesting Orientalisms 
With the EU and the Soviet Union anchoring opposite ends of the "European" 
spectrum, another central aspect of orientalist discourse in Slubice concentrates on 
locating the cities' places within this hierarchy. This discourse follows a pattern of 
differentiation described by Bakic-Hayden as "nesting orientalisms," in which the 
original dichotomy of Orientalism is reproduced (and re-reproduced) in a graduated 
fashion of ever finer distinctions, so that places and peoples are perceived to be located 
on a ranked scale of "Eastern-ness" or "Otherness," relative to one's own society (Bakic-
Hayden 1995:918). In Slubice/Frankfurt, this hierarchy follows a perceived distance 
from the Russian Empire or Soviet Union, and is expanded across Germany and Poland 
in a generalized pattern so that more westward regions are viewed as more advanced or 
"European" than eastern regions. Put simply, West Germany is perceived as the most 
European, followed by East Germany, Western Poland, Eastern Poland, and finally 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. 
Third country nationals seem to have felt this pattern particularly acutely (See 
Chapter 5). Olena, a student from Russia, summarized this hierarchy, "In our [Russians'] 
17
 Literally, "100 years behind the negroes." In Poland, which has an insignificant African population and 
no history of slavery or colonialism in Africa, this statement is not as racially and politically charged—or as 
offensive—as it might be in the American context. 
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understanding, Germany is Europe. Poland is not-so-Europe—it is closer to us. In 
Belarus, Poland looks like Europe. Russia is definitely not Europe." Aleksandra, a 
Ukrainian secondary school teacher, also experienced a citizenship-based social hierarchy 
in Slubice: "Poles say that Germans have a superiority complex, but Poles definitely have 
a superiority complex toward Ukraine. Maybe [here] in the west [of Poland] [it] is better 
because they don't know as many Ukrainians. If someone drinks, fights, lies or isn't 
reliable, [Poles] say they are Ukrainian. [When] the grandparents of a friend [of mine] 
argue, [they] say to each other "you are a Ukrainian" [Poles] think [Ukraine] is Third 
World and won't catch up." 
The idea that a "Russian" or "Soviet" social mentality inhibits civilizational 
growth and progress forms the basis for a second form of nesting orientalism in Poland. 
In this case, contemporary social and political variations are explained by perceived 
differences in the 19 century governing regimes, social orders, and institutions put in 
place and administered by Prussia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russia, after the 
completion of the final partition of Poland in 1795. A particular contrast is routinely 
drawn between the enlightened" "western" powers and the more authoritarian Russian 
Empire. 
For example, after the first round of the 2005 presidential election, Gazeta 
Wyborcza ran a brief article illustrating differences in the district (powiat)-\evel voting 
results the Wielkopolska voivodship. The article explained that the districts voting for 
Donald Tusk {Platforma Obywatelska—Citizens' Platform), a "progressive" center-left, 
economically liberal, and pro-EU candidate, were located in the Prussian partition, while 
the districts voting for the conservative, populist, and Euroskeptic Andzej Lepper 
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(Samobrona—Self Defense Party), were located in the Russian-controlled Congress 
Kingdom (created at the Congress of Vienna in 1815) (Bojarski 2005). The East-West 
political divide was also strikingly apparent in the final-round election results, when Tusk 
won much of western and northern Poland while Lech Kaczynski (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwosc —Law and Justice Party), his more economically and socially 
conservative, and less enthusiastically pro-EU rival, won the vote in the east and south as 
well as the overall election (Kublik 2005). The same pattern was similarly demonstrated 
in the 2003 EU accession referendum, when support for the EU was highest in the west 
and north, although the referendum passed in almost every powiat (Gazeta Wyborcza 
2003). 
In its analysis of Poland's 2005 election, The Economist (2005:52) also fell back 
on Partitions-based orientalism to explain the results: 
It is hardly news that Poland's east and south-east—much of which used to 
be part of Russia—are poor and conservative, while the north and west— 
formerly part of Germany—are more liberal and open to change... In the 
latest election, voting patterns followed the dictates of history and 
geography more closely than ever and in ways that were not always 
obvious. Most of the families who now live in the ex-German territories 
originate from the east, and only moved west after borders were redrawn 
in 1945. But that does not make them conservative now: life in formerly 
German lands, where the infrastructure is good and contact with 
westerners frequent, has made people more open to change. 
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The implications of both the Gazeta Wyborcza and The Economist articles are clear. 
First, the East continues to be held back from becoming more progressive and European 
by the lingering effects of Russia's influence. Not only that, the differences between the 
"German West" and "Russian East" are portrayed as so stark that even 60 years after the 
shift in the border, the leftovers of German civilization converted conservative settlers 
from the East into liberals. 
Given the complexity of population movements in Poland after World War II, in 
which the majority of families settling in the "Recovered Territories," did not, in fact, 
come from the "East"18 (Gruchman, et. al 1959 143-145, cf. Szaz 1960:133), as well as 
the almost 90 intervening years since Poland's reemergence as an independent state in 
1918, it would seem that a Partitions-based explanation for political difference in 2005 is 
highly suspect if not analytically meaningless. The observed election results probably 
have much more to do with regional variations in age, education, and population density, 
with Tusk garnering higher support among people under age forty, individuals with a 
high level of education, and in cities over 50,000 people (Kochanowicz 2005). 
Nevertheless, because the German/Russian division corresponds with broader 
orientalizing discourses in which Germany is at the core of Europe and Russia is at the 
periphery, the historical explanation carries a great deal of rhetorical power for 
explaining and asserting why Poland's west is more "progressive" and "European" than 
its east. 
Only about 28% of the "Recovered Territories'" residents in 1950 were repatriated from lands annexed 
by the Soviet Union. About 20% were pre-war inhabitants of the region, and about 49% arrived from 
within Poland's post-World War II boundaries. The remaining 3% were repatriated from elsewhere abroad 
(primarily France and Germany) (Gruchman, et. al 1959:144). 
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Reclaiming value 
For residents of Slubice, asserting moral or social superiority over residents of 
Frankfurt was often even more important than claiming a higher level of European-ness 
compared to eastern Poland. By shifting the comparison to social and ethical values, 
such as "hospitality" or "friendliness"—qualities that are, as a rule, highly esteemed in 
Poland (cf. Holly, et. al. 2003:825)--Slubice residents attempted to create a counter-
narrative to the prevailing orientalist discourse between East Germany and Poland as a 
way of reclaiming some of the status lost due to the economic asymmetry between the 
two cities. In these narratives, Slubice residents regularly utilized discourses that 
portrayed East Germans as inferior to West Germans, and are similar to German forms of 
nesting orientalism, which were established and reinforced by the asymmetrical processes 
of reunification (cf. Berdahl 1999, Borneman 1992,1993, 1998). 
Michal, a Slubice customs officer, and his wife Maja, an educational 
administrator, used a vocabulary of social values while discussing the difference in 
attitudes between East and West Germans: 
Michal: In the Western part of Germany, people are more normal. 
Here [in Frankfurt] they are different, the Germans are evil, naughty, 
jealous, envious—they feel [they are] better than Poles. We used to think 
all Germans were like [in Frankfurt], but we met a couple who live near 
the French border, and they were very friendly and wanted to have fun, to 
go on a tour in Poland—to Mazuria (a region in northeast Poland known 
for its lakes). In the western part of Germany you can see [the difference] 
on the street, they are more helpful and friendly. 
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Maja: Sometimes [here] they act like they don't understand you. 
Michal: The attitude has changed a lot since 15 years ago, but it 
still lacks a lot. 
Maja: Once the older generation dies, the younger people who 
participate in [cooperative] projects will change the attitude. 
Michal: Sometimes you meet people here in Frankfurt [with a 
more positive attitude] like this, but they are the exception. We [Poles] say 
they must be baby born in a family with someone from a Slavic family--
Too friendly for a German. 
Maja: [Too friendly for] a "typisch Deutsch" (typical German). . 
.We had a good experience at a wedding in Warsaw for two students from 
Viadrina University, one polish and one German. The wedding had lots of 
people from Germany, mixed [with Poles]. We met a couple that were 
Polish but had lived in Germany, and spoke both Polish and German, and 
also a German couple who were very tense. They were closed, didn't 
dance, and the woman asked what the [banquet] dishes were. These were 
"typisch Deutsch" the [bride also said so] -I was surprised that the people 
who live in Germany also differentiate. 
Bartosz, a social services worker, had a similar perception: 
"I was in Frankfurt(Main), [and] I was in Bavaria. I think people in West 
Germany are friendlier than in the East. I feel better in West Germany than 
in East Germany. [AA: Is there anything specific that makes you say 
that?] I think people in the West live more calmly than people in the East. 
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People from East Germany think they are treated worse than people in the 
West. People from the west call them "Ossi" and it offends them, and 
they [Wessis] make fun of them [Ossis] and laugh at them. 
By claiming affinity with West Germans, who not only occupy the apex of the EU's 
economic and social status hierarchies, but also, as citizens of a founding member of the 
EU, have an unassailable European pedigree, Slubice residents used narratives like these 
not only to assert their social superiority over East Germans from Frankfurt, but also to 
demonstrate a values-based acceptance of their status as Europeans. 
Judgments about the relative character of East Germans also fit into larger ethical 
narratives about contemporary progress and decline which residents of Slubice used to 
talk about life in the EU (Armbruster et. al. 2003, cf. Galasihska 2003:398,400). In this 
case, the socialist past and its "everyday moral communities" is rehabilitated for use as a 
yardstick to evaluate and critique the present (Hann 2002:10, cf. Asher 2003,Dunn 
2004a), as is shown by the following composite narrative constructed from several of my 
correspondents: 
When I was 17, [Slubice] it was a sad city, a small, sad communist city. 
I traveled the area, and all small cities looked the same, gray and sad, it 
was a sad time.. .when communism fell, changes burst forth rapidly 
(Arek, an electronics technician). 
[Slubice has changed,] a lot for the better, but it started in 1989. 
It used to be grayer, sadder. The only plus was that people had jobs, but 
that didn't mean they worked, [only that] they went to work. [During 
socialism,] Frankfurt looked better than Slubice. Today, Slubice looks 
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better than Frankfurt. Frankfurt is now sad and empty. Maybe it was 
because our shops were empty [then]. Frankfurt is sad, there are hardly 
any people around. Slubice is always full of people (Iza, an English 
teacher). 
People take better care of [Slubice] now—new roads, new 
houses, new cafes—lots [of places] have been redecorated. At the time 
of the communist regime, everyone had a job and was well paid, maybe 
it wasn't beautiful, but... Comparing now to the time of the communist 
regime, back then new houses were built and people had a hope of 
having new houses, but they weren't beautiful. Now it is more beautiful, 
but unemployment is higher . . .That's why problems appear. People 
start drinking, stealing, smuggling drugs. Lots of prostitutes work here.. 
.Living expenses have gotten higher, everything is more expensive. 
Prices are almost the same as the West, but salaries are 10 times less! 
And the only plus is that I see that the town is prettier.. .It is difficult to 
say that something positive has happened (Maria, a teacher). 
There is too much development right now. I don't like this. The 
rush, people are in a hurry to achieve something. But do you really need 
this? I have never complained that I am in a bad situation. I've had 
enough (Tomik, a retired teacher and mechanic). 
Visually, [Slubice] is more beautiful. Speaking of places of 
work, there are no firms, no companies. Now a capitalistic approach can 
be seen toward people. . . People are not as nice to each other—people 
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don't visit as often, or meet in cafes. People used to meet in homes. 
Families visited more, talked more. [Today its] a hectic lifestyle. People 
always run after some job (Marek, a forwarding agent). 
Within these observations, aesthetic progress and improvement is juxtaposed with a deep 
ambivalence toward the realities of Poland's market economy, and an anxiety regarding 
potential social decline. While the EU is not foregrounded in the narratives above, my 
respondents' experience of the EU expansion and EU policies are central to 
contextualizing these comparative observations. 
First, EU funds are directly or indirectly responsible for many of Slubice's 
aesthetic improvements, in particular the renovation of three of its parks and its soccer 
stadium, which were part of a comprehensive 2003 urban renewal and cultural exchange 
project for Frankurt(Oder)/Slubice known as the "Europagarden" and funded in large part 
through the EU's regional development initiatives (specifically PHARE and INTERREG) 
(Urzaji Miejski w Slubicach 2003). Second, these observations contradict the implied 
promise of EU accession—at least as it was understood by most of my correspondents— 
that life would immediately get better. Instead, while the city improved on the surface, 
deeper economic problems, such as unemployment and low relative wages, persisted with 
few indications of near-term improvement, save the possibility of emigration to 
elsewhere in Poland or abroad (See Chapters 1 & 2). Furthermore, the asymmetries of 
wealth inherent to the EU and its economically-oriented conception of citizenship created 
a desire to "catch up" with more affluent member states, which continues to threaten 
local social ties and relations—two of the redeemable qualities of the socialist Other. 
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Although their socialist past often works to separate Slubice residents from their 
West European counterparts, in making sense of the EU's transnational projects of 
deterritorialization and integration, their lived experience with the socialism's similar 
goal of building a cooperative international economic and political system becomes a 
useful tool for evaluating the present. While most, if not all, of my correspondents would 
agree with the assessment that socialism was the cause of their current experience of 
economic "backwardness," they would not necessarily agree that socialism was 
civilizationally or ethically inferior to Western Europe, especially given the failure of the 
post-socialist state to secure employment or basic living wages for much of its 
population. In this way, discourses about social values are both a way of asserting a 
morally based claim to higher status within the EU hierarchy and a form of resistance to 
the more neo-liberal aspects of the EU's social model. 
Conclusions 
The EU's 2004 expansion was marked by the extension of hierarchy in 
economics, social practice, and governmentality. In each case, Eastern Europe and its 
citizens were placed in a second-class position relative to the older West European 
members. Despite EU policies and discourses that have orientalized Eastern Europe as 
economically backward, temporally behind, and socially inferior, the location where 
countries or individuals fall on the European/non-European continuum can also be 
relative and contestable, as is shown by the discourses of nesting orientalism my 
correspondents strategically employed to reclaim and assert their value within the EU. In 
theory at least, EU accession promises a further way for East European countries and 
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their citizens to improve their place in the European hierarchy, based on how completely 
they have normalized and internalized the EU's governing practices, policies, systems 
and institutions. 
Expansion is additionally a way through which the EU fulfills the last of Borosz's 
characteristics of imperial order: the projection of power onto the external environment. 
The promise of EU accession has been an extremely effective mode of foreign policy for 
successfully prevailing its will on other countries. Simultaneously, the EU's East 
European expansions in 2004 and 2007 further enhanced its status as an economic 
superpower, allowing it to exercise a commensurate degree of political power on the 
world stage. Since the scope of future EU expansions seem to have narrowed for the 
foreseeable future to the former Yugoslav republics and Turkey, the EU has recently 
shifted to the European Neighborhood Policy as an alternative method for projecting 
long-term power onto its neighbors. Established in 2004, the European Neighborhood 
Policy's stated purpose is to extend EU standards through economic, political, cultural, 
and security cooperation to its immediate neighbors via land or sea borders in North 
Africa the Middle East, and Eastern Europe with no pretense of eventual EU accession. 
Prior to the 2004 expansion, Borosz observed, "The essence of the European Union's 
strategy vis-a-vis the central and eastern European applicants is integration without 
inclusion: participation in the production systems, and appendance to the consumption 
markets of the EU corporations without the attendant political, economic, social and 
cultural rights conferred by European Union citizenship" (2001:108). While this remains 
partially true for the East European accession countries, it is perhaps even truer for the 
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countries in the European neighborhood, which, unlike the A10, have little or no hope of 
inclusion within the EU's power and policy-making structures. 
If the EU has exhibited many of the characteristics of imperial order vis-a-vis the 
A10, why, in contrast to most empires, is it still seen as a "good thing" by a majority of 
the population in its new member states?19 For the EU's supporters, its imperial aspects 
are regularly justified by arguments similar to Hobson's (1965 [1902]:294) concept of the 
"imperial trust," which asserts that an imperial policy can be acceptable and legitimate as 
long as it is (1) mutually beneficial for both parties (2) it advances the common good and 
"civilization" and (3) it contains some sort of democratic representation for all parties. 
One doesn't (and didn't prior to the 2004 expansion) have to look too far to find more or 
less these same arguments in print, both in the general media and in the academy. When 
I asked a class of (mostly Polish) Masters of European Studies students in Slubice if they 
would classify the EU as a colonial power, this was essentially the answer I received, as 
the class came to the consensus of "sure, the EU may be colonial, but that's okay 
because its better." There is a certain force to this argument. The EU's new member 
states do have representation in both the European Parliament and the European Council. 
In Poland, and elsewhere in the A10, wages and GDP are increasing, inflation is 
relatively low or in-check, and investment is on the rise. For those who are well 
educated, speak several languages, or are prepared to live abroad (see Chapter 2) the 
future does look promising. Nevertheless, the answer to the question of the whether or 
not the EU is enhancing the common good, and if life is, in fact, getting better, depends 
much on whom you ask. 
19
 54% in 2006. Another 36% remained neutral, saying EU membership was neither good nor bad 
(Eurobarometer 2 007b: 75). 
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For many Slubice residents, the economic realities of the EU accession moment 
were often disappointing, especially for the generation that brought about the end of 
socialism and ushered in the reorientation toward the EU. Near the end of my fieldwork, 
I discussed Poland's EU accession with my neighbors in Slubice, Magdalena and 
Czeslaw, who summarized the ambivalence of accession well as they simultaneously 
conveyed not only the lack of difference the EU has made for them personally, but also 
the hope they maintain for the future: 
Magdalena: Different people have different opinions, but ours is 
good. 
Czeslaw: For us at our age, lacking one year from 70, the EU 
generally won't give anything to me, or take anything from me. For 
young people it is a chance to get a job, because there is a chance for 
development. [But,] I don't mention broad state matters. If a farmer gets 
some funding to make his farm stronger, it matters. A person who goes to 
work in Germany, England or Ireland earns three times more. For this 
person everything is good and positive. It's a good prospective for him 
[motioning to his infant grandson sitting on my wife's lap]. 
Another of my correspondents put this mixed view of EU accession even more 
succinctly, saying, "We wanted a rose but got a tulip— it's a flower, but not the same." 
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Appendix A 
Buying Detergent: A Transnational Illustration 
Given a local context of multiple currencies, variable availability of goods, and 
regulatory standards that are incompletely harmonized (cf. Dunn 2004b), shopping in 
Frankfurt and Slubice quickly becomes a complicated affair. This complexity is well 
illustrated by the example of cross-border purchases of laundry detergent. Laundry 
detergent was one of the products that residents of Slubice most frequently purchased in 
Germany, and most of my correspondents assured me the detergents sold in Germany 
were higher quality than those sold in Poland, even when comparing detergents 
manufactured by the same company under the same brand name. Initially skeptical of 
this claim, I purchased a box of Ariel laundry detergent-a widely available brand 
manufactured by Procter & Gamble—from each side of the border for the purpose of 
comparison. 
The boxes of the two detergents immediately suggested differences in the targeted 
markets and consumers. The packaging of the Ariel from Germany was highly specific 
to the German market, including a map of Germany indicating different water properties 
and the corresponding dosages, as well as German-language only instructions. In 
contrast, the packaging from Poland was not country-specific, and gave instructions in 
language-free graphics. Both packages listed similar active ingredients, although the 
ranges of the proportions listed allowed for a great deal of variance in their contents.1 
Visually, the detergents were virtually indistinguishable, and although their 
fragrance was different, the critical factor seemed to be the detergents' concentrations. 
1
 The German packaging also indicates the relevant EC regulation on detergents (EC 648/2004, OJ L 
104/1) (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2004). 
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While the ingredient lists and dosage charts did not give enough information for a precise 
calculation, a rough estimate based on the dosages recommended for normally dirty 
laundry and a medium level of water hardness suggested that the German detergent was 
about 1.5 times stronger than the Polish version. Using this result to calculate prices in 
cleaning power per kilogram, in Frankfurt/Slubice the Polish detergent ranged from about 
the same cost to twice as expensive as the German detergent depending on where and in 
what quantity it is purchased. At least for this product, my formal calculations 
confirmed my correspondents' experience-based opinions, a result that is probably not 
atypical. According to Miller, consumers are surprisingly accurate in evaluating the 
complex equations of price, quantity and quality that determine value in shopping 
decisions (Miller 1998:53), and one quantitative study observed an in-store level of 
computational accuracy of 98%, compared to only 59% for similar questions on a formal 
test (Lave, Murtaugh, and de la Rocha 1984:82). 
The conclusion that concentration was a key difference between detergents sold in 
Poland and Germany was supported by the 2006 "Eurocompact" campaign instituted by 
the International Association for Soaps, Detergents and Maintenance Products (AISE)2 in 
cooperation with the European Commission. The campaign aimed to reduce the 
consumption of detergents in Central and Eastern Europe by 33% in weight and 25% in 
volume, primarily by concentrating detergents at a ratio of 3 kg of old detergent to 2 kg 
of new (or 1.5 to 1) (AISE 2006), and included an educational campaign consisting of 
posters, in-store displays, and television and print advertisements. Ariel was one of the 
2
 The AISE is the official representative body of the detergent industry in Europe, with a membership that 
includes 33 National Associations in 30 countries, and over 900 companies. 
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brands participating in this reformulation, and an updated version of its Polish packaging 
included the campaign's labels to differentiate the concentrated detergent. 
When I contacted the public relations offices of Procter & Gamble in Germany 
and Poland, both representatives confirmed that the composition of the detergents was 
different from country to country, but neither would indicate precisely what the 
differences were. The German representative simply indicated that legal regulations on 
ingredients and the needs of consumers vary from country to country, while the Polish 
representative stressed that the detergents in Poland and Germany are of the same 
efficiency and safety, and variations in the detergents arise from differences in laundry 
methods (e.g. the type of machine, the temperature of the wash, and the dosage of the 
detergent) and consumer needs, including the type of "dirtiness" of clothes and fragrance 
preferences—needs which she said Procter & Gamble thoroughly researches.4 She went 
on to assert that the belief detergent sold in Germany is better results from the prejudice 
embedded in individuals from the "previous" (i.e. socialist) system, "when practically 
everything from the West was better in reality," and that in a "blind" test both detergents 
would perform equally well.5 This response met with amusement and derision from 
several of my Polish correspondents, who first sarcastically remarked, "so now German 
dirt is different than Polish dirt" and then observed that most of the people they knew 
used German or western manufactured washing machines, so the laundry methods 
probably were not all that different. 
As this illustration shows, shopping in the local context of Frankfurt/Slubice takes 
place at the intersection of national and international regulatory and market spaces. Even 
3
 Procter & Gamble Service GmbH, personal communication with the author, April 27, 2006. 
4
 Procter & Gamble Dzial Konsumencki, personal communication with the author, April 26, 2006 
5
 Procter & Gamble Dzial Konsumencki, personal communication with the author, April 26, 2006 
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though the Polish detergent appears to be designed for, and aimed at, an international 
audience, it was viewed by Slubice consumers as a lesser product in comparison to the 
detergent marketed specifically to Germany. In this case, the Polish detergent was seen 
as part of the wrong type of international market, that is, a market outside of the "first 
world" which is less technologically advanced than Germany or the EU, and where 
second-rate goods can be sold. Consumers in Slubice sought to circumvent consuming in 
this inferior market by purchasing western-built washing machines and buying their 
detergents in Germany. By reformulating the detergents sold in Eastern Europe so that 
they more closely resemble concentrations in other EU countries, the Eurocompact 
campaign therefore tries to do for Poland what residents of Slubice have already been 
doing locally for years: more closely integrating the Polish and EU markets through 
consumption habits that impart individual shoppers with a more transnational and 
"European" sense of consumer identity. 
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